Fitri Asdini v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 746/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 18 May 2026.

1. This is the Applicant’s application by Form 86 filed on 24 May 2021 for leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Petitions Office (the “Board”) dated 14 May 2021 (the “Decision”) dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) in his Notice of Decision dated 21 March 2018 (the “Notice”), refusing her application for non‑refoulement protection.

Cites 1 case

Case No.HCAL 746/2021[2026] HKCFI 2804
Court
High Court CFI
Date18 May 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 746/2021

[2026] HKCFI 2804

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 746 of 2021

BETWEEN

  Fitri Asdini Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Putative
  Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following;

    consideration of documents only;          or
   consideration of documents and the Applicant being absent in open court.

Order by Deputy High Court Judge To:

Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.This is the Applicant’s application by Form 86 filed on 24 May 2021 for leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Petitions Office (the “Board”) dated 14 May 2021 (the “Decision”) dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) in his Notice of Decision dated 21 March 2018 (the “Notice”), refusing her application for non‑refoulement protection. 

2.The Applicant had requested an oral hearing.  A hearing on 22 April 2026 was scheduled for her and notice of hearing was sent to her by post on 8 April 2026 to her address as stated in her Form 86, and her address as discovered from the Immigration Department on 6 February 2026.  An attempt was made by a court staff on the afternoon before the date of the hearing to contact her by telephone to remind her of the hearing, but the call was not answered.  There is nothing to suggest that the Applicant had not received the notice of hearing or had moved.  The Court was satisfied that the notice of hearing had been duly served on the Applicant and that the Court had tried its best endeavour to bring the hearing to her notice.  However, she did not appear at the hearing.  Having considered the nature of the application and issues raised, the Decision, the papers, the applicable legal principles and all the circumstances, the Court considered that the leave application may be justly determined on paper without an oral hearing.

The Applicant’s claim

3.The Applicant is an Indonesian national, now aged 41.  She arrived in Hong Kong on 5 August 2016 to work as a foreign domestic helper but overstayed since 21 January 2017.  She was arrested on 22 February 2017 for overstaying.  Then, she lodged a non-refoulement claim by written signification on 2, 3, 6 and 8 March 2017.  Her claim was assessed on all four applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (the “USM”), namely: Torture Risk[1]; BOR 3 Risk[2]; Persecution Risk[3]; and BOR 2 Risk[4].  It was rejected by the Director’s Notice.  Her appeal against the Notice was dismissed by the Board’s Decision.  She now applies for leave to apply for judicial review of that Decision.

4.The Applicant’s personal background, the factual background leading to the present application, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced, the finding of the Board and the reasons for its Decision are set out in details in the Board’s Decision.  These will not be repeated here.  The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[5] for reference.  In gist, she claims she will be harmed or killed by her stepfather for refusing to date a rich man with a view to marry him and for having developed a lesbian relationship with another woman.   

The finding of the Board

5.The Applicant claimed that she had been assaulted five or six times by her stepfather and burnt with cigarette butts.  She had sought medical treatment.  She could not produce any medical evidence but submitted some photographs of the injuries she suffered.  From the photographs and her account, the Board found the injuries she suffered did not attain the minimum level of severity and there was nothing to suggest that she had suffered mental injuries.  She could not stand the ill-treatment and moved out of the family home to live with her cousin in Jakarta.  She was informed by her cousin that her stepfather was very angry because of her lesbian relationship with another woman and threatened to kill her.  Her stepfather had never directly threatened to kill the Applicant.  The Board did not accept her stepfather had real intention to kill the Applicant.  If he had, he would have gone to her cousin’s home to kill her instead of giving her a verbal warning through her cousin. 

6.The Board found the Applicant’s dispute with her stepfather a family dispute and that she had failed to prove that her feared ill-treatment was inflicted by public officials or persons able to wield the authority of the government and/or the state had any connection with the claim or had acquiesced in her ill-treatment.  It found the ill‑treatment did not fall within the meaning of ‘torture’ under section 37U(1) of the Immigration Ordinance and did not arise on account of any of the reasons enumerated in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol

7.It found on the basis of country of origin information (“COI”) that the Indonesian government was able and willing to afford protection to the Applicant, but it was the Applicant’s own volition not to seek protection from the state and not that the Indonesian government or authorities were unable or unwilling to offer her protection.  It also found the feared harm and risk of harm were localized to the Applicant’s home locality; that she could avoid the harm and risk by relocating to other cities or areas within Indonesia; and it would not be unduly harsh for her to do so.

8.Applying the law applicable to non-refoulement protection under the USM, it found the Applicant had failed to prove her entitlement to protection under any of the applicable grounds under the USM.  Hence, it dismissed her appeal.

The legal principles applicable to judicial review

9.The function of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non‑refoulement claims afresh.  The primary decision-makers in a claim for non‑refoulement are the Director and the Board.  They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non‑refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.  In an application for judicial review, the Court will scrutinize the Board’s decision, and intervene only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality:  see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[6].

Grounds for judicial review

10.The Applicant did not advance any grounds of application in her Form 86 or her supporting affirmation.  In the absence of any specific grounds of application, the court in a judicial review could only scrutinize the Decision for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.

Overall scrutiny

11.Having rigorously examined the Decision, the papers and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles applicable to non-refoulement protection under the USM; the burden of proof and standard of proof; correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness.  The Board analysed the evidence carefully and tested it against common sense, inherent probability and the COI.  It basically accepted the Applicant’s factual evidence and made some further finding of fact on the basis of her evidence and the COI.  It gave full reasons for its finding.  On the evidence, it was open to the Board to make the findings as it did.  Applying the law applicable to non‑refoulement protection to the facts it found, the Board came to the conclusion that the Applicant is not entitled to non-refoulement protection under any of the four applicable grounds under the USM.  These are mixed findings of fact and of the law.  Insofar as they are finding of the law, they are absolutely correct.  Insofar as they are findings of fact, they are exclusively within the realm of the Board, which the Court on a judicial review will not interfere save when such finding was made as result of error of law or procedural unfairness or that the Decision is irrational.  The Court could detect no error of law or procedural unfairness in the Decision.  The Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test.  It is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.  Basically, the Applicant failed to discharge her burden of proving her fears and risks.  The Decision is utterly without fault.  The proposed judicial review has no realistic prospect of success. 

Conclusion

12.For the above reasons, the Applicant’s leave application is refused.

Dated the 18th day of May 2026

  ( Seline Sze )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 18/05/2026

Fitri Asdini

Applicant’s ref. no:
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 18/05/2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 11004/18/4/14/I1464

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 449/18 (Formerly RBCZ 10654/17) (T8I80)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



Form CALL-1



[1]  Risk of torture as defined in Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115; the definition being the same as that found in Article 1 of the Convention against torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

[2]  Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of Section 8 of Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 and Article 7 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)

[3]  Risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 23 and 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol

[4]  Risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383

[5]  https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL000746_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

[6]  [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]