Musrini v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1490/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 May 2026.

1. The Applicant is a 41-year-old national of Indonesia who arrived in Hong Kong on 11 April 2017 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract on 11 April 2019 or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her employment was prematurely terminated on 1 November 2018, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and more than 2 years later on 18 November 2020 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement cla

Cites 4 cases

Case No.HCAL 1490/2022[2026] HKCFI 2617
Court
High Court CFI
Date07 May 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 1490/2022

[2026] HKCFI 2617

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1490 OF 2022

BETWEEN

  Musrini Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board Putative
    Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

   consideration of the documents only;       or
    consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.The Applicant is a 41-year-old national of Indonesia who arrived in Hong Kong on 11 April 2017 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract on 11 April 2019 or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her employment was prematurely terminated on 1 November 2018, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and more than 2 years later on 18 November 2020 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia she would be harmed or killed by her abusive husband over their marital disputes. She was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of her claim.

2.The Applicant was born and raised in Dsn Crabak, Kab. Trenggalek, Indonesia. After leaving school she married her husband as arranged by her family and moved to live with him in Surabaya.

3.However, the Applicant soon found her husband was a womanizer with many girlfriends, and when she raised objections to his conduct, her husband would become violent towards her by beating her at will, and in order to stay away from his abuses, the Applicant in 2012 went to work in Singapore as a domestic helper until 2015 when she returned to her husband’s home in Indonesia

4.Their relationship however did not improve as her husband continued to be violent and abusive towards her, and so in April 2017 the Applicant started coming to Hong Kong to work as a foreign domestic helper, and for which she was required by her husband to remit part of her monthly salary to him in Indonesia for his use.

5.In 2018 while in Hong Kong the Applicant met and formed a relationship with another man, and when her husband later found out about it, he became furious and threatened the Applicant on the phone that he would kill her when she returned to Indonesia, and so after her last employment was prematurely terminated in November 2018, the Applicant was afraid to return to Indonesia and therefore overstayed in Hong Kong and subsequently raised her non-refoulement claim for protection, for which she completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 6 December 2021 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).             

6.By a Notice of Decision dated 7 January 2022 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

7.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from her husband upon her return to Indonesia as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from him, that there is no evidence of any real intention of her husband to seriously harm or kill her other than just angry words and empty threats, that in any event it was a private domestic or marital dispute between just the 2 of them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 275 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 1.9 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from her home district in large cities such as Jakarta or Bali where it would be difficult if not impossible for her husband to locate her.

8.On 19 January 2022 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which she attended an oral hearing on 6 October 2022 before the Board during which she gave evidence and answered questions raised of her claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 16 November 2022 her appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

9.In its decision[1] the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from her husband over their marital disputes that caused her to overstay in Hong Kong to seek protection but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of her husband to seriously harm or kill her other than angry words and empty threats, and that in any event it was a private marital dispute between just the 2 of them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon her return to Indonesia as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for her to move safely to other parts of the country away from her home district without any risk of being located by her husband that her claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.    

10.On 14 December 2022 the Applicant filed her Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and in her supporting affirmation of the same date she put forward the following grounds for her intended challenge:

(1) That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing her non-refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that her life must be protected by the criminal law from extra-judicial killings that she may face if deported back to her home country;

(2) That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in her case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting her claim;

(3) That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing her claim;

(4) That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in her country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void;

(5) That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions;

(6) That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required her to respond to questions that she was not in a position to offer any response;

(7) That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.         

11.These are however all just bare and vague assertions of the Applicant containing a few key words or phrases but without any necessary or relevant particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to her case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy were state acquiescence or extra-judicial killings to the Applicant’s case when on the factual basis of even her own case that it was a private domestic dispute between her and her husband only without any official involvement or political element at all. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, nor was she able to do so at the hearing of her application, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for her intended challenge.

12.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

13.In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in her claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for her to relocate to other part of Indonesia, there is simply no justification to afford her with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.                

14.In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

15.As I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss her application.

Dated the 7th day of May 2026

  (Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant on 7 May 2026

Musrini

Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 7 May 2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 19751

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 2295/21 (formerly RBCZ 10975/21)(T5S39)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



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