Re Khanom Sharifa

CACV 484/2026, [2026] HKCA 1187

On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 2476

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 484 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 3289/2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge To (“the Judge”) given on 30 April 2026[1] (“the Leave Decision”) refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 30 October 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 8 January 2019 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

2.The applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the Board’s reasons in reaching the Board’s Decision have been set out therein[2] as well as by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [2]-[4], which will not be repeated. 

3.After considering the documents filed by the applicant as well as the oral submissions she made at the hearing of the leave application, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated at [6]-[10] of the Leave Decision. 

Appeal to this court

4.In a Notice of Appeal dated 12 May 2026, the applicant stated inter alia that she would face hardship should she be refouled, and that the Board had “significantly relied on the source of news which is not officially recognised” and on “some cases which are outdated”.

5.In her written submissions dated 9 June 2026, the applicant referred, inter alia, to the well-established principles in ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[3] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514. 

6.We heard the appeal on 2 July 2026, at which the applicant was absent.  We will therefore proceed to determine the appeal on the basis of the documents filed with the court.  

Discussion

7.As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review.  It is necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that would justify this court in intervening: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  An appeal is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge.  In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

8.The applicant has failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant were bare assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.

9.In the present case, the Board found on the evidence that the applicant would not face a real risk of harm should she be refouled.  The Board was unconvinced that she would be targeted by members of the Awami League merely because she was a supporter of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and that her voluntary and uneventful return to Bangladesh in September 2014 pointed to the fact that no such real risk of harm existed.  These were factual findings open to the Board on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [4]-[10].  We see no basis to interfere.

10.The applicant has accordingly failed to demonstrate how the Board had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.

11.Further, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate on whether and, if so, how the trite principles referred to in her written submissions had not been properly applied by the Judge or by the Board in the determination of her claim/appeal.

12.As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision.  There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.

The applicant, unrepresented, absent