Dong Dezhi v. Officers of the Labour Tribunal

HCAL 1262/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4071

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1262 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.The Applicant is the claimant in Labour Tribunal proceedings, LBTC 1562/2026.  The Putative Interested Party is the respondent in the Tribunal proceedings.  Those proceedings are at an interlocutory stage, and various interlocutory directions have been made by Tribunal officers.  The pre-trial review (“PTR”) hearing and the trial are yet to occur.

2.By Form 86 dated 13 July 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge what was written in correspondence by Tribunal officers in letters dated 29 June 2026, 30 June 2026, 6 July 2026 (two letters) and 8 July 2026 (two letters) “together with the underlying decisions therein”.

3.I note from a Memorandum dated 14 July 2026 that the Applicant has filed an application for legal aid, which triggered the automatic 42-day stay.  But, in light of my findings below, I see no prejudice to the Applicant in lifting the stay with immediate effect, which I have done.

4.Having considered the materials put forward by the Applicant in support of his application, I am satisfied that it can appropriately be dealt with on the papers. 

5.This is my Decision.

B.  The Application

6.As stated, the application centres on correspondence sent by the Tribunal to the Applicant as claimant in the proceedings.  Copies of the correspondence are attached to the Applicant’s affidavit, and can be described or summarised as follows:

(1)  The letter dated 29 June 2026 merely informs the Applicant that his earlier letters received by the Tribunal on 16 and 17 June 2026 are currently being processed, and asked him to await the reply.

(2)  The letter dated 30 June 2026 is a response to the Applicant’s letter dated 17 June 2026, and informs the Applicant (1) to refer to the Tribunal’s letter dated 25 June 2026, (2) that a PTR hearing will take place on 14 July 2026, and (3) that there will not be any hearing before the PTR hearing on 14 July 2026.

(3)  One letter dated 6 July 2026 is a response to the Applicant’s letter dated 15 June 2026, and provides a timeline as to the issuance of some of the Tribunal’s earlier letters to the claimant.

(4)  A second letter dated 6 July 2026 is a response to the Applicant’s letters dated 17 and 30 June 2026, and provides a timeline as to the issuance of the Tribunal’s letter to the claimant dated 12 May 2026.

(5)  One letter dated 8 July 2026 informs the Applicant that (1) his application for the recusal of both the Presiding Officer and the Deputy Presiding Officer from any further handling of the case is refused, (2) as regards a new application made on 30 June 2026, the Applicant should refer to the Tribunal’s letter of 25 June 2026, and (3) the Applicant’s application for transcripts is refused.

(6)  A second letter dated 8 July 2026 informs the Applicant that (1) the PTR fixed for 14 July 2026 and the trial fixed for 13-14 August 2026 are vacated pending the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal made in the High Court, and (2) the parties should refix the PTR and trial dates after conclusion of the Applicant’s appeal in the High Court.

7.As is obvious from that last letter, and as referred to by the Applicant in the papers filed for these proceedings, the Applicant has indeed commenced HCLA 21/2026, seeking leave to appeal against decisions of the Tribunal under section 32 of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance Cap 25.

8.It is in those circumstances that the Applicant also says that the application for leave to apply for judicial review made in these proceedings is solely to preserve his public law remedies in light of the requirement that judicial review be commenced promptly, and is not intended to duplicate or circumvent the statutory appeal process.

9.The Form 86 states that the application is advanced on the following intended grounds of judicial review:

(a)  Failure to exercise jurisdiction, by failing to determine substantive application is properly before the Tribunal.

(b)  Procedural unfairness, by responding to correspondence without determining the substantive issues raised.

(c)  Failure to take relevant matters into account, including the Applicant Austria’s application to amend the written Order dated 15 May 2026 and the supplementary submissions concerning the witness summons application.

(d)  in adequate reasons, by refusing applications or referring to earlier correspondence without addressing the issues raised.

(e)  Failure to determine the Applicant’s request for record of verification, by providing only a narrative chronology without producing the requested records or giving reasons for refusing the request.

C.  No Merit in the Application

10.As is also obvious from the description of the correspondence (see above), most of the letters simply do not contain any ‘decision’ whatsoever, but merely inform the Applicant of various procedural dates and circumstances.  Any attempt to challenge those letters by way of judicial review is a complete non-starter.

11.Only the first letter of 8 July 2026 might be said to contain any actual ‘decision’.  But the Applicant also faces further insurmountable hurdles.

12.First, it is trite that judicial review is a remedy of last resort, and leave to apply for judicial review will ordinarily be refused where there is an available alternative remedy.  Here, there is such an available alternative remedy.  The Applicant has pursued that remedy in seeking leave to appeal in HCLA 21/2026.  It is not open to the Applicant to adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude, where he presumably thinks he should be granted leave to appeal, but in case he is not. For that reason alone, I would refuse leave to apply for judicial review.

13.In so far as the Applicant suggests that the Court might stay these proceedings, or otherwise case manage them, pending the determination of HCLA 21/2026, that is inappropriate and I refuse that suggestion.  If there is no proper basis for making the application now, it should be dismissed.

14.Secondly, the intended grounds of review advanced are essentially little more than recitation of the heads of challenge typical in and applicable to judicial review proceedings.  With respect, they do not seem to me properly to identify public law grounds of review, in breach of the mandatory requirements under Order 53 rule 3.  This may well be because almost all the letters the target of the intended challenge do not actually contain any decision.

15.Thirdly, the Court exercising its judicial review supervisory jurisdiction does not exist to micro-manage interlocutory proceedings and case management directions given in the Tribunal.  Indeed, only case management decisions appear to have been made, and no substantive decisions have been made as might be of sufficient finality (or, if they have, they are subject to the application for leave to appeal).  As already noted the PTR and the trial dates have been vacated and will be refixed after the determination of the application for leave to appeal.

D.  Result

16.The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success.  Most of his intended challenge is also directed at matters which do not amount to decisions, but are merely the content of informative correspondence or responses to his correspondence or interlocutory applications made to the Tribunal.  Insofar as the correspondence identifies the making of any decisions, they are interlocutory or case management matters which are inapt for the judicial review by this Court.  Further, the Applicant has and is exercising an available alternative remedy.

17.In those circumstances, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The applicant, acting in person