Kanwaljit Kaur v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 316/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 5 June 2026.
1. By Form 86 filed on 28 February 2023 (the “ Form ”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “ Leave Application ”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “ Board ”) dated 20 February 2023 (the “ Board’s Decision ”).
Cites 3 cases
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HCAL 316/2023 [2026] HKCFI 3218 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 316 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By Form 86 filed on 28 February 2023 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 20 February 2023 (the “Board’s Decision”). 2.On the Form, the Applicant named herself as the proposed respondent and the Board as the proposed interested party. As it is trite that the Board should be the proposed respondent whereas the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) should be the proposed interested party in an application of this sort, I make an order to amend the Form on the Court’s own motion. 3.The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the Leave Application. The hearing took place on 11 May 2026 and the Applicant attended in person. The Applicant however indicated at the hearing that she had nothing to say in respect of the Leave Application, despite having requested the oral hearing herself. Background 4.The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference. Discussion 5.The applicable legal principles relating to application of this sort are well established. The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. (See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14) 6.The Applicant did not provide any grounds in support of the Leave Application on the Form. In the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant simply stated that the Director had failed to consider all matters raised and had failed to give adequate reasons for the decision. She attached a copy of the Board’s Decision to the Affirmation. 7.In so far as the Applicant intended to seek leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Director’s decision dated 13 August 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) in the supporting Affirmation, the application is misconceived. The Director’s Decision had already been superseded by the Board’s Decision. The Director’s Decision is not susceptible to judicial review once appeal to the Board had been pursued (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549, at §§31-45). Accordingly, in so far as the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review in relation to the Director’s Decision, the application fails in limine and is dismissed. 8.I have considered the Board’s Decision in detail. I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Neither has the Applicant been able to demonstrate any of the same. There is nothing to indicate that the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. I note that the Applicant had failed to identify precisely the matters she alleged the Board had overlooked. Contrary to the Applicant’s contention, the Board had provided adequate reasons in support of its decision. The Board was entitled to find the Applicant’s case not credible, vague and dubious for the reasons given (§§33-77 of the Board’s Decision). I see no errors committed by the Board in this regard. The Board’s Decision was well supported by evidence with proper reasons given. The Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. 9.Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Suffice for me to state that in reaching the decision, I have considered all the relevant documents before me. Conclusion 10.In the premises, I make an order that the Form be amended as described above and the Leave Application be dismissed. Dated the 5th day of June 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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