Lala v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 356/2023 [2026] HKCFI 3019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 356 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Connie Lee:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By Form 86 filed on 9 March 2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 9 February 2023 (the “Board” and the “Board’s Decision”). By that decision, the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 28 April 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”), which had rejected her non-refoulement claims on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”). 2.The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision. It is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations and descriptions used in the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink[1] to which is included below, are also adopted herein. 3.The Applicant attended the oral hearing and informed the Court that she got married in Hong Kong and is currently waiting for her visa. Discussion 4.Judicial review does not operate as a further avenue of appeal. The Leave Application operates as a “filtering” process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision. The primary decision makers are the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are error of laws, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.[2] 5.In seeking to challenge the Board’s Decision, the Applicant ought to have clearly and precisely identified the grounds relied upon in the Form 86 and in her supporting affirmation. [3] The Applicant’s grounds can be summarized as follows:-
6.I have scrutinized the Board’s Decision carefully and come to the view that none of the aforesaid Grounds can be established or considered as valid or effective public law grounds. 7.First, most if not all of the grounds merely consist of generic, vague and/or unparticularized assertions without reference to any underlying facts or matters establishing why, how and where each of those complaints arise in relation to the Board’s Decision. General assertions without particulars are not effective grounds and cannot assist the Applicant.[4] 8.Ground 2 to Ground 5 are untrue and must be rejected:-
9.Second, the Board was acutely aware of the Applicant’s claim that she was in fear of harm by the Creditor as her parents had borrowed a loan of which she was a guarantor, and they had no money to repay the loan. The Board duly considered the evidence and submissions made by the parties including the materials submitted to the Director of Immigration and the Applicant’s oral evidence at the hearing and relevant COI materials before rejecting the factual basis of the Applicant’s claim (see: Paragraph 49 of the Board’s Decision). The Board was therefore not satisfied that (1) there was a real chance or risk that the Applicant would be killed or subjected to any form of relevant harm were she to return to her hometown (see: Paragraph 59 of the Board’s Decision); and (2) assistance from the authorities would not be available should the Applicant required the same (see: Paragraph 67 of the Board’s Decision). In any case, the Board was of the view that internal relocation would be viable (see: Paragraph 59 of the Board’s Decision). 10.It follows that Ground 1 has no merit and must be rejected. The Board did properly and duly consider the Applicant’s claim with adequate reasons provided. It was simply entitled to come to the conclusions it did and reject the Applicant’s claim. 11.Third, Ground 6 has no substance. Likewise, the Applicant’s latest factual circumstances regarding her marriage in Hong Kong do not add substance to the Leave Application.[5] 12.Fourth, in all circumstances, I can discern no error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board in the assessment and rejection of the Applicant’s claim. Conclusion 13.Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success.[6] I dismiss the Application. Dated the 5th day of June 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL000356_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf [2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]; Nupur Mst v. Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. [3] Ho Loy & Anor v. Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (Unrep.) 22.12.2016 at [142]. [4] Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at [16]. [5] Oguzie Ikechukwu Charles [2022] HKCA 135 at [20]; Adeel Muhammad [2023] HKCA 948 at [5], [7]. [6] Peter Po Fun Chan v. Winnie Cheung & Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||