Konew Capital International Ltd v. Ho Wai Han and Others
Read the full judgment text of DCMP 5961/2025 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 20 April 2026.
1. By way of an Originating Summons issued by the Plaintiff on 27 October 2025 ( “the OS” ), the Plaintiff seeks:-
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DCMP 5961/2025 [2026] HKDC 920 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 5961 OF 2025 ---------------------------
____________________ BETWEEN
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________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ________________________________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.By way of an Originating Summons issued by the Plaintiff on 27 October 2025 (“the OS”), the Plaintiff seeks:-
2.At the hearing on 20 April 2026, having heard the Plaintiff’s submissions and the Defendants being absent, I granted judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and made the order now appearing at paragraph 29 below. I will now give my reasons. B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3.The Plaintiff is and was at all material times a duly licensed money lender under the Money Lenders Ordinance (Cap. 163) (“MLO”). 4.The 1st and 3rd Defendants are and were at all material times the registered owners and joint tenants of the Property. 5.By the Mortgage, the 1st Defendant charged her share in the Property to the Plaintiff to secure the repayment of the general credit facilities to the extent of HK$1,500,000 together with interest thereon. 6.The Mortgage contains inter alia the following relevant terms:-
7.By the Loan Agreement, the Plaintiff agreed to make available to the 1st and 2nd Defendants a loan in the sum of HK$300,000 (“the Loan”) subject to the terms and conditions therein. The Loan was part of the general credit facilities as secured under the Mortgage. 8.The Loan Agreement further provides inter alia that:-
9.Pursuant to the Loan Agreement, the Plaintiff has granted the Loan to the 1st and 2nd Defendants. 10.The 1st and 2nd Defendants have defaulted to make the monthly repayments due to the Plaintiff since 25 May 2025. By two letters dated 3 October 2025, the Plaintiff (through its solicitors), demanded the payment of the entire balance of the Loan and interest thereon from the 1st and 2nd Defendants within 7 days. Despite the demands, the 1st and 2nd Defendants still failed and/or refused to repay the outstanding balance of the Loan (together with interest) to the Plaintiff. C. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 11.The OS was taken out by the Plaintiff on 27 October 2025. The OS, the Notice of Appointment to Hear Originating Summons dated 24 November 2025, the Affirmation of Lee Oi Ying (“Lee 1st”) in support of the OS, and the Notice of Adjournment to Hearing Originating Summons dated 30 January 2026 have been duly served on the Defendants at their last known address. The Defendants have failed to acknowledge service of the OS. The OS was affixed at the entrance of the Property on 31 October 2025 as required by Order 10 rule 4(2) of the Rules of the District Court (“RDC”). The relevant notices of the first hearing on 14 January 2026 and of the present hearing were also posted up at the Property. 12.I am satisfied that the Defendants has been properly served at their usual or last known address in the absence of any evidence suggesting that notice of the same would not have come to their attention: Hou Tsun Tat v Wong Wai Chung (unrep., DCPI 96/2015, 31 October 2017) at §§19-20; Full Gold Development Limited v Wong Tsing [2023] HKDC 423, at §§38-45. 13.In addition, the Plaintiff has also given notice of these proceedings to other incumbrancers of the Property (whose priority ranks below the Plaintiff), although the Plaintiff has not received any response from these informed parties. 14.The Plaintiff has also served these proceedings on the Director of Lands as required by section 3(2) of PO and rule 4 of the Partition Rules. The Director of Lands expressed in his letter to the Plaintiff dated 28 December 2025 that he had no comments on the Plaintiff’s present application. 15.In the circumstances, I am satisfied that all relevant parties have been served with (and/or given notice of) these proceedings and notice of the present hearing. Having regard to the nature of the application, I also found it expedient to proceed with the matter in the absence of the Defendants in accordance with Order 32 rule 5 of RDC (which is applicable for hearing of the OS pursuant to Order 28 rule 1 of RDC). D. Monetary Claim 16.The OS was issued under both O.83A and O.88 of RDC. Paragraph 1 of the OS seeks a monetary judgment for all outstanding sums under the Mortgage. There is no reference to any claim under the Loan Agreement in the OS. However, it is abundantly clear from the supporting affirmation (i.e. Lee 1st), and confirmed at the hearing by Ms. Ma of the Plaintiff’s solicitors appearing for the Plaintiff that the outstanding indebtedness under the Mortgage arose entirely from the Loan Agreement. The obligation to repay does not strictly arise under the Mortgage, such that without a breach of the Loan Agreement, the Plaintiff is not entitled to claim under the Mortgage independently. As such, it should properly be regarded as a money lender’s action: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol.1, commentary 88/1/2. Consequently, before granting any monetary award under O.83A, the requirements thereunder must be satisfied. 