Xiao Xiang v. The Law Society of Hong Kong
|
HCAL 1602/2025 [2026] HKCFI 4236 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1602 OF 2025 ________________________
________________________
____________________ D E C I S I O N ____________________ A. Introduction 1.The approach taken by the Applicant in the underlying process and in the arguments deployed in these proceedings might be thought by some to indicate that – at least up to the time these proceedings began – the Applicant did not yet have sufficient experience and knowledge to qualify as an overseas lawyer in Hong Kong. The case arises out of his intention so to qualify. 2.By his Form 86 dated 14 July 2025, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge a decision (“Decision”) of the Law Society of Hong Kong (“LSHK”), given by its letter dated 22 May 2025 (“Denial Letter”) to refuse his eligibility to sit the 2025 Overseas Lawyers Qualification Examination (“OLQE”) under the Overseas Lawyers (Qualification for Admission) Rules Cap 159Q (“OLQA Rules”). 3.The Applicant filed an affirmation dated 14 July 2025 (“Affirmation”) in support of the leave application. 4.I gave directions giving leave to the LSHK to file an Initial Response to the application, and leave to the Applicant to file a Reply to that Initial Response. My directions also indicated that I would then decide whether to deal with the application for leave to apply for judicial review on paper, and if so that I would proceed to do so without further notice to the parties. 5.The Initial Response was served by Clyde & Co, solicitors for the LSHK. The position of the LSHK is that the application for leave to apply for judicial review should be dismissed on various bases (which I will consider below). The Applicant filed a Reply in Chinese running to 122 pages (including 14 attachments). 6.Having considered the materials, I am satisfied that I can appropriately deal with the application for leave to apply for judicial review on the papers. 7.This is my Decision. 8.The Applicant’s Form 86, Affirmation, and Reply were all filed in Chinese. However, he obtained a Master of Laws degree from a law school in the USA (see background below). Therefore, I do not think that there will be any disadvantage or difficulty to him in understanding this Decision handed down in English. B. Background 9.The background can be ascertained from the Form 86, Affirmation, Initial Response and Reply, and can be restated broadly as follows. 10.The Applicant obtained his Master of Laws degrees from the Central South University, China on 31 May 2016 and the Emory University School of Law, USA on 17 December 2022 respectively. He obtained qualifications to practise law in the Chinese Mainland on 30 August 2019, and qualified as an Attorney and Counsellor at Law in the State of New York, USA on 16 January 2025. 11.In March 2025, the Applicant submitted his application to take the 2025 OLQE under the ‘non-common law jurisdictions’ (Chinese Mainland) category, and paid the application fee of HK$6,600. 12.On 22 May 2025, the LSHK rejected the Applicant’s application to take the 2025 OLQE, i.e. the Decision. The substance of the Denial Letter (signed by Ms Angela Li, Assistant Director, Regulation and Guidance, LSHK) stated as follows:
13.In his intended judicial review challenge, the Applicant sought the following relief: (1) an order quashing the Decision, (2) an order for the LSHK to reconsider his eligibility and application for taking the OLQE, (3) an order for the LSHK to refund the application fee of HK$6,600 or handle the fee properly, subject to the outcome of reconsideration, and (4) costs of the application for leave to apply for judicial review. C. Grounds of Review 14.Reading his Form 86, his Affirmation and Reply, the Applicant’s proposed grounds of review could be summarised as follows:
15.As can be seen below, due to their overlapping nature and similar underlying rationale, it is logical to deal first with the intended Grounds 1-5, then Ground 7, Grounds 8-9, and Grounds 10-11, and lastly Ground 6 about the overall reasonableness of the Decision. D. Legal Principles and the LSHK’s OLQE Regime 16.Before doing so, it is helpful to set out the relevant legal principles and the LSHK’s OLQE regime, which are relied upon by the Applicant in framing his challenge to the Decision in the present case. D.1 Basic Law, ICCPR, BOR, and Statutory Provisions 17.BL 8 provides that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained, except for any that contravene the Basic Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”). 18.BL 39 guarantees that the provisions of the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the HKSAR. 19.The principle that all persons are equal before the law is enshrined in Article 26 of the ICCPR:
20.BOR 22, as set out in Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance Cap 383, also provides for the equality before and equal protection of law:
21.Section 73(1)(da) of the LPO empowers the Council of the LSHK to make rules respecting the admission of persons under section 4(1)(b) of the LPO (i.e. persons seeking admission in Hong Kong based on qualifications acquired outside Hong Kong), including qualifications for admission, examinations and the fees to be paid for applications and examinations. The material provision is as follows:
22.Rule 4(2)(b)(ii) of the OLQA Rules sets out the minimum “2 years of post-admission experience in the practice of law” requirement for an applicant from a common law jurisdiction, as follows:
