Steadyprofit Ltd v. Appeal Tribunal (Buildings)
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2346/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 July 2026.
1. This judicial review application arises out of the issuance of a building order dated 30 November 2023 (“Order”), issued by the Building Authority (“BA”) under section 24(1) of the Building Ordinance Cap 123 (“BO”). The Order required the Applicant to demolish or reinstate parts of the concerned property affected by alleged unauthorised building works (“UBWs”). The Applicant appealed against the Order to the Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (“BAT”).
Cites 3 cases
|
HCAL 2346/2025 [2026] HKCFI 4019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2346 OF 2025 ________________________
________________________
___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ A. Introduction 1.This judicial review application arises out of the issuance of a building order dated 30 November 2023 (“Order”), issued by the Building Authority (“BA”) under section 24(1) of the Building Ordinance Cap 123 (“BO”). The Order required the Applicant to demolish or reinstate parts of the concerned property affected by alleged unauthorised building works (“UBWs”). The Applicant appealed against the Order to the Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (“BAT”). 2.By the Form 86 dated 20 October 2025, the Applicant seeks to challenge the determination of the BAT dated 21 July 2025 that no good cause had been shown for holding a full hearing of the Applicant’s appeal (“Determination”). 3.By way of relief, the Applicant seeks:
4.The matter was brought to a ‘rolled-up’ hearing on 22 January 2026, where the Applicant was represented by Mr Ian Chau of Counsel, and the BA was represented by Mr Tommy Cheung of Counsel and Mr Edward Chik, Senior Government Counsel. As would be expected, the BAT did not appear and was not represented. 5.At the end of the argument at the hearing, I reserved my decision to be handed down later. 6.This is my Judgment. B. Background B.1 The Property and the STT 975 7.On 12 September 1996, the Applicant became the registered owner of House 7 of Beaulieu Peninsula in Tuen Mun (“Property”), which included a garage and a garden. 8.Adjacent to the Property is an area (“STT Area”), specifically a natural slope leading to the seafront, owned by the Government. 9.Almost 8 years later, the STT Area was leased by the Government to the Applicant under a Short Term Tenancy (“STT”) No. 975 dated 11 July 2005 (“STT 975”). The STT 975 was for a term certain from 12 August 1997 to 31 March 2000, and thereafter quarterly until such time as the tenancy is determined. 10.Material sections of the STT 975 are as follows:
11.The STT 975 was followed by renewals by way of renewal letters from the District Lands Officer, Tuen Mun (“DLO”) dated 9 May 2012 (“2012 DLO Letter”), 22 May 2022, and 24 December 2024. B.2 The Order 12.In around April 2011, the Buildings Department (“BD”) announced its new enforcement policy against UBWs, which adopted a wider scope for enforcement action “so as to remove UBWs in a more comprehensive and systematic manner”. The previous ten-year programme of UBW removal focused on those constituting a “higher risk to public safety or an obvious or imminent danger to life or property”, whereas the new enforcement policy, effective 1 April 2011, extended coverage of actionable UBWs to include UBWs on rooftops and podiums as well as those in yards and lanes of buildings, irrespective of their risk to public safety or whether they are newly constructed. This included inter alia (a) items constituting obvious hazard or imminent danger to life or property, (b) new items (excluding statutorily exempted building works under the BO) irrespective of the date of completion of the building where such items have been carried out, (c) items on the exterior of buildings, including those on rooftops and podiums, in yards and lanes and projecting from external walls, and (d) items in or on buildings constituting a serious health or environmental nuisance. 13.In 2023, the Property was selected as one of the target buildings nominated by the BD for Large Scale Operation, namely Comprehensive Unauthorised Building Works Clearance 2023. 14.In October 2023, the Existing Buildings Division of the BD carried out inspections of the Property and the STT Area. A total of 16 UBWs were recorded, including UBW 16 which was in relation to structures erected on and over the STT Area (“STT Structures”), described in the Inspection Photographic Record Sheet dated 15 November 2023 as structures erected beyond the turfing slope area adjoining the LG/F garden and the STT Area, with several levels of structures leading from LG/F garden connecting with stairs to the sea. 15.On 30 November 2023, the BA issued the Order requiring the Applicant to demolish or reinstate parts of the building affected by the UBWs (all 16 of them). The STT Structures were specified under §1(b)(xvi) of the Order, and were referred to as “structures erected on and over [the STT Area]”. The STT Structures appear to refer to railings, a balustrade and platforms with a staircase leading to the sea in front of the Property. The Applicant was required to commence the works within 90 days and complete such works within 180 days of the date of the Order, all to the satisfaction of the BA. 16.By letter dated 28 February 2024, the DLO reminded the Applicant of the Order and asked the Applicant to submit a remedial proposal for removal and remedial works of the STT Structures. However, by that date, the Applicant had already appealed against the Order (see below). 17.There was and is a significant factual dispute as to the erection of the STT Structures. The Applicant alleges that the STT Structures existed on the STT Area before the Applicant applied for the STT in around 1997-8, and later granted. The BA’s stance that this is a bare assertion, and the STT Structures did not form part of the STT Area prior to it being subject to the STT 975. I will return to this point later as it forms a significant part of the Applicant’s challenge. B.3 The Applicant’s Appeal to the BAT 18.By Notice of Appeal dated 19 December 2023, the Applicant appealed to the BAT against the Order. 19.On 14 February 2025, a preliminary hearing was held before the BAT (“Preliminary Hearing”), at which the Applicant was required to show good cause to proceed to a full hearing. 20.At the Preliminary Hearing, the Applicant submitted, amongst other things, that:
B.4 The Determination 21.On 21 July 2025, the BAT rendered the Determination, whereby the BAT rejected the Applicant’s arguments and ruled there was no good cause for holding a hearing, thus dismissing the appeal. 22.These proceedings were commenced on 20 October 2025. However, it is important to note that the intended judicial review challenge has focused on UBW 16, namely the STT Structures, and that part of the Determination dealing with the appeal in that respect. 23.It is, therefore, apt to set out the relevant part of the Determination:
24.As will be seen, the argument in this application replicates in large part that advanced in the BAT, and forms the foundation for the challenge to the Determination. C. Relevant Statutory Provisions 25.The purpose of the BO, as expressed in its long title, is to “provide for the planning, design and construction of buildings and associated works; to make provision for the rendering safe or dangerous buildings and land; to make provision for regular inspections of buildings and the associated repairs to prevent the buildings from becoming unsafe; and to make provision for matters connected therewith”. 26.Part of the argument in this case arises from the exemption provisions found in section 41 of the BO, the material parts of which are as follows:
27.By reference to the exemption provided for in section 41(1)(ba), it can be noted that under section 2 of the Land (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance Cap 28, “unleased land” simply refers to land which is not leased land. It is also appropriate to recognise here that the argument based upon the section 41(1)(ba) exemption was not advanced before the BAT (a point to which I shall return later). 28.As stated, the Order in this case was issued pursuant to section 24(1) of the BO. It is well-settled that the wording of that section gives the BA a discretion as to whether or not to issue a building order. But the discretion is limited or circumscribed, in the sense that it cannot be exercised to defeat the purpose of the BO. 29.There is no dispute that the Order was appealable under the BO, and that the time for appealing was 21 days. In more detail as to appeals, the provisions of the BO material for present purposes are as follows:
30.I have previously set out the applicable principles for a preliminary hearing before the BAT in numerous cases, but it may be useful to summarise them once more:
D. The Intended Grounds of Review 31.The Applicant put forward three intended grounds of review:
32.As summarised by Mr Chau, these grounds relate to express exemptions on section 41 of the BO, as well as related legitimate expectation, and their application to fixtures which were extant on Government land, before it was disposed of as garden extensions by way of STT 975. 33.For his part, Mr Cheung submitted that whilst two of the intended grounds are structured as errors of law and fact, fundamentally the Applicant is disagreeing with the BAT’s rejection of its arguments advanced before the BAT. Further, there was no error of law in ruling that the Government had not, by any conduct or otherwise, created any legitimate expectation for the Applicant that no action to enforce against the STT Structures would be taken. 34.Though there is some considerable overlap amongst them, I can deal with the intended grounds each in turn. E. Ground 1: Error of Law in Construing Exemptions 35.Ground 1 concerns the interpretation of section 41 of the BO. The Applicant’s case is twofold, being (1) the STT Structures are fixtures which belong to the Government (as owner of the STT Area), and therefore (2) the Order was issued wrongly. 36.Interwoven was the Applicant’s contention in the Preliminary Hearing (and repeated in this leave application) that the STT Structures had been in existence in the STT Area since 1997, when the Applicant first applied for the STT. As such, the Applicant generally submits that the STT Structures were exempt from the BO by virtue of section 41(a), i.e. “buildings belonging to the Government”. Put shortly, Mr Chau submitted that if the STT Structures already existed in 1997, they existed on “unreleased land” and were therefore within the exemptions; and they could not have become UBWs merely upon the grant of the STT 975. 37.It is convenient to repeat that at §§62 and 63.4 of the Determination, the BAT found that:
38.The Applicant’s challenge focuses on the part that “buildings belonging to the Government” referred to structures “legally owned” by the Government, and that the Applicant’s interpretation of section 41(a) would inevitably lead to a conclusion that unlawful building structures on government land would become property or be in the rightful possession of the Government, even if the Government never owned, built nor approved of such building structures. 39.Mr Chau’s submissions might be summarised as follows:
40.Mr Chau also made submissions by reference to section 41(1)(ba) of the BO, which he said would be applicable even if there were doubts as to whether the STT Structures belong to the Government. That section provides for the exemption relating to any “unleased land”. Mr Chau submitted that there can be no question that before the grant of the STT to the applicant by the STT 975, the land comprising the STT Area with the STT Structures on it was “unleased land”, so exempt from the BO, and they were not UBWs. The grant of the STT in 2005 (albeit backdated to 1997) could not somehow transform into UBWs things which were previously not UBWs and/or exempt. 41.Mr Chau acknowledged that this argument had not been specifically raised before the BAT, but submitted that it should nevertheless be considered where (1) the exemption was part and parcel of the same section 41 exemptions to be construed as a whole, (2) no factual evidence necessary to consider the point is missing, (3) reference had been made at the BAT to the description of the Government as owner of the unleased land, (4) similar issues were already before the BAT, not least in relation to legitimate expectation. 42.I accept that at face value these submissions have some apparent force. 43.But, on the other side of the argument, I note Mr Cheung’s submission that the question of whether or not an item is a fixture must be supported and proved by evidence, and that it does not follow that an item of a large size and/or placed at a site for a long period of time will necessarily become a fixture. Indeed, the classification of something as either a fixture or a chattel may depend objectively on the degree of annexation and the object or purpose of annexation. 44.There is also some force to his submission that there must be some degree of intention or knowledge on the part of the receiving party before property rights can transfer. In particular, Mr Cheung stressed the danger of Mr Chau’s interpretation, namely that dangerous structures built on Government land become Government property if there is sufficient annexation. That is all the more so where the Government appears to have been unaware of the STT Structures. He submitted that this goes against the very purpose of the BO. 45.Mr Cheung further submitted that, under §29(e) of the STT 975 the Government reserves the right to “take appropriate action” under the BO in respect of any structure or building erected on the STT Area. Therefore, he said, as a matter of law, the BA is statutorily required to take action against unlawful structures notwithstanding the Government’s private capacity as landlord in the STT 975. Even if the STT Structures were in fact fixtures upon the STT Area, that would not by itself preclude the BA from issuing the Order to remove them. 46.As to the Applicant’s new point on section 41(1)(ba), Mr Cheung submitted that the point should never be entertained but would be rejected on its merits in any event. It would be objectionable to deal with a new point on judicial review where the Court cannot decide on the preliminary point afresh when it was neither raised before nor decided by the BAT. No criticism of the BAT for making an error of law could possibly succeed if the argument on law was not presented to begin with. The point does require evidential foundation to establish the factual status and circumstances of the STT Structures at any relevant or material times. 47.However, ultimately it seems to me that the key point was that all of the argument depended upon the factual assertion that the STT Structures were already present on the STT Area prior to 1997. However, as noted by the BAT at §63.4 of the Determination, the Applicant adduced no evidence on the age of the STT Structures. With respect, acceptance of the Applicant’s contentions at face value in the absence of any bona fide evidence would be contrary to the procedural and evidentiary rules of the preliminary hearing process. As I have set out above, the burden was on the Applicant to prove any matters it wished in support of its case. For similar points, or the application of the points, reference can also be made to Magic Key Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) [2020] HKCFI 1716, and Lo Yin Ming v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) [2011] 3 HKLRD 573. 48.In the First Schedule of the STT 975, the particulars of the premises are simply given as “all that piece of ground situate at Beaulieu Peninsula, Tuen Mun, New Territories, Hong Kong comprising an area of 113 square metres or thereabouts…”. There is no mention of or reference to the STT Structures in any way. The Applicant did not identify or demonstrate by evidence the condition of the STT Structures in the earlier periods of time. 49.The photographs taken at the time of inspections dated 3 and 11 October 2023 similarly do not assist. Simply because the STT Structures were present in 2023 does not mean one can infer the existence of those STT Structures as far back as 1997. 50.Again, the burden rested upon the Applicant to adduce sufficient evidence as regards its claims that the STT Structures are fixtures upon the STT Area and predate the STT. I do not think Mr Chau is correct when he suggested that the existence and extent of structures well over 20 years ago is a matter of factual dispute which must merit a full hearing, potentially with expert evidence. The Applicant adduced no such evidence, and does not appear to have identified the nature of what such evidence might comprise. In any event, the weight to be given to the evidence, including actual or potential expert opinion evidence, was a matter for the BAT. The Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction is unlikely to interfere unless they can be demonstrated either irrationality or a clear area of law. 51.On the materials advanced, the BAT found that the Applicant’s claims were unsubstantiated, because they amounted to bare assertions, which should not be accepted at face value. That was the first and determinative point. It is not a finding with which the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction will interfere. 52.In these circumstances, it cannot reasonably be argued that the BAT misconstrued section 41 of the BO as regards to the STT Structures. 53.Ground 1 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. Alternatively, even if there is a proper basis for the grant of leave, I would refuse Ground 1 on substantive hearing. F. Ground 2: Failure on Factual Findings 54.Mr Chau submitted that the BAT failed to take into account, or failed to take into account sufficiently, the following circumstantial evidence:
55.It was the BAT’s opinion that the Applicant’s allegation with regard to the age and/or existence of the STT Structures was unsubstantiated. In coming to that conclusion, the BAT must have taken into account the circumstantial evidence above, but found it unconvincing and/or simply untrue. 56.Moreover, the argument that the Applicant’s claims could be rebutted by the BA because it had full access to aerial photographs does not assist. Again, the burden rested squarely on the Applicant to adduce sufficient evidence in support of its claims, which the Applicant was more than likely able to produce. At the time of the Preliminary Hearing, the Applicant had already been the owner of the Property for over 27 years. The STT Area would have been in direct view of the Property every single day. The Applicant could have asked the previous owner of the Property for pictures or other evidence of the STT Structures that would demonstrate its pre-existence. Alternatively, the Applicant could have asked other neighbours for similar evidence. As a matter of fact, no evidence was produced by the Applicant to support its claims. 57.It is settled that what is and is not a relevant consideration for a public decision-maker to have in mind and the weight with which the factor is afforded is, absent a statutory code of compulsory considerations, for the decision-maker, not the Court, to decide. Simply because the BAT did not explicitly state every factor it had considered does not mean it did not consider those factors. Having considered the arguments put forward by the Applicant, the BAT decided its factual case was not established. 58.As can be seen, Ground 2 in effect is repetitive of some issues that within Ground 1. The points made are not improved by repetition. 59.Ground 2 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. Alternatively, even if there is a proper basis for the grant of leave, I would refuse Ground 2 on substantive hearing. G. Ground 3: Legitimate Expectation 60.Certain situations can give rise to a legitimate expectation, in which event failing to honour the expectation may, in particular circumstances, result in such unfairness to individuals so as to amount to an abuse of power justifying intervention by the Court. 61.The expectation must be reasonable, that is, reasonable in the light of the official conduct which is said to have given rise to the expectation. It must also be lawful. 62.Mr Chau submitted that the legitimate expectation here is akin to an implied contractual representation. Mr Chau went further to state that the leasing and/or renewal of the STT amounted to an implied representation by conduct that the Applicant would not be obliged to demolish, remove or alter the STT Structures. Mr Chau again sought to rely on the section 41 exemptions by reason of the STT Structures allegedly pre-dating the STT and therefore being either (1) a building “belonging to the Government”, and/or (2) part of the “unleased land”. 63.Again, Ground 3 is largely premised on the assumption that the STT Structures predated the STT 975 and were therefore already part of the STT Area, and it is for that reason that they fell under the section 41 exemptions of either “belonging to the Government” or being “unleased land”. But – in a way with which there is no reasonably arguable basis for interference (see above) – the BAT found that the Applicant simply had not adduced sufficient evidence to support this claim. 64.There may be some weight to the fact that the STT was renewed twice in 2012 and 2022 respectively. In the pictures attached to the letter from Wong, Hui & Co to the Environmental Protection Department dated 27 August 2014, the balustrade, railing and staircase (i.e. the STT Structures) in the STT Area can be seen, supporting an inference that the STT Structures were at least already present at the time of the 2022 STT renewal. But 2014 was after the 2012 renewal, and a long time after 1997, or even 2005 – or any sameness and continuity throughout that period. As such, the foundation for Ground 3 falls away. 65.In any event, such an expectation that the Applicant would be permitted to retain and use the STT Structures, if any, is neither lawful nor reasonable. I accept Mr Cheung’s submissions that (1) the BA has no power of dispensation from the statutory requirements under section 14 of the BO that no building works shall be commenced or carried out without first having obtained the requisite approval and consent in writing from the BA, and (2) the BA’s policy regarding unauthorised building works is one of “enforcement” rather than “tolerance”, and the fact that the BA has not taken action against an unauthorised structure for a long period of time does not mean that no action can or will be taken against it: see Magic Key at §38, which emphasises that no relevant representation or promise made by the BA would support an inference of the alleged legitimate expectation. 66.Mr Chau submitted that the current situation is different from Magic Key, in that the structure started out as Government property and would have been exempt from the BO and the STT 975 itself prima facie prohibits demolition. As such, he said, it would be reasonable for the Applicant to expect non-enforcement. 67.But – in addition to the missing evidence – under §29(e) of the STT 975 the Government reserves the right to “take appropriate action” under the BO. Indeed, the position of the BA in relation to enforcement action against unauthorised structures is different from that of the DLO against breaches of the terms of a Government lease. But by Mr Cheung, the Government has let land via the STT in its private capacity of landlord, but has reserve the right to take public action in its capacity as the BA. Further, the 2012 DLO Letter provides that acceptance of the tenancy renewal “shall not constitute any waiver by the Government of any breach … of any of the terms and conditions” of the STT 975. These provisions go explicitly against any alleged legitimate expectation of non-enforcement. 68.Ground 3 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. Alternatively, even if there is a proper basis for the grant of leave, I would refuse Ground 3 on substantive hearing. H. Procedural Dispute 69.There was a further procedural dispute between the parties, namely as to whether all issues raised at the Preliminary Hearing could proceed to a full hearing so long as good cause for a full hearing is found for at least one of those issues. 70.The BO is admittedly vague in this regard. Section 49(2) merely states that the BAT shall make an order dismissing the appeal if good cause has not been shown for holding a full hearing, but “shall otherwise hold a full hearing”. The BO does not explain what happens when multiple grounds of appeal are raised and/or some (but not all) of those grounds show good cause. 71.Mr Chau argued in favour of an “all or nothing” approach, whereby either the appeal is dismissed upon a finding that good cause has not been shown, or the matter as a whole may proceed to a full hearing where good cause is successfully shown for at least one of the reasons for appeal, even if the other reasons were unsuccessful at the preliminary hearing stage. Mr Chau likened the preliminary hearing procedure to a “species of its own” where by default leave to appeal is not required. Mr Chau submitted that allowing for separation of the issues at the preliminary stage may lead to the BA creating multiple full hearings and (where successful) multiple demolition orders which may conceivably deal with the same property. However, I do not accept that submission. 72.Indeed, the effect of the “all or nothing” approach would essentially be that an appellant may have a “second bite” for all issues raised, even if the BAT considers that good cause has not been shown for each and every one of those issues. 73.I find Mr Cheung’s “purposive” interpretation to be more persuasive. I note section 50(1)(a), which provides that “every question” shall be determined by a majority vote of the BAT, applicable equally to both full hearings and preliminary hearings. As for section 50(2), Mr Cheung submitted that the BAT making such other order “as it thinks fit” also extends to broader case management powers such as severance of issues. 74.In my view, section 49 of the BO is intended to serve as a true filter to allow matters which are worthy of a full hearing to proceed to a full hearing, whilst putting a stop at the preliminary stage to matters which do not warrant a full hearing. It seems to me to be inherently problematic if a BAT were, for example, to find one out of ten challenges of sufficient merit to warrant a full hearing, but then be required to conduct a full hearing also in relation to nine other challenges which, if dealt with separately, would not have led to a full hearing because no good reason for such a hearing has been shown. 75.This is analogous for example to an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, whereby the substantive appeal deals only with grounds for which leave was granted, and other grounds need not be addressed. With respect, the “second bite” approach seems obviously contrary to basic principles of reasonable expedition and efficiency – and cost effectiveness – which should underly any adjudicatory procedure. 76.I acknowledge that there may be cases where a clear severance of points may not be possible on an appeal to the BAT. But where, as here, the intended challenge was to a large number of UBWs, it would make little sense to permit the challenge to continue as regards all UBWs at a full hearing, if only one intended challenged UBW was thought to merit a full hearing (and the others not). I. Result 77.The Applicant’s application largely presupposes the existence of the STT Structures in 1997 and/or before the STT 975 was signed in 2005. The burden rested on the Applicant to adduce sufficient evidence in support of that claim at the Preliminary Hearing – and the Applicant faced what might be regarded as a litigation choice as to what evidence to adduce in order to seek to satisfy its burden. Saying there might be evidence later, including possible expert evidence, merely risked failing to provide sufficient evidence to warrant reaching the later stage. In this case, the BAT’s conclusion, finding against the Applicant, was not one which was unreasonable or unfair in the public law sense so as to sanction interference by the Court. Nice arguments as to the meaning of words like “belonging” are, therefore, rather beside the point. Nor was there any legitimate expectation arising. 78.The Applicant’s grounds of review are not reasonably arguable with a realistic prospect of success, and therefore the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. 79.As to costs, I presently see no reason why costs should not follow the event, and I order the BA’s costs to be paid by the Applicant, to be taxed if not agreed. Nevertheless, I will make this order first on a nisi basis, which will become absolute after 14 days unless a prior application is made to vary this order. Any variation application will be dealt with on paper.
Mr Ian Chau, instructed by Wong, Hui & Co, for the applicant Mr Tommy Cheung, instructed by, and Mr Edward Chik, Senior Government Counsel of, the Department of Justice, for the putative interested party | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
when the Appellant
applied for the STT. At the Hearing, upon enquiry from the Tribunal, the Appellant submitted that this
assertion can be accepted “at face value” and “is good enough to proceed with a full hearing”,
and that there is “no good reason to 
question the credibility” of the Appellant. The
Appellant also submitted that the BA could rebut this statement if they were false.
to the BA to disprove the
Appellant’s unsupported assertion.
(2017)
20 HKCFAR 196 at §75.
the age
of UBW-16, the argument that under. s.41(a) of BO UBW-16 belonged to the Government, and were hence exempt
from the 
provisions
of BO, is clearly non-sensical. On a purposive construction, “buildings belonging to
the Government” in s.41(a) of BO clearly refers to those structures legally owned by the 
Government. To
adopt the Appellant’s interpretation would mean that unlawful building structures on government land would
become property of or be in rightful possession of the Government, even if the Government never owned, built
nor approved the same. 
This practically attributes to the Government the
ownership of all such unlawful structures. Not only does this interpretation do violence to the
ordinary meaning of “belonging”, this also contradicts and defeats the express purpose of the BO,
namely to provide for the regulation of such unlawful building works.
the terms of the STT 975
Agreement, namely the Special Conditions in the 2nd Schedule (“Special Conditions”)
and the DLO’s letter to the Appellant dated 9.5.2012 continuing the STT (“2012 DLO Letter”).
unlawful building works:
any amending
legislation in respect of any structure or building erected on the Premises.”
the structures
therein. Clauses 2(n) of the STT 975 Agreement 
requires the Appellant (as tenant) to observe the Special
Conditions. Clause 4(c) of the STT 975 Agreement repeats that the STT is subject to the Special
Conditions.
enforcement over
such UBWs.
Agreement should be read
differently, such that these powers ought not to be exercised for (i) pre-existing structures
and/or (ii) UBWs on land subject to short term tenancy. In any event, BO provisions do not treat
such structures differently from any other UBWs.
in this regard.Cases cited in this judgment