17.Order 83A rule 2(1) provides that every money lender’s action may be begun by writ. It was accepted in Maxcolm Finance Limited v Cheng Chi Man [2019] HKCFI 2928, at §15 that this is not a mandatory requirement and such an action may be commenced by originating summons. This has also been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Honip Credit Ltd v Leung Tak Sing Paul [2020] HKCA 879, at §4.8. It is not difficult to see from the legislative history of Order 83A rule 2(1) that this must be the case. There is clearly nothing to suggest that the word “may” should in the circumstances be construed as imposing a mandatory requirement. Order 83A rule 2(1) now provides that every money lender’s action “may” be begun by writ, in contrast to the position before the introduction of the Civil Justice Reform where it then provided that every money lender’s action “shall” be begun by writ. The change from “shall” to “may” was a response to Recommendation 12 of the Final Report on Civil Justice Reform published in March 2004 (“Final Report”) where the Chief Justice’s Working Party recommended that “[t]he rules of the RHC making it mandatory to commence certain proceedings by writ or, as the case may be, by originating summons, should be abolished.” The reasoning was discussed at §§160-161 of the Final Report and that is to allow the flexibility of adopting a proper procedure depending on the whether factual disputes are likely to be involved. Order 83A rule 2(1) was amended pursuant to this recommendation and hence it must be clear that Order 83A rule 2(1) now affords a choice to a plaintiff. 18.As discussed above, in the past it was mandatory for a money lender’s action under Order 83A to be begun by writ, and hence it is not surprising that Order 83A rule 3 requires various information to be stated in the statement of claim. An originating summons process does not usually involve the filing of a statement of claim (unless perhaps where pleadings are to be ordered). The Court of Appeal had in Honip Credit Ltd v Leung Tak Sing Paul [2020] HKCA 879, at §4.9, held that the provisions of Order 83 rule 3 would be satisfied if the disclosure required thereunder is made in affirmation in support of the originating summons. In the present case, I am satisfied that these required particulars are contained in Lee 1st. I am also satisfied that the requirements under O.83A rule 4 have been complied with. The Plaintiff has also compiled with the various requirements under the MLO. 19.The Plaintiff has shown on the evidence that the 1st and 2nd Defendants have defaulted repayment of the Loan pursuant to the Loan Agreement and the Plaintiff is entitled to claim all outstanding balance of the Loan together with interest. The 1st and 2nd Defendants had only made 2 instalments in the total sum of HK$19,501 (with HK$5,608.62 being apportioned to the repayment of the principal sum and HK$13,892.38 being payment of interest). 20.The Plaintiff had on 3 October 2025 issued demand letters to the 1st and 2nd Defendants for the repayment of all outstanding sums within 7 days, and hence the Plaintiff is entitled to charge default interest on the outstanding interest up to 3 October 2025. The amount of outstanding interest from 25 May to 3 October 2025 was HK$34,858. By 19 December 2025, the outstanding accrued interest was HK$55,599.17, and the amount of default interest payable was HK$4,505.66. 21.As at 19 December 2025, the following sums were therefore due and payable by the 1st and 2nd Defendants under the Loan Agreement in the total sum of HK$354,496.21 as follows:-
22.The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment in the sum of HK$354,496.21 together with:-
E. ORDER FOR POSSESSION 23.The Plaintiff claims possession of the Property under Order 88 of RDC. I am satisfied that the requirements under Order 88 rules 4 and 5 have been satisfied. 24.It is in my view clear that the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ failure to make repayments by instalments constituted an event of default under Clause 7.1 of the Mortgage. This would entitle the Plaintiff to claim possession under Clause 8.2. I also accept the Plaintiff’s submissions that where the whole sum advanced has become due, a mortgagee is entitled as of right to an order for possession of the mortgage premises (unless the mortgage deed provided otherwise): Chekiang First Bank Ltd v Ko Hoi Luen [1999] 3 HKLRD 360. F. ORDER FOR SALE 25.The legal principles governing orders for sale under section 6 of Partition Ordinance (Cap. 352) are trite. They were referred to by Au-Yeung J in Cheung Wing Kuen Samuel v Ip Chui Sum [2021] HKCFI 2535, at §§9-12, as follows:-
26.The Plaintiff, being a mortgagee under the Mortgage with a right to possession, is entitled to apply for an order for sale. The Property is a domestic flat in a mult-storey building. The Property has a saleable area of 478 square feet. I accept that it is impractical for such a flat to be partitioned. In the circumstances, I am minded to grant an order for sale in the absence of any evidence demonstrating why an order for sale would be detrimental to all of the co-owners and/or evidence showing hardship to one of the co-owners. 27.The Plaintiff has adduced a valuation report on the Property. I accept the valuation contained therein, namely that as at 12 December 2025:-
28.The Plaintiff has drawn this court’s attention to the fact that, as revealed from the land search record of the Property, apart from the Mortgage, the 1st and 3rd Defendant’s interest in the Property is subject to potentially 2 other incumbrances (whose priority, as I am informed, ranks below the Plaintiff) from K Cash Express Limited and Primecredit Limited. The Plaintiff has given notices of these proceedings to the other incumbrancers but has not received any response. In the absence of any objections from other incumbrancers, I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to grant an order for sale as sought by the Plaintiff. G. CONCLUSION 29.For the forgoing reasons, I am satisfied that it would be appropriate to make an order for the sale of the Property. Upon discussion with Ms. Ma on the terms of the order, I granted the following order at the hearing:-
Ms Annie Ma, of Siao, Wen and Leung, for the Plaintiff The 1st to 3rd Defendants were not represented and did not appear | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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