Nguyen Ngoc Tuan v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1496/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 June 2026.
1. On 4 September 2025 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in dismissing his appeal regarding his non-refoulement claim upon finding that none of the grounds put forward by him reasonably arguable for his intended challenge given the fact that he at the hearing before the Board withdrew his appeal on his own volition and confirmation that it was safe for him to return to his home country, that there w
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HCAL 1496/2020 [2026] HKCFI 2938 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1496 OF 2020 _____________
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_______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ 1.On 4 September 2025 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in dismissing his appeal regarding his non-refoulement claim upon finding that none of the grounds put forward by him reasonably arguable for his intended challenge given the fact that he at the hearing before the Board withdrew his appeal on his own volition and confirmation that it was safe for him to return to his home country, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration (“Director”) or the Board or in its decision to allow him to voluntarily withdraw his appeal, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application. 2.The Applicant now by a summons issued on 22 September 2025 (of which somehow has only recently been brought to the court’s attention) seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period for him to file his appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A ended on 18 September 2025, and hence he was about 4 days late with his intended appeal. 3.In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346. 4.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 4 days may not be considered significant, for which he explained in his affirmation that he did not understand English and did not know how to file his appeal. 5.The court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 4 September 2025 to his then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, while ignorant of the law or procedural rules can never be accepted as a valid justification for their non-compliance, I am therefore not satisfied that the Applicant has provided any good reason for his delay. Nevertheless, given the relative insignificance thereof, I propose to focus on the prospect of success of his intended appeal. 6.However, the Applicant has failed to put forward any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision or why it may be reasonably arguable that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in his summons or his affirmation. As noted above that the Board’s decision was to allow the withdrawal of his appeal at his own request and confirmation that it was safe for him to return to his home country, henceforth there is simply no proper or legal basis for him to challenge the Court’s decision, and as such I am unable to see any prospect of success in his intended appeal. 7.In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse his application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss his summons.
The Applicant was unrepresented | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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