Re Ferry-hartono
Read the full judgment text of HCB 9013/2025 on BabelCite. This HCB judgment was delivered on 22 June 2026.
1. At the hearing on 22 June 2026, I made the usual bankruptcy order against the Debtor. Here are my reasons for doing so.
Cites 3 cases
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HCB 9013/2025 [2026] HKCFI 3633 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO. 9013 OF 2025 _______________
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_________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT _________________________ 1.At the hearing on 22 June 2026, I made the usual bankruptcy order against the Debtor. Here are my reasons for doing so. 2.By a petition presented on 21 November 2025, the Petitioner seeks a bankruptcy order against the Debtor on the basis of a statutory demand served on him on 25 July 2025 in respect of the amounts in the following cost orders with interest:
3.The petition was listed before DHCJ A Kwong on 30 March 2026. Shortly before the hearing, the Debtor filed a summons to cross-examine the Petitioner, amongst other things, to see if she “appreciates the reality and surrounding and the actions that she has brought”. An affidavit was also filed by the Debtor to support his summons. On 30 March 2026, the learned Judge gave leave to both the Debtor and the Petitioner to file and serve further affirmation evidence, and adjourned the petition and the Debtor’s summons to a hearing on 22 June 2026. 4.On 9 June 2026, the Debtor filed an “ex parte” application to adjourn the hearing on 22 June 2026 pending the resolution of the Debtor’s appeal in DCMP 4097/2021. 5.On 16 June 2026, the Debtor filed a further summons to stay the present bankruptcy proceedings pending the “affirmation” of the Petitioner’s mental capacity in HCMP 25/2024 and his appeal in DCMP 4097/2021. 6.At least 3 weeks have elapsed since the statutory demand was served. Further, the statutory demand has neither been complied with nor set aside in accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules. In these circumstances, the Debtor appears to be unable to pay the debts referred to in the statutory demand. 7.The Debtor advanced three main contentions to avoid the making of a bankruptcy order. First, he intimated that he intends to appeal against Deputy District Judge SP Yip’s decision dated 27 June 2023 in DCMP 4097/2021 (“DCMP Decision”), which would have an impact on of the cost orders made. Further, he contended that the present bankruptcy proceedings should be stayed pending the resolution of a separate court proceedings in HCMP 25/2024 in relation to the Petitioner’s mental capacity. Lastly, the Debtor sought to cross-examine the Petitioner in these proceedings to ascertain her mental capacity. 8.In my view, none of the Debtor’s contentions has any merit to oppose the bankruptcy petition. 9.Where a bankruptcy petition is presented based on a judgment debt, the bankruptcy court would treat the judgment for a sum of money as prima facie evidence that the judgment debtor is indebted to the judgment creditor for that sum. See Re Tam Mei Kam (unreported, CACV 87/2012, 8 March 2013) [22], [22.1] (Yuen JA). 10.According to the evidence produced by the Debtor, he wrote a 20-page Chinese letter to the learned Deputy District Judge on 2 June 2026 to say why he disagreed with various paragraphs of the DCMP Decision. The DCMP Decision was a decision on the preliminary issue about the mental capacity of the Petitioner and decided that the Petitioner was not a mentally incapacitated person as defined in the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap 136). Under RDC O.58, r.2(4), leave to appeal should have been sought from the judge within 28 days from the date of the decision. In other words, the Debtor should have applied for leave to appeal from the learned Deputy District Judge by 25 July 2023 (28 days from 27 June 2023). The Debtor has not explained why he only wrote to the learned Deputy District Judge less than 3 weeks before the substantive hearing of the bankruptcy petition. I am not satisfied that the Debtor has rebutted the prima facie evidence of indebtedness under the cost order of 27 June 2023. 11.Importantly, the Debtor has not put forward any basis to challenge the cost order of 19 June 2023 in DCMP 4097/2021 and the cost order of 8 January 2024 in HCA 752/2021, which also formed the basis of the Petitioner’s statutory demand. 12.At the substantive hearing, the Debtor produced a further affidavit dated 22 June 2026 which to a large extent repeated the matters that were already before the court. The only new matter raised by the Debtor in this new affidavit was that he would file an “appeal” by way of an originating summons to the High Court on 22 June 2026. It is unclear what “appeal” the Debtor referred to in the affidavit. In any event, nothing said by the Debtor in his latest affidavit would change the fact that he has not rebutted the prima facie evidence of indebtedness under the three cost orders made against him. 13.Accordingly, I considered that there was no basis to justify an adjournment or a stay of the petition on the basis of his application to challenge the cost order of 27 June 2023 in DCMP 4097/2021. I therefore dismissed the Debtor’s application to adjourn dated 9 June 2026. 14.As far as the separate proceedings in HCMP 25/2024 are concerned, no sufficient explanation was given by the Debtor as to how the outcome in such proceedings would have any impact on the cost orders comprised in the statutory demand, or in the court’s determination on whether a bankruptcy order should be made. I therefore refused to stay the present petition pending the determination his application in HCMP 25/2024. I also dismissed the Debtor’s summons dated 16 June 2026. 15.Finally, insofar as the Debtor continued to pursue his summons to cross-examine the Petitioner to determine her mental capacity in these proceedings, I saw no basis to accede to it. The Debtor has not produced any material to suggest how the court can compel a party to be cross-examined on his/her mental capacity. Insofar as the Debtor wished to cross-examine the Petitioner himself, I failed to see how the Debtor as a layman would be qualified to do so. In any event, it has been held that the court does not have inherent jurisdiction to order a party to attend a mental health examination: Au Wing Lun v Tam Mei Kam (unreported, HCA 811/2007, 13 July 2007) [25] (J Poon J). Accordingly, I dismissed the Debtor’s summons dated 27 March 2026. 16.For all these reasons, I was satisfied that the Debtor was unable to pay the debts referred to in the statutory demand and accordingly made the usual bankruptcy order against the Debtor.
Ms Larissa L.H. Wong, instructed by CL & Co. Solicitors, for the Petitioner The Debtor appeared in person Ms Lorvan Yiu, of Official Receiver’s Office, for the Official Receiver |