Wong Yo Ho James v. Club Marina Cove Ltd

HCSA 12/2026

[2026] HKCFI 1443

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL APPEAL NO 12 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL CLAIM NO 28160 OF 2023)

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D E C I S I O N

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.This is the hearing of the Claimant’s application for leave to appeal on point of law (the “Application Form”) filed on 9 February 2026 for leave to appeal in respect of the Claimant’s claim in SCTC 28160/2023. The order or orders against which the leave to appeal is sought are not entirely clear. It appears from the Application Form that the order against which the leave to appeal is sought is only the Order made by Deputy Adjudicator Mr Amos Ma (the “learned Deputy Adjudicator”) on 3 February 2026 (the “3 February Order”). However, during the oral hearing, the Claimant said that he is seeking leave also to appeal against the learned Deputy Adjudicator’s order made during the pre-trial review hearing (the “PTR Hearing”) on 13 January 2026 (the “PTR Order”). To avoid any unnecessary waste of time and resources, I am prepared to consider the PTR Order without regard to any time limit for the appeal as well as the 3 February Order.

II.  BACKGROUND

2.To put the matter in context, the PTR Order is, of course, a case-management order for preparing for the trial, to commence on 3 February 2026. The 3 February Order is an order made in the middle of the trial of the Claimant’s claim for the Claimant and the Defendant to file further evidence, and adjourning the trial to be part-heard on 6 March 2026. Subsequently, the part-heard trial has been postponed to 29 May 2026 due to the Claimant’s present application for leave to appeal.

III.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF REVIEW

3.For the legal principles governing an application for leave to appeal against a decision of the Small Claims Tribunal, by virtue of section 28(1) of the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance, the intended appeal must be “on any ground involving a question of law” or “on the ground that the claim was outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal”. Generally, unless a fact-finding is plainly wrong, a challenge to fact-findings is not a question of law: see Tong Pak Lung v Tong Choi Yuen [2026] HKCFI 885 at §§19-20 per Au-Yeung J.

4.A notable feature in the present application is that the trial has not been concluded and thus the learned Deputy Adjudicator has not made any fact-finding. Both the PTR Order and the 3 February Order are case-management orders successful appeal against which would require the claimant to pass the high hurdle of showing that the trial judge “has gone clearly wrong and made orders which will clearly involve an injustice or an inability for the trial court to carry out its task”: see Tang Yisu v Sunguard Security Company Ltd. [2023] HKCFI 3116 at §3.4 per DHCJ Jonathan Wong.

IV.  ANALYSIS

8.The intended ground of appeal against the PTR Order does not appear to target at the PTR Order itself. According to the Claimant, during the PTR Hearing, when explaining the procedures to the parties, the learned Deputy Adjudicator only looked at the Defendant but for most, if not all, of the time, the learned Deputy Adjudicator did not look at the Claimant and did not allow sufficient time for the Claimant to make submissions. The Claimant thinks that the learned Deputy Adjudicator was biased against him. In fact, the Claimant wrote to the Principal Adjudicator apparently to request another adjudicator to handle his claim, but the Principal Adjudicator refused.

9.To say that a judge or a judicial officer is biased, whether actually or apparently, the burden lies upon the Claimant and the burden is an onerous one. The Claimant is not saying that he was unable to hear the learned Deputy Adjudicator’s explanation of the procedures to the parties. His complaint was just that from his perspective, the learned Deputy Adjudicator only looked at the Defendant but not him. On the materials before me, I am unable to come to any view on this complaint, and in any event, without knowing the context, I cannot see how looking at one party but not the other can be amounted to any bias.

10.The Claimant also complained that the PTR Order was sent only to him only after the PTR Hearing, apparently alleging that the learned Deputy Adjudicator made up the PTR Order. However, the PTR Order was made orally during the PTR Hearing. The hardcopy of the PTR Order may have been sent subsequent to the parties, but this does not cause any prejudice to the Claimant. The Claimant should have properly jotted notes during the PTR Hearing, and there would be nothing to prevent the Claimant from requesting for clarification if he thought there was anything unclear and/or he could not jot down the order being made.

