Pramanick Sukumar v Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 708/2026 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 July 2026.
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 9 April 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Director (“ Director ”) dated 26 March 2026 (“ Director’s Subsequent Decision ”) refusing the applicant’s request (“ Request ”) for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement under s.37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance. In an earlie
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HCAL 708/2026 [2026] HKCFI 3972 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 708 of 2026
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy: The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 9 April 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Director (“Director”) dated 26 March 2026 (“Director’s Subsequent Decision”) refusing the applicant’s request (“Request”) for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement under s.37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance. In an earlier decision of the Director dated 25 November 2014 (“Director’s Earlier Decision”), the Director rejected applicant’s non-refoulement claim under all applicable grounds[1] except the ground based on BOR 2 risk, which further ground was also rejected by a decision of the Director dated 9 May 2017 (“Director’s Earlier Further Decision”). 2.On 28 May 2020, the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dismissed (“Board’s Decision”) the applicant’s appeals against the Director’s Earlier Further Decision. On 8 October 2025, a Deputy High Court Judge refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Background 3.The background can be viewed at Judge’s Decision ([2025] HKCFI 4649) at the Judiciary website. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the abbreviations and descriptions in the Board’s Decision. 4.On 24 December 2025, the applicant made the Request, and was represented by the Duty Lawyer Service in the Request. The statutory provisions on subsequent claims 5.Subsequent non-refoulement claims are regulated by s 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which provides:
6.The applicant submitted a total of 3 letters in support of the Request. The Request was based on the applicant’s claim that, if refouled to India, he would be harmed or killed by (i) the creditor, Bijay and his henchmen for an unpaid loan; (ii) the staff of the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) of India; and (iii) digital arrest scammers who posted as CBI. Discussion 7.A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision[2]. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Director’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 8.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds. Before the hearing, the applicant filed a written submission, submitting that the Director’s Subsequent Decision was irrational, procedurally unfair and unreasonable. He further submitted that the Director had significantly relied on the source of news, which was not officially recognized or hearsay. Attached to the written submission were a copy of police First Information Report against him and screenshots of the phone chat records. 9.As the applicant had requested for a hearing, the court scheduled a hearing on 19 May 2026. The court first explained to the applicant that the court would not be in a position to consider any documentary evidence in the Leave Application. The applicant then said he had nothing further to add. 10.In the Director’s Subsequent Decision, after the Director had taken into account the facts and findings he made in the Director’s Earlier Decision and the Director’s Earlier Further Decision as well as the Board’s Decision, the Director, found in relation to the risks stated in [6] above that:
11.After having given further consideration to the COI, the Director found that state protection and internal relocation continued to be reasonably available. He concluded that the Request had no realistic prospect of success and refused the applicant’s Request. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors. 12.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Director correctly applied the law and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant’s contentions in the written submissions were vague and lacked particulars. The documents attached to the written submission were irrelevant and they had already been placed and considered by the Director. In any event, the court’s role in the Leave Applicant does not encompass a re-consideration of the documents. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Director’s Subsequent Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to Director’s Subsequent Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[4]. Order 13.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 23rd day of July 2026.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. [2] Re Zenarae [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142]. [4] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment