Marina Bay Sands Pte. Ltd. v. Tsang Yeuk Kwan
Read the full judgment text of HCA 195/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 May 2026.
1. These are appeals brought by Tsang Yeuk Kwan (“D”) against Master Keith Lam’s decisions on 23 December 2025
Cited by 1 case · Cites 7 cases
|
HCA 195/2025 [2026] HKCFI 3271 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 195 OF 2025 ______________________ BETWEEN
______________________
______________________ REASONS FOR DECISION ______________________ 1.These are appeals brought by Tsang Yeuk Kwan (“D”) against Master Keith Lam’s decisions on 23 December 2025
2.At the conclusion of the hearing, I dismissed both appeals for the reasons set out below. Relevant factual background 3.P operates a casino and gaming resort (the “Casino”) in Singapore. 4.D is a Hong Kong permanent resident and was a patron of the Casino owned and operated by P. On 27 June 2016, P and D entered into a credit agreement (“Credit Agreement”) governed by Singapore laws. 5.Between 4 and 13 August 2024, the credit limit was increased to SGD6.3 million by way of 3 Requests to Revise Credit Limit Forms as evidenced by 9 Markers signed by D. 6.D has repeatedly acknowledged the debt but has only made partial repayments in the sum of SGD240,400, leaving a balance outstanding of SGD6,058,132 (the “Outstanding Amount”). 7.The rate of interest under the Credit Agreement is 12% per annum. P seeks contractual interest at that rate from 12 November 2024 until full payment. Procedural history 8.The key procedural steps are the following:
The New Evidence Summons 9.It is common ground that RHC O. 32, r. 11 A (4) applies. In respect of an interlocutory application before a master who has given directions for the exchange of evidence, “no further evidence may be adduced unless it appears to the Court that there are exceptional circumstances making it desirable that further evidence should be adduced.” See Jose Miranda Da Costa v Lorenzo Yih, unrep., HCA 156/2010, 28 April 2014 at §§9-13. 10.In Zhang Jizhi v Hong Kong TV International Media Group Limited & Another [2022] HKCFI 308, after referring to the Ladd v Marshall conditions, Marlene Ng J held (at §99) that in the post-CJR era, it is inconceivable for leave to be granted for filing further evidence “in the absence of genuine extenuating circumstances”. She explained (at §103) that there is no injustice in requiring the defendant to use diligence as is reasonable in the circumstances to put before the Court on the hearing of the Order 14 summons, all the evidence he relies on in defence whereas it would be a great injustice to the plaintiff to allow the defendant to introduce evidence which was readily available upon the original exchange of evidence pursuant to court directions but was not then produced. 11.The New Evidence consists of 3 affirmations[1]. Mr Tan who affirmed Tan 1st is a Singaporean solicitor of Terra Law LLC (“Terra Law”) who sought to give evidence on Singaporean law. His opinion (that if a casino operator permits an intoxicated person to participate in any gaming activities (including assigning markers for chips), it would contravene the relevant Singaporean regulations and thus whatever contract signed by such an intoxicated person would be tainted by illegality and unenforceable under Singaporean law,) is a mainstay of D’s defence to the O. 14 Summons. 12.Mr Tan had co-signed the Letter of Submission dated 11 April 2025 with Patrick Ee (“Mr Ee”) also of Terra Law which referred to Regulation 17 of the Casino Control (Conduct of Gaming) Regulations 2009 (“Regulation 17”) in support of the earlier new evidence summons considered in the 2025 Decision (at §§6(iv), 20-21 and 28). He was therefore already aware of Regulation 17 in April 2025. Tan 1st is dated 1 September 2025. 13.As the intoxication issue was first raised in D 2nd filed on 23 July 2025, it could and should have included Mr Tan’s opinion then. Instead, D did not file Tan 1st until 3 days before the substantive hearing of the Stay Appeal and D’s earlier new evidence summons that resulted in the 2025 Decision. 14.D 3rd seeks to elaborate on the events relating to D’s gambling trip at the Casino in August 2024. There is no reason why that material was not included in D 2nd. 15.Wong 1st sought to attribute the delay to a change of legal team and the need to liaise with Terra Law when Terra Law has been advising D on Singaporean law all along. The change in the Hong Kong legal team could not have been relevant to the issues under Singapore law. 16.The delay in filing the New Evidence Summons was entirely caused by D. Despite having repeatedly acknowledged the debts and made partial repayments, after P commenced this action to recover the outstanding balance, D has adopted delaying tactics. As explained in the 2025 Decision (at §31), D’s conduct that culminated in that Decision cannot be condoned. The New Evidence Summons before this Court is yet another attempt to delay the progress of this action. Such conduct is unacceptable and inexcusable. 