23.For an applicant whose jurisdiction of admission is a non-common law jurisdiction, the requirement of “not less than 5 years of experience in the practice of law” is stipulated in rule 5(1) of the OLQA Rules, as follows:
24.Rule 9 of the OLQA Rules provides for the statutory appeal procedure for an applicant who is not satisfied with the LSHK’s decision on the eligibility for sitting the OLQE:
25.In short, an applicant is required to file an application to the LSHK for review of its original decision (“Review Mechanism”) first, and if unsuccessful, he or she may then apply to the Court of First Instance (“CFI”), which may affirm the LSHK’s decision or make such other order as it thinks fit. D.2 The OLQE Regime 26.The relevant regulations, requirements and policies of the OLQE set and adopted by the LSHK can be found in its ‘2015 Information Package for Admission as a Solicitor in Hong Kong for Overseas Lawyers’ (“Information Package”). 27.Part I Section C.1 of the Information Package sets out the requirements for candidates admitted in common law jurisdictions and non-common law jurisdictions to sit the OLQE:
28.Regarding an applicant’s request for review on the LSHK’s decision on the eligibility to sit the OLQE, the details of the Review Mechanism are set out in Part I Section C.6 of the Information Package, as follows:
E. Available Alternative Remedy 29.It is trite that the public law nature of judicial review and the type of remedies which may be granted identify that applications for leave to apply for judicial review should be taken only as a last resort. An applicant should exhaust all appeal procedures or alternative remedies before resorting to judicial review. Where alternative remedies have not been exhausted, the Court may in the exercise of its discretion refuse to grant leave to apply for judicial review. 30.Though a degree of flexibility exists to cater for exceptional cases for the Court’s immediate intervention if substantial injustice is to be avoided, I do not think the present application falls into that category. 31.In the Reply, the Applicant submitted that there are exceptional circumstances in the present case, including (1) OEEC (as defined below) procedural and substantive flaws, (2) questionable validity and professionalism, (3) insufficient independence and operability, and (4) public elements and continuity. He alleged that the Review Mechanism is not a “prerequisite” that must be pursued first before filing an application for leave to apply for judicial review. 32.As canvassed above, an applicant who is not satisfied with the LSHK’s decision on eligibility is required to follow the appeal procedure as prescribed by the OLQA Rules and the OLQE Regime. 33.With respect to the Applicant, I do not find that there exist any special or unusual circumstances in the present case. 34.I accept the LSHK’s submission that the Applicant’s challenge to the Decision is plainly inapt, where he had a clear and effective alternative avenue of redress by use of the Review Mechanism and review by the CFI. It does not matter that he did not actually pursue that available alternative remedy, nor that he might be out of time for doing so. This alone is fatal to the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review. F. Grounds 1-5: Discrimination, Unequal Treatment, Disproportionality, and Departure from the LPO 35.Although the Applicant advanced substantial parts of his arguments by five separate grounds, they boil down to the alleged discriminatory and/or unequal treatment between applicants from common law jurisdictions and those from non-common law jurisdictions. 36.The gist of the Applicants’ submissions under Grounds 1 to 5 on the alleged breaches of the Basic Law, ICCPR, BOR, LPO and principles of proportionality as summarised in the Initial Response (in a way with which I agree) is as follows:
37.The Applicant repeated and further elaborated some of his arguments in the Reply, which I take into account but need not rehearse here. 38.With respect, none of the arguments advanced by the Applicant have any merit. I accept the LSHK’s submission that there is no unfair or unlawful discrimination under the regulatory framework of the OLQE against applicants from non-common law jurisdictions, let alone the existence of any disproportionate treatment, for the following reasons. 39.First, the differentiated eligibility criteria based on the legal background of the applicants under the OLQE Rules are not unfairly discriminatory, but reflect the practical necessity to ensure that the candidates possess sufficient familiarity with common law principles underpinning the Hong Kong legal system. 40.The legitimacy and substantive rationale in the separate differential treatment of candidates from common law and non-common law jurisdictions for the OLQE are reasonably founded upon the following well-known differences between the two legal systems:
41.Secondly, the introduction of the OLQE qualification process and criteria, including the different periods of practical experience between applicants from common law and non-common law jurisdictions, was intended to focus on (a) the difference between common law and non-common law systems of law and (b) the transition between the two systems, which was the original motivation and remains so today. 42.I accept the LSHK’s submission that this objective was included in the draft syllabus of the Qualified Lawyers Transfer Test provided to the LSHK’s Foreign Lawyers Accreditation Sub-Committee (“Sub-Committee”) on 16 October 1990, with the expectation that all candidates are sufficiently trained and experienced so as “to demonstrate an ability to apply the principles of statutory interpretation and the doctrine of precedent” and “appreciate the major differences between the codified civil law system and the non-codified common law system”. 43.As agreed by the Sub-Committee, the examination subjects would be designed to enable applicants from any jurisdiction to be admitted in Hong Kong (though exemptions would be granted having regard to the nature and extent of the applicant’s professional qualification and practical experience in the law), and a scheme categorising jurisdictions according to the nature of their legal systems would be prepared. 44.Candidates from the Chinese Mainland have never been the focus of attention or specifically differentiating treatment. Instead, the paramount motivating factor was recognition of the practical differences between the practice of law in common law jurisdictions and non-common law or civil law jurisdictions, and the impact that potentially has upon professional standards and the high standing of Hong Kong’s legal system. That was reflected in the Sub-Committee’s Final Report dated October 1991 titled “Scheme for Admission of Non-Hong Kong Qualified Lawyers”. The Final Report explained and stated that:
45.Thirdly, in respect of the difference in treatment between candidates from common law jurisdictions and non-common law jurisdictions, there exist the legitimate aim to be pursued and justifications for the difference. The LSHK provided submissions on this at some length, but I do not think it necessary to repeat them. I accept the thrust of the submissions, which can be summarised as follows:
46.It is also clear that there was no departure from the LPO. 47.Grounds 1 to 5 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. G. Ground 7: Substantive and Procedural Unfairness 48.The assertion made by the Applicant is that the LSHK’s Review Mechanism lacks independence and fairness. He was given no fair opportunity to present arguments, respond, or submit new evidence, because in the LSHK’s Denial Letter, it explicitly stated that if an applicant seeks a review, not only must a HKD3,000 fee be paid, but no new evidence will be accepted. The Review Mechanism amounts to a review by the same decision-making body of its own decision, effectively maintaining the original decision in substance, making it difficult for the applicant to recover or gain meaningful redress for the application and review fees already paid. 49.With respect, I do not think that the Applicant’s claim on the alleged unfairness could reasonably arguably be substantiated. 50.I accept the LSHK’s submission that there are sufficient procedural safeguards in the Review Mechanism for the following reasons:
51.As to the materials or information to be used on the review, they are properly limited to those originally provided. The process is not intended to be some rolling process where an applicant can supply materials said to show eligibility on a piecemeal basis. It is up to the applicant to show by documents/information the eligibility claimed, and if he or she disagrees with the view first taken by the LSHK on those materials, then a review can be sought. The applicant is expressly warned that the review will be on and only on the information originally provided. 52.Further, it is important to keep in mind that the Review Mechanism is only part of the available process by which a disgruntled applicant might seek redress from a decision as to eligibility adverse to him or her. Any question of substantive and procedural fairness is properly viewed in that wider context. The Review Mechanism provides an appropriate and proportionate ‘second look’ at the information provided with the application for eligibility. If still dissatisfied with the decision of the LSHK, the applicant can pursue a review in the CFI. 53.As traversed above, it was the Applicant’s own choice to refuse to seek redress by following the Review Mechanism or application to the CFI. In that context, it can be noted that such a review by the CFI would be on the merits of the claimed eligibility, whereas an application for leave to apply for judicial review focuses only on the integrity of the decision-making process engaged in by the LSHK. 54.Ground 7 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. H. Grounds 8 and 9: Failure to Recognise Mainland Legal Practice Experience and Disregard for Applicants Holding Multiple Legal System Qualifications 55.The nature of and logic behind the Applicant’s complaints under Grounds 8 and 9 are similar, and therefore can be dealt with together. 56.The essence of the Applicant’s complaint under Ground 8 is that the LSHK has failed to establish clear, reasonable, and suitably tailored eligibility criteria reflecting the characteristics of Mainland legal practice experience, showing a lack of understanding and consideration. In particular, the Applicant alleged that:
57.For Ground 9, the Applicant asserted that the LSHK has not provided clear, fair and predictable assessment standards for applicants holding multiple legal system qualifications, constituting procedural unfairness and unreasonable discretion. 58.It is fair for the LSHK to say that in the assessment by the LSHK on the Applicant’s OLQE application and eligibility, deficiencies and discrepancies were found in the application information and documents provided by the Applicant, the details of which need not be repeated for the present purposes. In gist, the LSHK’s position and findings, which I accept, are as follows:
