Re v. Trong Dai

CAMP 231/2023, [2026] HKCA 886

On appeal from [2020] HKCFI 1090

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 231 OF 2023

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 2834/2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 15 May 2025, this court (Chu VP and Barma JA)  handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ Bruno Chan dated 11 June 2020 refusing leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non-refoulement claim.

2.The facts and issues in the applicant’s application, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion filed on 21 May 2025, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the Notice of Motion, the applicant contended inter alia that this court erred in failing to apply the “principle of procedural fairness” and “the principle of irrationality”, and that there was “some error in law in [his] decision”.

4.In breach of the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the applicant failed to lodge written submissions.  He is thus deemed to have abandoned his right to rely on written submissions in the present application.

5.Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised.

7.The Notice of Motion failed to provide any particulars in the supposed errors in our judgment and it raises no ground that is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

8.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

9.For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 21 May 2025 is dismissed.

The applicant acting in person