Nguyen Van Binh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 316/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 April 2026.
1. By Form 86 filed on 10 May 2022, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 28 April 2022 (the “Board’s Decision”). By that decision, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 5 October 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”), which had rejected his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Me
Cites 5 cases
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HCAL 316/2022 [2026] HKCFI 2396 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 316 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Connie Lee:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By Form 86 filed on 10 May 2022, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 28 April 2022 (the “Board’s Decision”). By that decision, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 5 October 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”), which had rejected his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM). 2.The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision. It is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations and descriptions used in the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink[1] to which is included below, are also adopted herein. 3.The Applicant did not attend the oral hearing. I have considered the merits of the Leave Application based on the materials available before me.[2] Discussion 4.Judicial review does not operate as a further avenue of appeal. The Leave Application operates as a “filtering” process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[3] In seeking to challenge the Board’s Decision, the Applicant ought to have clearly and precisely identified the grounds relied upon in the Form 86 and in his supporting affirmation. Apart from contending that the Board’s Decision and the Director’s Decision are unsafe and/or wrong, the Applicant has failed to identify any valid or effective public law grounds.[4] 5.In view of the seriousness of the issues involved, I have reminded myself of the enhanced standard required by law. Despite the Applicant did not advance any valid ground for the intended judicial review, I have scrutinized the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. 6.I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. [5] 7.First, the primary decision makers are the Director of Immigration and the Board and the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director of Immigration).[6] 8.The Board was acutely aware of the Applicant’s claim that he would be harmed and/or subject to further ill-treatment from the moneylender because he was unable to pay the debt owing to the moneylender. The Board had assessed the material facts and evidence of the Applicant’s claim including the COI materials and found his case can be given no credence whatsoever. The Board rejected the factual basis of the Applicant’s claim entirely including his case about his business and the borrowing money for such business as well as his case of harm and ill-treatment from the moneylender. Given such finding of fact, the Board was entitled to find there was no real risk of harm and/or genuine risk of ill-treatment and torture. In any case, the Board did and was entitled to find reasonable state protection is readily available and it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant to relocate internally within Vietnam. 9.Second, it follows that the Board was quite simply entitled to come to the conclusions it did. There is nothing to indicate the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. 10.Third, in all circumstances, I can discern no error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board in the assessment and rejection of the Applicant’s claim. Conclusion 11.Accordingly, I dismiss the Leave Application. Dated the 30th day of April 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000316_2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf [2] Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091. [3] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [4] Ho Loy & Anor v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (Unrep.) 22.12.2016 at [142]. [5] Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. [6] Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment