Gelvolea Esperanza Torre v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 259/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 July 2026.

1. By a Form 86 filed on 21 February 2023 (the “ Form ”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 2 February 2023 (the “ Board ”, the “ Board’s Decision ”) and the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 20 January 2022 (the “ Director ”, the “ Imm Decision ”) (the “ Leave Application ”).

Cites 5 cases

Case No.HCAL 259/2023[2026] HKCFI 3772
Court
High Court CFI
Date10 Jul 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 259/2023

[2026] HKCFI 3772

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 259 of 2023

BETWEEN

  Gelvolea Esperanza Torre Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Putative
  Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following;

    consideration of documents only;          or
   consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Sabrina Ho:

1.  The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the putative respondent and the Director of Immigration as the putative interested party.

2.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By a Form 86 filed on 21 February 2023 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 2 February 2023 (the “Board”, the “Board’s Decision”) and the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 20 January 2022 (the “Director”, the “Imm Decision”) (the “Leave Application”).

2.The Imm Decision is not susceptible to judicial review as it has been superseded by the Board’s Decision once an appeal against it to the Board has been pursued by the Applicant: see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549 at para. 45. Thus, I will treat the Leave Application to cover the Board’s Decision only.

3.I amend the Form on my own volition to name the Board as the putative Respondent and the Director as the putative interested party.

4.In the Affirmation in support of the Leave Application (the “Affirmation”), the Applicant exhibited a copy of the Board’s Decision. While the Applicant claimed in the Affirmation that details of her grounds in support of the application will be provided later, this has not been done.

5.The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the Leave Application, which took place on 15 June 2026 (the “Hearing”). At the Hearing, the Applicant said that she has nothing to add.

Background

6.The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference.

Discussion

7.The Applicant has not identified any ground in support of the Leave Application, whether in the Form, the Affirmation or at the Hearing.

8.The relevant legal principles are well established. The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at para. 14; Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at para. 11. There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.

9.Having considered all the relevant materials before me, I do not consider the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s Decision to be reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

10.I have reviewed the Board’s Decision in detail. The Board had fully considered the Applicant’s evidence and her grounds for challenging the Director’s decision in refusing her claim for non-refoulement protection. On the facts, the Board found that the Applicant’s assertions that she fears that creditors of her deceased husband’s alleged creditors would kill/harm her if she returns to the Philippines to be incredible. The Board found that the Applicant has failed to establish any substantial grounds which support her claim that she will face any real risk of ill-treatment if she returns to the Philippines: see the Board’s Decision paras 29-35. On the above bases, the Board found that the Applicant would not face any Persecution Risk, BOR 2 Risk, BOR 3 Risk or Torture Risk[2] if she returns to Philippines and rejected the Applicant’s appeal: see the Board’s Decision paras. 36-44. I do not consider there to be any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.

11.Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and this Court is not expected to give elaborated reasons for its decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at para. 23. I have considered all the relevant materials in reaching the present decision.

Conclusion

12.For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Leave Application.

Dated the 10th day of July 2026

  (Klein Tse)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant on 10/7/2026

Gelvolea Esperanza Torre

Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 10/7/2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 19881

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 2422/21 (formerly RBCZ 5000158/21)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



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