Pipaton Naipaporn v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 909/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 May 2026.
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 7 June 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 23 May 2024 (“ Board’s Decision ”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”) dated
Cites 10 cases
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HCAL 909/2024 [2026] HKCFI 2326 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 909 of 2024
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy: The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Observations for the Applicant: Background 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 7 June 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 23 May 2024 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 19 January 2024 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: - 2.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Thailand, she would be harmed or killed by (i) her boyfriend as she dated another man in Hong Kong; and (ii) the loan shark due to the default in the repayment of the loan. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 3.The applicant has not requested for an oral hearing. On 14 February 2025, the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation) Section (1) of the Immigration Department faxed a letter to the court, informing the court that the applicant wanted to cancel the Leave Application. Enclosed with the fax was the applicant’s memo in English dated 27 January 2025, stating that she wanted to cancel the Leave Application as she it was safe for her to return home. In the circumstances, this court will dispose of the Leave Application on paper. Discussion 4.A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 5.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 and the supporting affirmation contained no such grounds. 6.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the Board found that the applicant was dishonest and unreliable and rejected the centerpiece of her account. It further found that state protection and internal relocation were reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors. 7.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a very high standard of fairness. The applicant has not advanced any grounds in support of the Leave Application. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5]. Withdrawal application 8.Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1140. Recent Removal 9.The court was recently informed that the applicant had been removed from Hong Kong. Order 10.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 7th day of May 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. [2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. [3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142. [4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment