Pramanick Sukumar v Torture Claims Appeal Board /

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 708/2026 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 July 2026.

1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 9 April 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Director (“ Director ”) dated 26 March 2026 (“ Director’s Subsequent Decision ”) refusing the applicant’s request (“ Request ”) for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement under s.37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance. In an earlie

Cites 5 cases

Case No.HCAL 708/2026[2026] HKCFI 3972
Court
High Court CFI
Date23 Jul 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 708/2026

[2026] HKCFI 3972

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 708 of 2026

BETWEEN

  Pramanick Sukumar Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board / Putative
  Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

    consideration of the documents only;            or
   consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:  

The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 9 April 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Director (“Director”) dated 26 March 2026 (“Director’s Subsequent Decision”) refusing the applicant’s request (“Request”) for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement under s.37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance. In an earlier decision of the Director dated 25 November 2014 (“Director’s Earlier Decision”), the Director rejected applicant’s non-refoulement claim under all applicable grounds[1] except the ground based on BOR 2 risk, which further ground was also rejected by a decision of the Director dated 9 May 2017 (“Director’s Earlier Further Decision”).

2.On 28 May 2020, the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dismissed (“Board’s Decision”) the applicant’s appeals against the Director’s Earlier Further Decision. On 8 October 2025, a Deputy High Court Judge refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.

Background

3.The background can be viewed at Judge’s Decision ([2025] HKCFI 4649) at the Judiciary website. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the abbreviations and descriptions in the Board’s Decision.

4.On 24 December 2025, the applicant made the Request, and was represented by the Duty Lawyer Service in the Request.

The statutory provisions on subsequent claims

5.Subsequent non-refoulement claims are regulated by s 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which provides:

Section 37ZO. “Limitation on subsequent claim

(1)  Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2)  A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that—

(a)  there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b)  the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3)  In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.”

6.The applicant submitted a total of 3 letters in support of the Request. The Request was based on the applicant’s claim that, if refouled to India, he would be harmed or killed by (i) the creditor, Bijay and his henchmen for an unpaid loan; (ii) the staff of the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) of India; and (iii) digital arrest scammers who posted as CBI.

Discussion

7.A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision[2]. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Director’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.

8.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds. Before the hearing, the applicant filed a written submission, submitting that the Director’s Subsequent Decision was irrational, procedurally unfair and unreasonable. He further submitted that the Director had significantly relied on the source of news, which was not officially recognized or hearsay. Attached to the written submission were a copy of police First Information Report against him and screenshots of the phone chat records.

9.As the applicant had requested for a hearing, the court scheduled a hearing on 19 May 2026. The court first explained to the applicant that the court would not be in a position to consider any documentary evidence in the Leave Application. The applicant then said he had nothing further to add.

10.In the Director’s Subsequent Decision, after the Director had taken into account the facts and findings he made in the Director’s Earlier Decision and the Director’s Earlier Further Decision as well as the Board’s Decision, the Director, found in relation to the risks stated in [6] above that:

(1)  Risk (i) there were no significant changes, which were also admitted by the applicant. The Director found that the Request was only a reiteration of the basis of his non-refoulement claim.

(2)  Risk (ii) the documents the applicant submitted – the “Central Bureau of Investigation – India Consent to Terms of Confidentially Agreement” dated 10 March 2025, and the screenshots of his WhatsApp conversation records- did not match with the information the Director found. The applicant was unable to account for the discrepancy. They were believed to be scams.

(3)  Risk (iii) there was no evidence that the scammers had ever demanded for money. Hence, his claimed risk of fear that they might harm him if he did not give them money could not be substantiated. Additionally, the Director found that a delay of more than 2 months for the applicant to raise this new claim was unreasonable.

11.After having given further consideration to the COI, the Director found that state protection and internal relocation continued to be reasonably available. He concluded that the Request had no realistic prospect of success and refused the applicant’s Request. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors.

12.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Director correctly applied the law and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant’s contentions in the written submissions were vague and lacked particulars. The documents attached to the written submission were irrelevant and they had already been placed and considered by the Director. In any event, the court’s role in the Leave Applicant does not encompass a re-consideration of the documents. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Director’s Subsequent Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to Director’s Subsequent Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[4].

Order

13.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Dated the 23rd day of July 2026.

  ( Alfred CHAN )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 23/7/2026

Pramanick Sukumar

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 23/7/2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
Nil

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: L/M (35557) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (formerly RBCZ/9001372/17 and RBCZ/0000803/09)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



Form CALL-1



[1]  The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.

[2]  Re Zenarae [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].

[3]  Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].

[4]  Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676