Sujiyem v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 1440/2022 [2026] HKCFI 2599 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1440 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 8 December 2022, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 2 December 2022 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 14 December 2021 rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1] except the risk of torture ground which had been previously dismissed by the Director on 3 August 2010. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: - 2.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her father’s creditor who forced her to sell dangerous drugs and had sex with him. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 3.At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 21 April 2026. The applicant was brought to court from Nei Kwu Correctional Institution on a body order. Discussion 4.A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision[2]. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 5.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting contained no such grounds at all. 6.At the hearing, this court asked the applicant whether she had any grounds she wished to submit in support of the Leave Application. The applicant stated that her father and younger brother had died 2 years ago. The loan shark was still trying to kill all her family members. She would need more time to stay in Hong Kong. 7.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, despite bare assertions, the Board was prepared to accept the basic premise of the applicant’s case as a person under the influence of an abusive creditor of her father. However, the Board did not accept her claim that the creditor had grown more powerful with underlings all over Indonesia in the 17 years since the abuse. The Board found that the past ill-treatment failed to meet the requisite level of severity. The Board further found that internal relocation was reasonably viable. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors. 8.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant has not provided any valid grounds, whether written or oral, in support of the Leave Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5]. Order 9.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 15th day of May 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. [2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142]. [4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment