Mwampiki Sophia Medsony v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 1502/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3236

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1502 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.By a summons filed on 8 May 2026 (“Summons”), the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal my order dated 21 April 2026 (“Order”) wherein I had, pursuant to the observations set out in [2026] HKCFI 1427 (“CALL-1”), refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 3 July 2020 (“TCAB Decision”).

2.In dealing with such I have had regard below to the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen [2025] HKCA 510).

3.In the Summons, the Applicant said that she wants to appeal the Order/CALL-1 and says that “the Judgment [is] unreasonable”. In the Affirmation (which exhibits the CALL-1) the Applicant says she is “late to appeal requesting extension of time”, that she wants to appeal against the Order/CALL-1, and asks for her application to be granted. Neither the Summons nor the Affirmation contain any grounds of appeal.

4.The 14-day period for the Applicant to appeal against the Order expired on 5 May 2026 (RHC O 53 r 3(4)), hence the application is 3 days late. While I do not see that I have been given a credible or valid explanation for the delay, given its length I have focused on the merits of the appeal.

5.It is trite that the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh [2025] HKCA 408). As regards such I had, in my decision, reviewed the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and found no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such. I do not see any proper ground of appeal with any prospect of success, particularly when the Applicant has not identified any ground of appeal or any basis (in the nature of an error of law, any failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst, supra). The mere assertion that the CALL-1 and/or Order were somehow “unreasonable” is patently inadequate to constitute any, or any proper, ground of appeal.

6.It would therefore be futile to extend time to allow the Applicant to mount a hopeless appeal. Doing so would also needlessly prejudice the respondent.

7.I hence, and notwithstanding the relatively short delay, refuse the application and dismiss the Summons.

The Applicant was unrepresented