Bhupinder Singh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

CACV 423/2026, [2026] HKCA 1100

On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 1473

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 423 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1516 OF 2021)

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BETWEEN

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims)  Lewis Law (“the Judge”)  dated 10 April 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 1473)  (“the Leave Decision”)  dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”)  against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”)  dated 19 October 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 October 2020, refusing his non refoulement claim.

2.The applicant is a national of India.  The basis of his non-refoulement claim is that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his uncle, who was allegedly associated with a member of the Legislative Assembly, owing to an alleged land dispute.  His background, the basis of his claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal were set out in the Board’s Decision: see [1] – [2] of the Leave Decision.  The Board accepted the applicant’s claims that he was harassed, assaulted and threatened by his uncle over the land dispute, and that if he were to return to his hometown, there was a real risk that he would be targeted for harm again. However, the dispute was a private one, with no state involvement. Nor was there any risk that the uncle would deprive the applicant of his life. The applicant was therefore unable to substantiate his claims for non-refoulement protection. In any event, the applicant could be internally relocated, and there would be no real risk to him if he were relocated to Chennai.

3.The Judge set out his reasons for refusing the Leave Application at [3] – [4] of the Leave Decision.  He noted that the applicant had not set out any grounds for seeking judicial review, and only said that his claim had not been carefully considered.

4.By the Notice of Appeal filed on 24 April 2026, the applicant claimed:

“I do not agree with the decision of the Court of First Instance.  The Court did not scrutinize my claim properly. Despite my problem in my home country is very severe the Court of First Instance and the Torture Claims Appeal Board rejected my claim.  The decision makers considered my claims as a simply.  If I return to my country I will be killed by my enemies.” (sic)  

5.In support of his appeal, the applicant also lodged written submissions on 1 June 2026.  In those submissions, he claimed that the Judge erred in failing to apply the principles of irrationality, procedural unfairness, and unreasonableness and that the Judge failed to analyse his claims properly.  The applicant alleged that his problems remain severe in his home country and his enemies are still looking for him and he will face hardship upon refoulement.  He further complained that the Board failed to give him sufficient chance to arrange relevant evidence and irrationally failed to analyse whether there was a consistent pattern of gross and mass violation of human rights in his country and whether state protection existed.

6.We heard the appeal on 15 June 2026.  A Punjabi interpreter was also present to provide language assistance.  At the hearing, the applicant confirmed he had nothing to add to the written materials submitted in support of his appeal.

DISCUSSION

7.The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non- refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

8.In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.  See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

9.At the outset, the assertions made by the applicant are mostly new grounds not raised before the Judge.  It is well established that this Court will generally not entertain new arguments which are fact-and-evidence sensitive which have not been canvassed at the Court of First Instance and for which leave has not been sought within time: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Gurpreet Singh [2021] HKCA 1740 at [15].  On this basis alone, his appeal must be dismissed.

10.In any event, we see no merit in his contentions.  Nowhere in his Notice of Appeal did the applicant identify any error committed by the Judge with specific particulars.  His assertions against the Board’s Decision are general and bare allegations unsupported by reference to the facts of his case.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. 

11.Furthermore, the applicant’s complaints against the Board’s Decision have no merit.  The Board had in mind the relevant principles concerning state protection, torture risk, and the assessment of whether a Risk State had a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights: see [23] and [29(c)] of the Board’s Decision.  However, having considered the individual circumstances of the applicant, in particular, that reasonable internal relocation would be available to him and that he failed to substantiate his claims for non-refoulement protection, it was open to the Board to consider it unnecessary to make any findings in relation to the level of state protection, state acquiescence, or whether the Risk State had a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights: see [47] and [54] of the Board’s Decision.  The Board also gave the applicant ample opportunities, both orally and in writing, to present his case, including attendance at an oral hearing on 19 March 2021 where the applicant made oral submissions with the assistance of an interpreter: see [8] and [27] of the Board’s Decision. Plainly, there is no merit in the applicant’s assertions.  As noted by the Judge at [4] of the Leave Decision, the Board conducted an anxious scrutiny of the facts of the case and assessed intensely the factual issues arising, and there was no public law error in the Board’s Decision.  We see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.

12.For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.

The Applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person