Aini Anis Noor v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

CACV 363/2026, [2026] HKCA 1137

On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 1840

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 363 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 1391 OF 2025)

_________________

________________

_________________

J U D G M E N T

_________________

Hon Eugene Fung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

Introduction

1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung (“the Judge”) given on 1 April 2026[1] refusing her application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision dated 17 April 2025 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”).  The Board had dismissed her appeal against the decision dated 13 February 2025 of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) which in turn had rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim having regard to the torture risk,[2] BOR 3 risk,[3] persecution risk[4] and BOR 2 risk[5] grounds.

Background

2.The applicant is a national of Indonesia born in 1988.  She last arrived in Hong Kong on 8 April 2024 as a visitor and was allowed to remain until 8 May 2024.  However, she did not leave Hong Kong as required and had overstayed since 9 May 2024.  On 30 July 2024, she was intercepted by the authorities and upon conviction of immigration offences she was sentenced to 10 days’ imprisonment, suspended for a year.  On 8 August 2024, she lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if she were to return to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her husband and the creditors/debt collectors of loans taken out by her husband. Details of the applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the Board’s reasons for rejecting her appeal have been set out in the Board’s decision.[6]  Essentially, the Board rejected the factual claims of the applicant on credibility grounds, and found that even accepting that her claims were true, she had not met the requirements entitling her to protection under any of the applicable grounds.

3.By a Form 86 filed on 18 June 2025, the applicant applied for leave to judicially review the Board’s decision.  In her supporting affirmation, she stated that she objected to the Board’s decision and would like to speak to the adjudicator again.  She did not raise any specific grounds for the intended judicial review.  The Judge dismissed her application for reasons set out in [12] to [16] of the Form CALL-1 dated 1 April 2026.  We will not repeat them.

Appeal to this Court

4.On 8 April 2026, the applicant filed her Notice of Appeal against the Judge’s decision and stated that she would like the Court of Appeal to review her application as the Judge’s decision was reached unreasonably.  No specific error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality was identified in either the Board’s decision or the Judge’s decision. 

5.As the applicant did not lodge any written submissions, the scheduled hearing of her appeal was vacated pursuant to the directions of the Court.  We therefore determine the appeal on the basis of the available documents and materials.

Discussion

6.In assessing the merits of the appeal, we have regard to the legal principles which this Court has adopted in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11].  In particular, the role of the court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  In the determination of an appeal against the refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  It is not the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if the appeal were a fresh application for judicial review.

7.Further, it is well-established that assessments of evidence, country of origin information (COI), risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director as they are primary decision makers.  The court, in its supervisory role, will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022.

8.In the present case, the Board found that the applicant’s claim was not credible as there were multiple inconsistencies and contradictions in her account of the loan and the alleged attacks from the creditors/debt collectors.  Her behaviour was also inconsistent with her alleged fear of her husband and the creditors; she never hid from them and had stayed at two known addresses.  She had also used family money to travel to Hong Kong instead of repaying the loans, and had only raised a claim for protection three months after she had overstayed in Hong Kong.  The Board assessed that even taking her allegations at their highest, there was no real chance of harm.  The Board assessed on the basis of the COI that reasonable state protection is available in Indonesia despite the presence of corruption, as the country information showed that the authorities have been taking active steps to combat corruption and to improve police efficiency.  Although it was not necessary to address the question of internal relocation, the Board assessed that the applicant could reasonably relocate to large cities like Jakarta or Bali where she could find work and avoid her husband and the creditors, given their limited resources and network.  The Board thus concluded that the applicant failed to satisfy the requisite entitlement to protection under any of the applicable grounds.

9.These are findings open to the Board based on the evidence it received and for the reasons it gave.  In her application for leave to apply for judicial review, the applicant had not pointed to any specific error in the Board’s findings or provide any particulars to support her objection of the Board’s decision.  The applicant failed to show any reasonably arguable public law error in relation to the Board’s decision.

10.In this appeal, the applicant merely stated that the Judge’s decision was reached unreasonably, without pointing to any specific legal error, procedural defect or irrational finding in the Judge’s reasoning.  She had not put forward any viable ground to challenge the Judge’s decision. In the circumstances, there is no proper basis for this Court to disturb the Judge’s decision.

11.In any event, by a letter dated 13 May 2026 (and received by the High Court on 18 May 2026), the applicant informed the Court that she would like to “close/withdraw case” because she wants to go back to Indonesia.  The letter was written in Indonesia and was subsequently sent to the Court Language Section for translation into English.  The translation of the letter only came to this Court’s attention on 17 June 2026.

12.Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The Applicant acted in person.

[1]    [2026] HKCFI 1840

[2]    This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[3]    This refers to risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[4]    This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[5]    This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.