Yiu Hon Yeung v. Director of Housing and Another

HCAL 2611/2025

[2026] HKCFI 3526

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2611 OF 2025

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DECISION ON LEAVE

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A.  Introduction

1.By my decision dated 4 December 2025, [2025] HKCFI 5916 (“Interim Decision”), I dismissed the Applicant’s application for interim relief in the form of a stay of execution of the Notice to Quit (“NTQ”), issued by the Director of Housing (“Director”) on 29 August 2025 to recover possession of a public rental housing unit in Mei Ying House, Shek Kip Mei Estate (“Shek Kip Mei Flat”).

2.In the Interim Decision, I also decided that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be held open, and directed that the Director provide an Initial Response, to which the Applicant may provide a Reply.

3.The Initial Response in English (with a Chinese translation) was filed by the Director on 18 December 2025.

4.By letter dated 23 December 2025, the Applicant sought a lengthy extension of time for him to file his Reply (at least four months from 30 December 2025), and stated that he may require additional time beyond four months which the Court should consider as a possibility. As I did not accept that the matters raised in the Initial Response need any particularly lengthy time for any appropriate Reply, I granted the Applicant an extension of 21 days until 20 January 2026 to file his Reply, which he then filed.

5.Having considered the materials, I am satisfied that the application for leave to apply for judicial review can appropriately be dealt with on the papers. This is my Decision.

B.  Background

6.The facts of particular relevance have been helpfully summarised in the Initial Response and also in my Interim Decision, and can be restated broadly as follows.

7.A tenancy agreement (“Tenancy Agreement”) was entered into between Ms Chan Luk Chee (“Ms Chan”) and the Housing Authority (“HA”) in respect of the tenancy of the Shek Kip Mei Flat, commencing on 25 December 2020. At all material times, Ms Chan was the sole tenant and permitted occupier, and there were no other authorised household members.

8.Clause II(20) of the Tenancy Agreement stipulates that the tenant (i.e. Ms Chan) is prohibited from permitting any person, other than the authorised household members on the list approved by the landlord (i.e. HA), to reside in the Shek Kip Mei Flat. The tenant is required to retain regular and continuous residence in the Shek Kip Mei Flat.

B.1  The Notice to Quit and the Applicant’s Appeal to the Appeal Panel (Housing)

9.Ms Chan, who left no will and no personal representative, passed away on 30 May 2025. Pursuant to section 19(1)(b) of the Housing Ordinance Cap 283 (“HO”) and section 10 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance Cap 10, the HA issued the NTQ to the Official Administrator on 29 August 2025 and terminated Ms Chan’s tenancy of the Shek Kip Mei Flat on 30 September 2025.

10.On 11 September 2025, the Applicant filed an appeal (“Appeal”) to the Appeal Panel (Housing) (“Appeal Panel”) against the NTQ. In the Appeal, the Applicant claimed that he was the “actual user” of the Shek Kip Mei Flat, and alleged that the NTQ was “entirely unjust” because the appeal case was highly relevant to the facts and issues of another case involving the HA (Case No. HD 1-7/COMM2/12/32740) (“Second Case”), which he asserted must be resolved first.

B.2  The Appeal Panel’s Decision to Reject the Applicant’s Appeal

11.By letter dated 17 September 2025, the Appeal Panel informed the Applicant that as he was neither the tenant nor an authorised occupant of the Shek Kip Mei Flat, the Appeal Panel could not accept an appeal lodged by the Applicant against the NTQ.

12.According to the records of the probate search conducted by the solicitors acting for the Director, the Applicant has not applied for a grant of representation in respect of Ms Chan’s estate and has no authority to act on behalf of Ms Chan or her estate, including purporting to lodge the appeal to the Appeal Panel on her behalf.

B.3  The Second Case (Case No. HD 1-7/COMM2/12/32740)

13.The gist of the Second Case is as follows:

(1)  On 14 March 2000, Mr Yiu Pong Chuen (“Mr Yiu”) entered into a tenancy agreement with the HA in respect of a public rental housing unit in Hoi Wen House, Hoi Fu Court, Mongkok West, Kowloon (“Mongkok Flat”). The Applicant has all along been an authorised occupier of the Mongkok Flat.

(2)  After Mr Yiu passed away on 21 September 2015, the HA issued a Notice to Quit to the Official Administrator on 31 July 2024 and terminated the tenancy of the Mongkok Flat on 31 August 2024. Copies of the relevant documents with a covering letter explaining the details were delivered to all surviving authorised family members.

(3)  By letter dated 24 January 2025, the Appeal Panel directed that if the Applicant submitted a duly completed application form together with the required information for taking over the tenancy of the Mongkok Flat on or before 23 July 2025, the Notice to Quit in respect of the Mongkok Flat would automatically become void.

(4)  On 13 August 2025, the HA wrote to the Applicant to:

(a)  confirm that he had satisfied the conditions as set by the Appeal Panel and that the Notice to Quit for the Mongkok Flat had become void; and

(b)  invite him to attend the HA’s office on 22 August 2025 to execute the new tenancy.

(5)  By six letters dated 22 August 2025, 29 August 2025, 5 September 2025, 12 September 2025, 12 November 2025 and 9 December 2025, the HA reiterated that invitation to the Applicant. The HA also informed the 1823 hotline on 15 August 2025 and 19 November 2025 respectively to reply to the Applicant.

(6)  The Applicant replied and declined the HA’s repeated invitations and failed to complete the execution of the new tenancy for the Mongkok Flat.

