Rupa Ale v Torture Claims Appeal Board /

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 420/2026 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 July 2026.

1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 16 February 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 30 September 2025 (“ Board’s Decision ”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”

Cites 8 cases

Case No.HCAL 420/2026[2026] HKCFI 3970
Court
High Court CFI
Date23 Jul 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 420/2026

[2026] HKCFI 3970

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 420 of 2026

BETWEEN

  Rupa Ale Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board / Putative
  Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

    consideration of the documents only;            or
   consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:  

1.  There shall be no extension of time for the applicant to file the application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.

2.  The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Introduction

1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 16 February 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 30 September 2025 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 21 July 2025 rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL000420_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to India, she would be harmed or killed by (i) her ex-boyfriend for having stopped sending payments to him to repay his debts; and (ii) her ex-boyfriend’s creditor as her ex-boyfriend had named the applicant as the guarantor for his debts. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.

3.At the applicant’s requested to attend the court’s scheduled hearing on 19 May 2026. A body order was issued to bring her up from Nei Kwu Correctional Institution to enable her to attend the court.

Discussion

4.A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.

5.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit.  The Form 86 provided no such grounds. In the supporting affirmation, the applicant exhibited a 2-page handwritten letter in the Nepali language.

6.At the hearing, the court informed the applicant that since the letter exhibited to the supporting affirmation was not translated, it could not be admitted as evidence. However, the applicant could tell the court the gist of the contents of the letter. The applicant told the court that she had stated in the letter that the person who threatened her was a member of a political party. Her life was still in danger. She further stated that her Nepalese husband whom she married in Hong Kong had left Hong Kong in 2024. The applicant had nothing further to submit apart from what she had told the court about the purported contents of the letter.   

7.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the Board found that the applicant’s assertions not credible. The Board did not accept the applicant’s account regarding the loan or her liability for the loan as a guarantor. The Board found that the applicant did not and would not face the claimed risks of harm. It further found that state protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors.

8.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The letter exhibited to the supporting affirmation could not be accepted as evidence. The purported contents of the letter also do not constitute any valid grounds to challenge the Board’s Decision.  The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5].

Whether to extend time for the late application

9.Another matter I need to consider is the delay. Pursuant to O 53 r 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, an application to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within 3 months from the date of the Board’s Decision. The applicant was late for more than 2 months.

10.According to the applicant’s explanation for the delay given at the hearing, the applicant said that she was still living at the last known address as shown at the covering letter which was sent together with the Board’s Decision. She could not recall why she did not file the Leave Application within the time limit before her detention on 17 November 2025.

11.The applicant plainly was unable to provide any reason for the delay. In the absence of good reason for the delay, and coupled with the lack of good prospects of success of her intended challenge, I refuse to exercise my discretion to grant the applicant an extension of the time to file the Leave Application out of time.

Orders

12.There shall be no extension of time for the applicant to file the application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.

13.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Dated the 23rd day of July 2026

  (Alfred Chan)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 23/7/2026

Rupa Ale

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 23/7/2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 26829

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 352/25 (formerly as RBCZ/5000238/25)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



Form CALL-1



[1]  The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.

[2]  Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].

[3]  Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].

[4]  Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

[5]  Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676