Dilir Emrah v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1375/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 May 2026.
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 16 June 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 6 June 2025 (“ Board’s Decision ”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”) dated 24
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HCAL 1375/2025 [2026] HKCFI 2496 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1375 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
Observations for the Applicant: Background 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 16 June 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 6 June 2025 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 24 January 2025 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: - 2.In the Form 86, the applicant did not name any putative interested party. As the Director should have been the proper putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be accordingly amended on the court’s own motion. 3.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Turkey, he would be harmed or killed by the Turkish authorities as an Alevi as well as his past support of the Cumhuriyet Jalk Partisi (a liberal left-wing political party). The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 4.On 13 November 2025, the applicant filed an affirmation to apply for the withdrawal of the Leave Application as he wanted to cancel his appeal for he no longer had any problems with his country and needed to take care of his family and children. 5.On 21 November 2025, the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation) Section (1) of the Immigration Department faxed a letter to the court, informing the court that in the applicant’s letter dated 14 November 2025, he stated that he wanted to return home as soon as possible as the issues in his home country had been resolved. In the circumstances, this court will dispose of the Leave Application on paper. Discussion 6.A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 7.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds. 8.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the Board found that whilst in Turkey, the Turkish authorities had not interfered with the applicant’s liberty due to his support of the CHP. Nor did the Board find that the applicant was personally targets by any far-right political forces. It therefore concluded that the applicant would not face any risk of harm if refouled. The Board further found that internal relocation would be reasonably viable. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors. 9.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a very high standard of fairness. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision, nor were such grounds identified in the Form 86 or otherwise. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5]. Withdrawal application 10.Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1140. Recent Removal 11.Before the applicant was removed, he signed a standard form memo dated 6 January 2026 addressed to the court, stating that he “chose not to provide any correspondence address for communication with the court and service of court documents.” Orders 12.The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion. 13.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 15th day of May 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. [2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. [3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142. [4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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