C.  Applications for Leave and Interim Relief

14.In the Form 86 dated 24 November 2025, the Applicant sought the following relief: (1) a declaration that the recovery of possession of the Shek Ki Mei Flat by the Director is “invalid”; (2) a declaration that the decision by the Appeal Panel is also “invalid”; (3) an order of disclosure from the Director of all relevant documents and information, and all information and documents of the Applicant and all related family members; and (4) interim relief in the form of a stay of execution of the NTQ until a decision on the judicial review (which was rejected by my Interim Decision).

15.The intended grounds of review as relied upon by the Applicant are “Procedural unfairness – Legitimate expectation – Maladministration – Proportionality principle – Factual Mistake”.

16.The Applicant did not file any affidavit or affirmation in support of the Form 86, whether to verify the facts in the Form 86 or otherwise. His affirmation (exhibited with a letter from the Housing Department (“HD”)) filed in support of the interim relief application merely identified the interim relief sought.

17.In his Reply, the Applicant made the following further allegations:

(1)  Breach of Duty of Candour: In judicial review proceedings, the Putative Respondent, as a public law (sic) organisation, and its legal representatives owe the virtuous duty to the Court to frankly disclose all relevant facts. It is suspected that they have breached this duty in the multiple representations in the Initial Response which misled the Court.

(2)  Fettering of Discretion: The HD / Appeal Panel only adopted the named tenant and household members in the tenancy as the sole standard without regard to the uniqueness of individual cases.

(3)  Public Interest: This case concerns the protection for vulnerable groups and the integrity of public organisations, in which public interest of great importance is at stake, and should be adjudicated by the Court.

D.  Analysis

18.First, in any application for leave to apply for judicial review, the applicant is required to demonstrate that he or she has locus or standing to bring his or her case before the Court. The governing provision is to be found in the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) Order 53 rule 3(7), which states that the Court shall not grant leave unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. At the leave stage, the Court should be satisfied as a threshold question that the applicant is prima facie a person with the necessary sufficient interest.

19.Section 20(1) of the HO is also relevant. It provides that the tenant may lodge an appeal with the Appeal Panel within 15 days after the HA serves a Notice to Quit pursuant to section 19(1)(b). In addition, if the chairman of the Appeal Panel is satisfied that the tenant is unable to appeal by reason of ill-health, absence or other cause thought sufficient by the chairman, he may permit an appeal to be made on behalf of the tenant by a person authorised under the lease to occupy the land or part of it.

20.As canvassed above, according to the HA’s records, the Applicant was neither the tenant nor an authorised household member of the Shek Kip Mei Flat. The original tenant, Ms Chan passed away in May 2025 and left no will. So far, no grant of representation has been applied for. With respect, the Applicant’s claim on “facts of residence” because “[he is] neither a ‘lodger’ nor a ‘paying guest’, but resides in the Shek Kip Mei Flat naturally for the responsibility for providing care and the perpetuation of the family” is neither substantiated nor relevant. The Applicant is an unauthorised occupier of the Shek Kip Mei Flat, who, in my view, lacks standing to bring these proceedings.

21.Having carefully considered the issue of locus or standing, it seems to me that this application can be dismissed on the preliminary point of lack of standing.

22.Secondly, on the facts of the present case (and also the Second Case) and on the relevant contemporaneous documents, there is no evidence to suggest the existence of any procedural unfairness and/or breach of legitimate expectation, let alone any maladministration, disproportionality or factual mistake as alleged by the Applicant.

23.Thirdly, one of Applicant’s new allegations is of a breach of duty of candour as allegedly made by the Director in these judicial review proceedings. With respect, this assertion cannot stand. On the contrary, it is the Initial Response (with annexures) filed by the Director that has provided the further background information and documents pertinent to the Applicant’s case (and the Second Case), which are necessary for disposing fairly of the issues before the Court.

24.As is clearly shown in the Form 86 and the Reply, there was a failure on the part of the Applicant in making full and frank disclosure, including in particular the relevant background of the Second Case. It is not for the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction to guess or try to ascertain the details of or particular aspects of the decisions that the Applicant intends to challenge. This is also fatal to the application.

25.Fourthly, another new allegation made by the Applicant is that the HD / Appeal Panel fettered its/their discretion, by only adopting the named tenant and household members in the tenancy as the sole standard without regard to the uniqueness of individual cases. As can be seen in the facts of the Second Case above, the HD has provided multiple opportunities to the Applicant to take over the tenancy of the Mongkok Flat. It is the delay and/or refusal of the Applicant in completing the necessary procedures as required by the HD, which caused the Mongkok Flat to remain vacant for a long period of time and himself to be unable to become the new tenant of the premises. I accept the Director’s submission that the events in the Second Case do not constitute any real reason for the NTQ to be declared invalid or for the HA to withhold obtaining possession of the Shek Kip Mei Flat. There is no reasonably arguable basis to suggest that the Director has fettered his discretion.

26.Fifthly, the Applicant’s last newly made allegation is that the present case concerns protection for vulnerable groups and the integrity of public organisations, in which public interest of great importance is at stake, and should be adjudicated by the Court. With respect, I disagree. On the contrary, it is in the public interest for the HA (by the HD as its executive arm) to issue a Notice to Quit to recover possession of a public rental housing unit in the situation that there is no new tenant (or authorised household members) to take over a tenancy.

27.Lastly, merely providing generic descriptions of some typical headings of public law error in the Applicant’s Form 86 and Reply, without evidence in support, neither make the intended grounds of review become reasonably arguable nor justify the grant of leave to apply for judicial review.

E.  Result

28.On the law and principles applicable, none of the intended grounds as relied upon by the Applicant is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. Leave to apply for judicial review is therefore refused.

29.However, in the exercise of my discretion, I make no order as to costs.

The applicant, acting in person

Li, Kwok & Law, solicitors for the 1^st putative respondent