11.In the circumstances, I see no arguability in the intended appeal against the PTR Order.

12.In respect of the 3 February Order, the Claimant’s first intended ground of appeal is that the learned Deputy Adjudicator should not have ordered him to produce his medical records to the Defendant due to privacy. The medical records are in relation to the injury the Claimant has allegedly suffered as a result of the wrong allegedly committed by the Defendant. The Claimant submits that it should be sufficient for the Small Claims Tribunal or any third party appointed by it to peruse and consider the medical records.

13.The Claimant’s such ground of appeal has no merit at all. Privacy is not a reason for not disclosing the medical records a claimant relies on in relation to the injury he has suffered as a result of the defendant’s wrong. Disclosure of such records to the Defendant is an integral and essential part of the fair administration of justice, so that the Defendant would be afforded a fair chance to examine the records to see if the alleged injury is sustained by proper evidence. Any concern about privacy is unnecessary, as there is always an implied undertaking on the parties not to use the documents disclosed in a legal action for ulterior purposes, and any irrelevant parts could be redacted. To avoid any unnecessary quarrel, where the Court or the Small Claims Tribunal finds it necessary to refer to the contents of the records in its decision or judgment, the Court or the Small Claims Tribunal is free to do so. Similarly, during the trial or hearing, which is open to public, if the Court find it necessary for the Court or the parties to refer to the contents of the records, they are free to do so.

14.The Claimant’s second intended ground of appeal in respect of the 3 February Order is that the learned Deputy Adjudicator should not have ordered or allowed the Defendant to produce the club rules. Part of the club rules was produced by the Defendant during the trial, and clearly, to understand in proper context what that part of the club rules is intended to mean, and to be fair to the Claimant as well, disclosure of the club rules is necessary for the fair disposal of the matter. I see nothing wrong in ordering or allowing the Defendant to disclose the club rules.

15.The Claimant’s third intended ground of appeal in respect of the 3 February Order is that the learned Deputy Adjudicator should not admit hearsay evidence, and if hearsay evidence is allowed, the Claimant should be afforded a right to cross-examine the maker of the hearsay evidence. In civil matters, hearsay evidence is in general admissible, and it is a matter of weight to be accorded to such hearsay evidence. Further, it is for that party to decide what witnesses to call to support his or her case. If he or she decides not to call certain witnesses, he or she would have to bear the consequences, if any. In addition, subject to case-management and consideration of, among others, proportionality, the maker of the hearsay evidence may be summonsed for cross-examination. However, in the present Claimant’s claim, the Claimant has not properly made any application to summons any maker of the hearsay evidence. I cannot see any ground for the Claimant to say that the learned Deputy Adjudicator has made any or any plain error that would warrant interference from the appellate court.

16.In gist, there is no merit in the intended appeal against the 3 February Order.

17.As mentioned at the outside, the part-heard trial was originally fixed to resume on 6 March 2026. Due to the Application Form, the part-heard trial was refixed to resume on 29 May 2026. The Claimant seems to complain that the matter should not have been dragged on, and the part-heard trial should remain on 6 March 2026. Given the Claimant’s present application for leave to appeal, the learned Deputy Adjudicator was perfectly entitled, and rightly in my view, to refix the part-heard trial.

18.Lastly, in his oral and written submissions (including written submissions lodged after the hearing), the Claimant essentially asks the Court to direct the learned Deputy Adjudicator as to how to conduct the trial and at a point even asks the Court to take over the trial. Such submissions are completely devoid of merits. How to conduct the trial, which is still ongoing, and how to deal with the Claimant’s claim, are within the purview of the learned Deputy Adjudicator, and I see no grounds for me to interfere. It appears that the Claimant has misunderstood the procedures – at a point during the hearing, he even told me that he expected that I would conduct the trial and have the witnesses made available for him to cross-examine before me. This is gravely misfortunate that the Claimant has such misunderstanding.

V.  CONCLUSION

19.For the above reasons, I dismiss the Application Form with no order as to costs.

20.As an aside, the Claimant confirmed to me that the language for the Decision can either be Chinese or English, and that both languages are equally agreeable to him. Therefore, I render the present Decision in English.

The Claimant appeared in person