17.As regards the substance of Tan 1st, the allegation appears to be that P was in breach of Regulation 17 by allowing D2 to gamble at the Casino in an intoxicated state. However, he recognises that the consequence of any breach is that P would only be subject to disciplinary action under section 54 of the Casino Control Act 2006. 18.Mr Tan then asserts that “whatever contract signed by the patron in the state of intoxication would also be tainted with illegality, rendering it invalid and unenforceable under the laws of Singapore.” He referred to Ting Siew May v Boon Lay Choo [2014] 3 SLR 609 §70 in support but that passage merely states some general factors that the court should consider in assessing proportionality in the context of contracts entered into with the object of committing an illegal act. No illegal purpose is identified when the parties entered into the Credit Agreement or when D signed the Markers. Nor is there any allegation in D 2nd and D 3rd of any intention on the part of P or D or both of performing the Credit Agreement in an illegal manner or entering into the Markers for gaming credit with the intention of contravening any statutory provision. 19.It is entirely unclear how the relevant factors or which of them would be applicable to support Mr Tan’s assertion that whatever contract signed would be unenforceable. Further, while there are references to unauthorised casino promotions, the legal consequence of any breach remains unidentified nor is how that might constitute a defence explained. 20.Finally, Mr Tan’s impartiality and credibility is also problematic. He and Mr Ee of Terra Law sent to P the Notice of Intent to file legal proceedings against P in Singapore dated 18 August 2025. 21.As for D 3rd, it does not cover events that have not already been addressed in his previous affirmations. Supplemental bare assertions can hardly make any material difference to the outcome. 22.Mr Owen Kun, counsel for D, submitted that the test for admitting new evidence should not be “straight jacketed by the Ladd v Marshall conditions[2]”. Even assuming that approach to be correct, I have no hesitation in concluding that D has failed to show any exceptional circumstances in the present case for the New Evidence to be admitted. The summary judgment application
23.The applicable legal principles are trite and a summary of the relevant principles can be found in the judgment of Ng J in Guanghua SS Holdings Limited v Lim Yew Cheng & Another [2022] HKCFI 1052 at §13[3]. 24.D’s affirmation in opposition must “condescend upon particulars”: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol 1, §14/4/4. Faced with an Order 14 application, a defendant cannot be sparing of the particulars of his defence, and then claim, as a result of his own parsimony in details, that there is an obscurity which must await trial for illumination: Sumikin Bussan International (HK) Ltd v The Precast Piling & Engineering Co Ltd, HCA 3814/2001 at §39 per DHCJ Reyes[4].
25.The purpose of D’s trip to Singapore in August 2024 was to seek medical treatment. 26.He arrived in Singapore on 4 August 2024 and stayed at the Marina Bay Sands Hotel in the same suite as Chen Wenbo (“Mr Chen”). D consumed a mix of whisky and red wine as well as medication for his heart condition. That evening he gambled at the Casino. 27.D consumed more than a bottle of whisky every evening during his stay from 4-18 August 2024. 28.He had a medical consultation on 8 August 2024 with a cardiologist who provided a medical report on 10 August 2024 that shook D’s confidence and mood. 29.D’s recollection of events that took place at the material time, namely, from 4 to 13 August 2024 was said to be impaired. He could not recall signing any documents or any of the events at the gaming floor or of the contents of the documents that P’s staff explained to him.
30.Mr Kun raised 2 points by way of defence: (i) D’s intoxication at the material times when he signed the Markers and received the chips from P from 4 to 13 August 2024; and (ii) defects and inconsistencies in P’s case. These will be considered in turn.
