Potiwat Rujirat v Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1147/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 July 2026.
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 19 May 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 11 September 2023 (“ Board’s Decision ”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”) dat
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HCAL 1147/2025 [2026] HKCFI 3969 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1147 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
Introduction 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 19 May 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 11 September 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 18 July 2022 rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: - 2.In the Form 86, the applicant named himself as the proposed interested party. As the Director should have been the proper putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended on the court’s own motion. 3.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Thailand, he would be harmed or killed by the loan shark with triad background for an unpaid loan. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 4.At court scheduled hearing on 19 May 2026, the applicant attended the hearing in person, and simply submitted that he would like to continue with his case. Discussion 5.A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 6.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds. 7.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the Board found the applicant’s evidence incredible and unreliable, and rejected his account regarding the loan and threats from the loan shark. In the event, the Board found that state protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors. 8.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant advanced no grounds at all in support of the Leave Application, and has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. I find that the applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5]. Whether to extend time for the late application 9.Another matter I need to consider is the delay. Pursuant to O 53 r 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, an application to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within 3 months from the date of the Board’s Decision. The Leave Application was late for about 1 year and 5 months. 10.When this court asked the applicant for the reason for the delay, the applicant stated that he only knew about the procedure about late application during his 3-months’ detention at the immigration detention facility. He was discharged in around July 2024. He said he only later received a letter from the Board from his former address. 11.I do not accept the applicant had provided good reason for the delay. Firstly, ignorance cannot be accepted as good reason for his purported reason that he only learnt about the procedure during his detention in 2024. Secondly, the applicant’s purported explanation for having received the Board’s Decision late had only scant detail, it also directly contradicted his alleged ignorance. 12.Having regard to the lengthy delay, and most importantly, the lack of good prospects of success of the intended challenge, I refuse to exercise my discretion to grant the applicant an extension of the time to file the Leave Application out of time. Orders 13.The Form 86 shall be amended on the court’s own motion. 14.There shall be no extension of time for the applicant to file the application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time. 15.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 23rd day of July 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. [2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142]. [4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment