Re Coomber, Peter John

HCB 6599/2025

[2026] HKCFI 2928

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 6599 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction and Background

1.There is before me a bankruptcy petition presented by the Secretary for Justice (“SJ”) against Mr Peter John Coomber (“the Debtor”) on 27 August 2025 (“the Petition”). According to the Petition, the Debtor was indebted to SJ in the sum of HK$265,394.64 together with interest (“the Debt”) being the total amount owed in respect of: (a) a costs order dated 17 May 2023 in respect of HCAL 922/2022; (b) a costs order dated 19 December 2023 in respect of DCCJ 1129/2023; (c) a costs order dated 30 January 2023 in respect of DCCJ 3416/2022; (d) a costs order dated 27 February 2024 in respect of DCCJ 3416/2023 and DCCJ 1956/2022; and (e) a costs order dated 10 May 2024 in respect of CAMP 291/2023 and CAMP 292/2003, (collectively, “the Costs Orders”).

2.A statutory demand in respect of the Debt dated 5 March 2025 (“the SD”) was served upon the Debtor by an advertisement published in the South China Morning Post on 17 April 2025. Service of the SD was deemed and leave to file the Petition was granted by order of Master J Wong on 4 August 2025.

3.An order for substituted service of the Petition by way of advertisement in newspaper was granted by Master J Wong on 6 November 2025 and the advertisement was so inserted in the South China Morning Post on 13 November 2025.

4.The Debtor entered a Notice of Intention to Appear on 14 November 2025.

5.At the substantive hearing of the Petition, Mr Alvin Hor, Acting Senior Government Counsel appeared for SJ and the Debtor appeared, in person, unrepresented.

Applicable Legal Principles

6.Section 6(1) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap. 6, provides that a creditor’s petition must be in respect of one or more debts owed by the debtor. Section 6(2)(c) provides that a creditor’s petition may be presented in respect of a debt if, but only if, at the time the petition is presented, the debt is one which the debtor appears either to be unable to pay or to have no reasonable prospect of being able to pay. It is provided in s.6A(1)(a) that for the purpose of s.6(2)(c), the debtor appears to be unable to pay a debt if, but only if, the debt is payable immediately and a statutory demand in the prescribed form is served by the petitioning creditor on the debtor requiring him to pay the debt or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor, and at least three weeks have elapsed since the demand was served and the demand has not been complied with or set aside in accordance with the rules.

7.Furthermore, it is well-established that bankruptcy proceedings are summary in nature and are not intended to be used for the purpose of debt collection. The jurisdiction to make a bankruptcy order will only be exercised in very clear cases. The court will not make a bankruptcy order against an alleged debtor if he or she can show, with sufficiently precise evidence, that there is a bona fide dispute in relation to the debt on which the petition is based. See Re Tam Mei Kam (unrep) HCB 3777/2011, 25 April 2012, at §7 per Barma J (as he then was).

8.Where the debt is based on a judgment, the court has jurisdiction to go behind a judgment or order and to determine whether there was good consideration for the debt in question. But the court will not normally go behind a judgment or order unless there was sufficient reason to do so. As a general principle, the validity of the judgment debt would only be inquired into, where there was evidence of fraud or collusion, or miscarriage of justice, or there was no good petitioning creditor’s debt, apart from the judgment. An allegation of fraud alone is not sufficient to persuade the court to go behind the judgment or order giving rise to the judgment debt. The debtor must condescend upon particulars and support the allegations with clear and credible evidence. See Re Chung Kau, Debtor (Unrep) HCB 581/2003, 5 May 2003, §§7-8 per DHCJ Poon (as he then was).

Discussion

9.The background to these actions going back to 2001 was comprehensively set out in a Decision of Coleman J dated 17 May 2023 in HCAL 922/2022 (see [2023] HKCFI 1330, reported in [2023] 3 HKLRD 231) at §§13-70. See also a concise summary by the Court of Appeal in [2024] HKCA 440 (“CA Decision”) at §7 (with reference therein to “the plaintiff” being to the Debtor) as follows:

(1)  On 18 August 2001, the plaintiff pleaded guilty and was subsequently convicted in DCCC 328/2001. He served his sentence thereafter;

(2)  Four years later, on 13 July 2005, the plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal against conviction directly to the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”) (FAMC 56/2005). This application was dismissed by the Appeal Committee under Rule 7(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules (Cap. 484A) (“the CFA Rules”) pursuant to the summons issued by the then Acting Registrar of CFA (“Rule 7 Order”).

(3)  Over the years, the plaintiff persisted in his pursuit of the appeal in the CFA. The plaintiff made various attempts to file applications and requested a new FAMC number, but these were not entertained. Correspondence between the CFA and the plaintiff ensued, leading to the issuance of an Order by Tang PJ (as Tang NPJ then was) on 2 August 2017. This order directed the CFA Registry not to accept the plaintiff’s latest filing to appeal against the Registrar’s directions and not to assign an action number to the purported application.

(4)  On 14 August 2019, the plaintiff attempted to submit a Notice of Motion and two bundles purportedly in accordance with Rule 66 of the CFA Rules. On 20 August 2019, Acting Registrar Wong (the defendant in DCCJ 1956/2022 herein) replied and reiterated that FAMC 56/2005 had already been dismissed by the Rule 7 Order.

(5)  On 2 August 2021, the plaintiff approached the Appeals Registry in the High Court with the intention to file two Notices of Application for leave to Appeal out of time against his criminal conviction in DCCC 328/2001. The plaintiff’s application was referred to Master Pang, who then referred it to Macrae VP, who directed that, among other things, “...the case will not be listed for hearing.”

(6)  On 13 August 2021, Eva Lau (D1 in DCCJ 3416/2022 herein), acting as the clerk to Master Pang, issued a letter informing the plaintiff of Macrae VP’s directions. Unfortunately, due to a clerical mistake, an incorrect case number “CACC 128/2020” was cited in the top left corner of the letter. As Coleman J puts it eloquently, “[t]his unfortunate, but swiftly corrected, error has given free rein to the Applicant’s imagination to lead him to believe that there was in fact a CACC reference accorded to his papers, which was later superseded or countermanded.” (See Coomber, Peter John v Lau Ng Wai Lan Rita, [2023] 3 HKLRD 231, at [38])

(7)  On 24 August 2021, Eva Lau rectified the mistake and issued a revised letter with the same content but the correct reference. Through letters dated 2 September 2021 and 6 October 2021, Eva Lau informed the plaintiff that his application would not be listed for hearing and reiterated that no criminal appeal number had been assigned. On 6 October 2021, Eva Lau, acting on the instructions of Master Pang, issued another reply informing the plaintiff that no further action would be taken to present the case before the Court of Appeal.

(8)  Thereafter and until 2 March 2022, there were other exchanges in correspondence between the plaintiff and the court.

(9)  On 2 March 2022, the plaintiff faxed a letter to Registrar Kwang (at the High Court) seeking confirmation that CACC 128/2021 had been assigned to the Form XI application. An interim reply was issued by Sandy Cheung (D2 in DCCJ 3416/2022 herein) on 15 March 2022. Eventually on 28 March 2022, Sandy Cheung issued a letter to the plaintiff containing the reply by Registrar Kwang that no criminal appeal was ever assigned to the plaintiff’s Form XI application.

10.At the hearing of the Petition, in essence, so far as concerns the Petition, the Debtor submitted that:

(1)  DCCJ 1956/2022[1], DCCJ 3416/2022[2] and DCCJ 1129/2023[3] which were applications for “misfeasance in public office” taken out by him against public servants in the public interest were public interest litigations for which there should be no order as to costs relying on Leung Kwok Hung v The President of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR [2014] 17 HKCFAR 841 and Chu Hoi Dick & Anor v Secretary for Home Affairs (unrep) HCAL 87/2007, 6 September 2007;

(2)  The three applications were struck out by HHJ Jonathan Wong[4] (“the Judge”) but instead of seeking leave to appeal from the Judge, he applied directly to the Court of Appeal (according to him because the Judge displayed actual bias in his decisions and was biased in favour of the Government);

(3)  The appeals against the Judge’s decisions in DCCJ 1956/2022 and DCCJ 3416/2022 were ultimately dismissed in CAMP 291&292/2023[5]. However, he submitted that the judges in the High Court awarded costs against him without affording him a statutory oral hearing according to law;

(4)  Furthermore, he submitted the Judge, although he was a judicial officer but as a district judge he was not a “judge”, and the two High Court judges, because of the “civil service judiciary” are not independent and impartial, were biased towards the Government. He relied heavily on the articles of Eric Barnes (former High Court judge and at the time of writing, a magistrate) in the Hong Kong Law Journal (“HKLJ”) in 1976 and Associate Professor Berry FC Hsu in HKLJ in 2004. He therefore submitted that the Judge and the Court of Appeal judges were not impartial and were servants of the Government;

(5)  He also made a number of complaints against the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), such as their evidence filed in the DCCJ actions being forgeries (it was asserted that the affirmations of Eva Lau were not signed by her upon his analysis of her signatures) and various court documents in relation to these proceedings being forged by DOJ by applying the High Court seal (which according to him DOJ had a duplicate set) to various copies of the Petition and also to an Order of Linda Chan J dated 5 January 2026.

11.It seems to me most of the Debtor’s submissions were matters that he had raised but were rejected by previous courts. There was no further appeal against those decisions which resulted in the Costs Orders being made against the Debtor. These matters should not be allowed to be raised again now.

12.In respect of §10(1) above, it would appear that the Debtor had sought to vary the costs order in DCCJ 1956/2022 and DCCJ 3416/2022 on the grounds that they are “public interest litigation” citing Leung Kwok Hung which was rejected by the Judge: see [2023] HKDC 1673 at §§2.1-2.7.

13.In respect of §10(2) above, the Court of Appeal has held that the Debtor ought to have first applied for leave to appeal before the Judge: see CA Decision, §§11-24. His reason for not doing so purportedly because of the bias displayed by the Judge was rejected as “bare assertions which are not supported by any particulars nor has the plaintiff have filed any evidence in support of them. The court will not accept such cryptic, unsubstantiated and un-particularised bare assertions as proof of the existence of any exceptional circumstances”. See ibid, §22.

14.In respect of §10(3) above, as stated in CA Decision, §4, having considered the papers and submissions, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that it is not necessary to hold an oral hearing and that it would be appropriate for them to exercise their discretion to deal with these applications on paper, pursuant to O.59, r.2A(5) of the Rules of High Court. O.59, r.2A(5) provides:

“ The Court of Appeal may –

(a) determine the application without a hearing on the basis of written submissions only; or

(b) direct that the application be heard at an oral hearing,

and in both cases, the Court of Appeal may give such directions as it thinks fit in relation to the application.”

15.In respect of §10(4) above, the two articles and extensive quotations therefrom were submitted to the Court of Appeal in the Debtor’s submissions entitled “Composite Application Bundle Dealing with an Intended Appeal from DCCJ 1956/2022 and DCCJ 3416/2022” dated 27 October 2023 and were considered. The allegations of bias were all dismissed as not arguable: see CA Decision, §§33-43.

16.In respect of §10(5) above, these are very serious allegations made only by way of oral submissions which were not advanced in the Debtor’s Skeleton Argument and were not supported by any cogent evidence. I see no reason for not accepting Mr Hor’s explanation that as additional copies of the sealed Petition were required for service, a copy of the sealed Petition was brought to the High Court and re-sealed which explains the presence of two court seals on one copy of the Petition. I cannot accept the bare assertion that DOJ had a duplicate set of the High Court seal.

17.In any event, even taking into account all his oral submissions which I had carefully considered, I regret to say that none of the matters raised by the Debtor can constitute grounds for this court to go behind the Costs Orders. There has not been any appeal or any successful appeal against the Costs Orders. Any perceived miscarriage of justice based on the very serious allegations that all judges of the High Court are not impartial and not independent, plainly is unsustainable when it remains his bare assertion not being supported with clear and credible evidence.

Disposition and Orders

18.As the Debtor has not satisfied me by sufficiently clear and credible evidence that there is a bona fide dispute of substance in relation to the Costs Orders on which the Petition is based, and the Debtor appears unable to pay the Debt, and there is in my view no other reason to withhold the making of a bankruptcy order against him, I shall make the usual bankruptcy order, with costs, against the Debtor. In these circumstances, there is no basis to award any costs let alone exemplary damages as sought by the Debtor against SJ.

19.The Debtor is directed to file and serve a list of objections (limited to 2 pages) to the Statement of Costs for Summary Assessment dated 15 April 2026 within 7 days from the handing down of this decision for summary assessment of costs by me on paper.

Mr Alvin Hor, Acting Senior Government Counsel of Department of Justice, for the Petitioner

The Debtor appeared in person

The Official Receiver did not appear