Pham Thuy Duong v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 250/2022 [2026] HKCFI 2390 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 250 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Connie Lee:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By Form 86 filed on 25 April 2022, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 8 April 2022 (the “Board’s Decision”). By that decision, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 2 August 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”), which had rejected her non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM). 2.The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision. It is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations and descriptions used in the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink[1] to which is included below, are also adopted herein. 3.The Applicant did not attend the oral hearing. Subsequent to the hearing, it has come to my attention that the Notice of Hearing issued by post was returned to the High Court with the indication “incomplete address”. However, it is the Applicant who has failed to discharge her duty to provide and update the Court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to her attention in a timely manner.[2] In any case, I have considered the merits of the Leave Application based on the materials available before me.[3] Discussion 4.Judicial review does not operate as a further avenue of appeal. The Leave Application operates as a “filtering” process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[4] In seeking to challenge the Board’s Decision, the Applicant ought to have clearly and precisely identified the grounds relied upon in the Form 86 and in her supporting affirmation. Apart from contending that the Board’s Decision and the Director’s Decision are unsafe and/or wrong, the Applicant has failed to identify any valid or effective public law grounds.[5] 5.In view of the seriousness of the issues involved, I have reminded myself of the enhanced standard required by law. Despite the Applicant did not advance any valid ground for the intended judicial review, I have scrutinized the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. 6.I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. [6] 7.First, the primary decision makers are the Director of Immigration and the Board and the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director of Immigration).[7] 8.The Board was acutely aware of the Applicant’s claim that she would be seriously harmed or killed by the Triad Syndicate from which her parents had borrowed money. The Board had assessed the material facts and evidence of the Applicant’s claim including the COI materials and rejected her case relating to the loan, the Rape Incident and the stated threats by the Triad Syndicate. The Board was also entitled to find that (1) the level of risk of harm upon her return to her home country is low and the ill-treatment, whether physical or mental, inflicted upon her did not attain a minimum level of severity (2) the Triad Syndicate was and is not as powerful as she claimed; (3) reasonable state protection would be available and (4) if necessary, she can relocate to other places in Vietnam. 9.Second, there is simply nothing to indicate the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. The Board was quite simply entitled to come to the conclusions it did. 10.Third, in all circumstances, I can discern no error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board in the assessment and rejection of the Applicant’s claim. Conclusion 11.Accordingly, I dismiss the Leave Application. Dated the 30th day of April 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000250_2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf [2] Said Umair v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 82 at [9]; Hasmi Rizwan Imran [2018] HKCA 439 at [14] [3] Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091. [4] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [5] Ho Loy & Anor v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (Unrep.) 22.12.2016 at [142] [6] Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. [7] Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment