Veni Pramata Setiawati v. Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 192/2023 [2026] HKCFI 3013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 192 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Connie Lee:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.By Form 86 filed on 10 February 2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 30 January 2023 (the “Board” and the “Board’s Decision”). By that decision, the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 28 September 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”), which had rejected her non-refoulement claims on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”). 2.The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision. It is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations and descriptions used in the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink[1] to which is included below, are also adopted herein. 3.The Applicant attended the oral hearing. She informed the Court that she has just enrolled her 2-year-old child to a school in Hong Kong and she does not wish to go back to her home country. Discussion 4.Judicial review does not operate as a further avenue of appeal. The Leave Application operates as a “filtering” process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision. The primary decision makers are the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are error of laws, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. [2] 5.In seeking to challenge the Board’s Decision, the Applicant ought to have clearly and precisely identified the grounds relied upon in the Form 86 and in her supporting affirmation. [3] The Applicant’s grounds can be summarized as follows: -
6.I have scrutinized the Board’s Decision carefully and come to the view that none of the aforesaid Grounds can be established or considered as valid or effective public law grounds. 7.First, most if not all of the grounds merely consist of generic, vague and/or unparticularized assertions without reference to any underlying facts or matters establishing why, how and where each of those complaints arise in relation to the Board’s Decision. General assertions without particulars are not effective grounds and cannot assist the Applicant.[4] 8.Ground 2 to Ground 5 are obviously untrue and must be rejected: -
9.Second, the Board was acutely aware of the Applicant’s claim that if she was to be refouled to Indonesia, she would be at risk of the proscribed harm there from her husband (and the loan shark), on account of her failure to repay the loan from the loan shark, to whom her husband, without her knowledge or consent, had provided her name as guarantor for the repayment of the loan. The Board had duly considered the evidence and submissions made by the parties including the documents put forward by the Applicant as well as the COI materials before reaching the findings that (1) the risk that she might suffer serious harm at the hands of her husband and/or the loan shark was low and fell far short of the standard required to warrant international protection (see: Paragraphs 90 and 103 of the Board’s Decision ); (2) there would be adequate state protection and (3) internal relocation would not cause undue hardship or otherwise be unreasonable (see: Paragraphs 96 and 102 of the Board’s Decision). 10.It follows that Ground 1 has no merit and must be rejected. The Board did properly and duly consider the Applicant’s claim with adequate reasons provided. It was simply entitled to come to the conclusions it did and reject the Applicant’s claim. 11.Third, Ground 6 has no substance. Likewise, the Applicant’s latest circumstances of having enrolled her child to a school in Hong Kong also add no substance to the Leave Application. [5] Fourth, in all circumstances, I can discern no error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board in the assessment and rejection of the Applicant’s claim. Conclusion 12.Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success.[6] I dismiss the Application. Dated the 3rd day of June 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL000192_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf [2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]; Nupur Mst v. Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. [3] Ho Loy & Anor v. Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (Unrep.) 22.12.2016 at [142] . [4] Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at [16]. [5] Oguzie Ikechukwu Charles [2022] HKCA 135 at [20]; Adeel Muhammad [2023] HKCA 948 at [5], [7]. [6] Peter Po Fun Chan v. Winnie Cheung & Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||