Case Document

100%Judiciary

DCCJ 5984/2024 & 5985/2024

[2026] HKDC 781

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 5984 OF 2024

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BETWEEN

	KWOK LAI SHEUNG	Plaintiff
	and
	MORE INSURANCE BROKER COMPANY LIMITED	1^st Defendant
	SKY JOY INDUSTRIES LIMITED	2^nd Defendant
	CHOI LEE WAN（蔡利雲）	3^rd Defendant
	HO WING LEUNG	4^th Defendant

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 5985 OF 2024

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BETWEEN

	KWOK MAY FA	Plaintiff
	and
	MORE INSURANCE BROKER COMPANY LIMITED	1^st Defendant
	SKY JOY INDUSTRIES LIMITED	2^nd Defendant
	CHOI LEE WAN（蔡利雲）	3^rd Defendant
	HO WING LEUNG	4^th Defendant

------------------------------

Before:

Deputy District Judge B. Mak in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:	13 February 2026
Date of Decision:	13 February 2026
Date of Reasons for Decision:	12 May 2026

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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Introduction

1.By a summons under each of DCCJ 5984/2024 and DCCJ 5985/2024 dated 22 December 2025, the respective plaintiff applied for leave to appeal against my decision dated 17 December 2025 (“my Decision”).

2.After hearing counsel’s submission on 13 February 2026, I dismissed the application but granted an interim continuation of the Injunction Order of Her Honour Judge G Chow dated 25 October 2024 pending the determination of the intended appeal to the Court of Appeal.

3.Here are my reasons.

Legal principles

4.Section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance provides:-

“(2) Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge, the master or the Court of Appeal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that—

(a) the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.”

5.The test of whether an appeal has a reasonable prospect of success under the new statutory provision is the same test as applied before the amendment to Cap 336, ie whether the applicant for leave can show that he has an arguable case with reasonable chances of success on appeal as is laid down in Ma Bik Yung v Ko Chuen [2009] 3 HKC 359. A reasonable prospect of success means an appeal with prospects that are more than “fanciful” but which do not need to be shown to be “probable”: see Wing Tat Haberdashery Co Ltd v Elegance Development & Industrial Co Ltd, HCMP 357/2011, 8 July 2011, unreported.

6.Where the appeal is against the exercise of a discretion, the appellant ought to demonstrate that the decision was plainly wrong, or that the trial judge has taken irrelevant matters into consideration or has ignored relevant matters: see SMM v TWM (Child: Relocation) [2010] 4 HKLRD 37 at p 48.

Ground 1

7.By Ground 1, Mr Kwan Ping Kan together with Mr Samuel Leung, counsel for the 1^st and 2^nd plaintiffs, complained that I have conflated the test for a Mareva injunction with that for a proprietary injunction. Counsel submitted that the plaintiffs were seeking a proprietary injunction but I have applied the test for a Mareva injunction by considering the real risk of dissipation.

8.It must be clear that notwithstanding the original intention of the plaintiffs was to apply for a proprietary injunction and a Mareva injunction, the Order granted by Her Honour Judge G Chow on 25 October 2024 (“the Order”) was a Mareva injunction only. Mr Kwan, who appeared for the plaintiffs in that hearing, must have known this fact.

9.Further, by the summonses under each of the action respectively filed on 28 October 2024, the plaintiffs applied for the continuation of the Order.

10.In the light of the above, it is hard to see how the Court should apply the test for a proprietary injunction when considering the continuation of a Mareva injunction.

11.I see no merits in Ground 1.

Ground 2

12.By Ground 2, counsel complained that I have misapplied the test in determining whether there had been a risk of dissipation.

13.In my Decision, I have considered the submission of Mr Samuel Leung who appeared for the plaintiffs in the hearing before me. I came to the conclusion as I did.

14.I am not persuaded that the conclusion in my Decision was plainly wrong.

15.I see no merits in Ground 2.

Conclusion and Order

16.Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Costs

17.Costs to follow the event. I make a costs order nisi that the 1^st and 2^nd plaintiffs shall pay the 2^nd to 4^th defendants the costs of this application with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

18.In the absence of any application for variation by summons within 14 days from the date of this Decision, the costs order nisi shall become absolute.