31.Mr Kun submitted that because D was heavily intoxicated at the material times, he lacked the requisite capacity to contract with P, rendering the credits advanced by P to D during D’s intoxication unenforceable. Further, it is unlawful under Singaporean law for a casino to allow intoxicated patrons to gamble with the result that the transactions between D and P at the Casino are tainted by illegality and are unenforceable under Singaporean law. 32.Mr Nicholas Hunsworth, Solicitor Advocate and Mr Johnson Ng, Solicitor Advocate appeared for P. D does not deny that he received the gaming credit of SGD6,298,532 for gambling between 4 and 13 August 2024. 33.P submitted that the “intoxication” story is not believable for the following reasons:
34.Those matters aside, D’s evidence is inconsistent:
35.P submitted that, in any event, there is no arguable defence based on intoxication. D has not adduced any evidence on Singapore Law insofar as he is also relying on intoxication as a defence going to D’s capacity. 36.Even if Singapore Law is similar to Hong Kong law on this issue, a contract may be voidable if there is a lack of capacity where the person entering into the contract if he was so drunk that he was unable to understand the general nature and effect of the transaction and the counterparty must have known of his infirmity: Butterworths Common Law Series, The Law of the Contract, 7th edn. at §4.20; Aspinall’s Club Limited v Mr Lester Hui Chun Mo [2023] EWHC 2036 (KB) §§ 301-304. As noted in Aspinall at §306, there are varying degrees of drunkenness/intoxication. D has not shown that he falls within the extreme of not knowing what he was doing. 37.Further, a voidable contract on the ground of drunkenness can be ratified when the intoxicated party has sobered up: The Law of the Contract at §4.20. In the present case, P submitted that by D’s repeated express representations in his WhatsApp messages that he would make repayments, seeking more time to sell his assets for repayments, his conduct in making partial repayments, coupled with the fact that he did not raise the intoxication allegation at that time, D has clearly ratified the 9 drawings of gaming credit as evidenced by the Markers. 38.D was not able to address the points made above. 39.In the circumstances, plainly D has failed to raise an arguable defence based on intoxication.
40.Mr Kun referred to clause 4 of the Credit Agreement which reads as follows:
41.After the Credit Agreement was signed, D made 3 Requests to Revise Credit Limit on 3 separate occasions and days. Each of the Requests (which gave the borrower the option of increasing the credit limit on a temporary or permanent basis) was signed by D and a special employee on behalf of P:
For the 2nd and 3rd Requests, the option selected was for a temporary revision. 42.Mr Kun submitted that in order to increase the credit limit there must be an application by D that has been approved by P prior to any credit being given to D as a borrower. However, according to the Markers, some SGD 4,999,537 worth of the Markers were signed by D by 8 August 2024 before D’s signature on the 2nd Request. 43.He further submitted that the 3rd Request suggests that the 2nd Request was for some reason not approved as the credit limit commenced from SGD3 million. 44.Mr Hunsworth highlighted the fact that those points are new as they had not previously been made by counsel representing D before the Master. 45.While recognising that clause 4 of the Credit Agreement envisages D “first requests” the increase of credit limit, P’s response is that nothing in clause 4 suggests that if P proceeds to grant the credit sought, D signs the Marker and the Request to Revise Credit Limit is submitted by D and approved by P, any such credit would be irrecoverable or that a strict compliance with the time sequence is a condition precedent to any valid credit to be given. The fact that clause 6 provides that P ‘may’ (rather than ‘must’) refuse any request of credit whenever the request exceeds the Credit Limit reinforces P’s interpretation. 46.As to the 2nd Request, both P and D signed it and agreed to the revision of credit to SGD5 million. 47.D’ s submission that the inference to be drawn from the fact that the 3rd Request commenced from SGD3 million is that the 2nd Request was not approved is misplaced. As the 2nd Request was for a temporary revision, it was clearly appropriate to start from SGD3 million for the 3rd Request. 48.D also appears to suggest that there should be “some form of approval” and queries whether P ever approved D’s requests. But as submitted by P, there is no merit in the doubts D sought to raise:
49.For the reasons set out above, D has failed to raise any arguable defence based on “defects and inconsistencies” in P’s case. 50.There being no arguable defence raised, the appeals were dismissed.
Mr Nicholas Hunsworth (Solicitor Advocate) and Mr Johnson Ng (Solicitor Advocate), of Messrs. Johnson Stokes & Master, for the Plaintiff Mr Owen Kun, instructed by Messrs. N. K. Tsang & Co. for the Defendant [1] See §1 (b) above. [2] See per Recorder Richard Khaw SC in Re Primlaks (HK) Ltd [2024] HKCFI 752 at §21. [3] (a) Regarding Alson Tan Aff, the key allegation appears to be that P was in breach of Regulation 17 of the Regulations by allowing D to gamble at its casino in an intoxicated state (which is not believable as submitted below). However, without prejudice to any reply expert opinion P may adduce if so ordered by the Court, Mr. Tan recognises that the consequence of any breach in the Regulations is that P would be subject to disciplinary action under section 54 of the Casino Control Act 2006.
[4] Cited by DHCJ H Au-Yeung (as he then was) in China Construction Bank (Asia) Corporation Limited v Wong Sai Chung [2022] HKCFI 2579 at §19. [5] See 2025 Decision at §§ 21, 49-50. [6] WhatsApp messages dated 23, 26 and 29 August 2024 and 1 January 2025. [7] D 1st at §7. | |||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 195/2025