59.On the facts of the present case as traversed above, there is no force in the Applicant’s suggestion that the LSHK has failed to reasonably recognise the legal practice experience in the Chinese Mainland, let alone the alleged insufficient understanding of the Mainland judicial system. I also accept the LSHK’s submission that the qualifications and experience (supported by documentation provided by the Applicant) were given full recognition and duly assessed by the LSHK in accordance with the criteria set out in the Information Package. 60.Grounds 8 and 9 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. I. Grounds 10 and 11: Lack of Reasonableness in International Comparison and Contrary to the Nation-Level Policies 61.The crux of the Applicant’s case on these grounds is that:
62.There is obviously a significant degree of overlap between these Grounds 10 to 11 and Grounds 1 to 5. For the same reasons as set out above, these two grounds must also be rejected as without merit. 63.In addition, the Applicant’s reference to other jurisdictions’ admission systems and his allegation of contravention of national-level policies are of no relevance, because the present challenge concerns the admission of lawyers from other jurisdictions under the OLQE Regime in Hong Kong. The Applicants’ allegations are made on bases which are not reasonably arguable. 64.Grounds 10 and 11 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. J. Ground 6: Wednesbury unreasonableness 65.It is trite that a decision may be found to be Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational in circumstances including that the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. Put without the double negatives, that means that a decision is Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational if it is one which no reasonable authority properly directing itself could have reached. It is also trite that establishing irrationality is a high hurdle for a judicial review applicant to overcome. 66.The complaint of the Applicant is that:
67.It seems to me that the Applicant is essentially repeating or repackaging the points already raised in other grounds relied upon by him. I have already dealt with the issue of irrationality in the above context. 68.But it also seems to me that there is a perfectly supportable basis to require a longer period of experience from a non-common law lawyer as opposed to a common law lawyer when seeking to obtain local qualification in a common law jurisdiction. Further there is plainly no imposition of an arbitrary or capricious additional barrier. In short, there is no reasonably arguable Wednesbury unreasonableness in the LSHK’s Decision. 69.Ground 6 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. K. Result 70.Dissatisfied with the first decision on his eligibility, the Applicant had (but apparently chose deliberately to ignore) a perfectly straightforward and reasonable, available alternative remedy – one that comprised a review by the LSHK and a potential application for further review by the CFI. The Applicant failed to exhaust the available alternative remedy of a review or further review on the merits. For that reason alone, I would refuse leave to apply for judicial review. 71.In any event, on the law and principles applicable, none of the grounds of review advanced by the Applicant is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. 72.The application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. L. Costs 73.As to costs, in the Initial Response, the LSHK sought an order for costs to it. 74.In his Reply, the Applicant submitted that the Court may grant a protective costs order or make no order as to costs, on the basis of judicial justice and access to justice, and that the present application is not a case in the “abuse of process or frivolous” category. 75.As I stated in my recent decision in Boill Healthcare Holdings Limited v The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited [2026] HKCFI 3827 at §§54-59, the principles applicable to the costs issue have been set out by the Court of Final Appeal in Leung Kwok Hung v President of the Legislative Council (No 2) (2014) 17 HKCFAR 841. As relevant and applicable to the present case, it was held at §17(2) that since applications for leave to apply for judicial review are, by the rules themselves, meant to proceed on an ex parte basis, the general rule should be that an unsuccessful applicant will not be ordered to pay the costs of a putative respondent or putative interested party unless there are special or unusual circumstances which justify such an award. 76.The exceptional circumstances in the present case that would (and do) justify departure from the usual “no order as to costs” are (1) the refusal of the Applicant to seek alternative remedies under the OLQE Regime of pursing the (relatively inexpensive) Review Mechanism and potentially an application to the CFI, when there was no good reason for him not to do so, (2) the lack of merit in his intended grounds of review, and (3) the assistance received by the Court from the submissions invited from, and provided by, the LSHK, properly exercising its statutory regulatory role. 77.Therefore, in the exercise of my discretion, I order the Applicant to pay the costs of the LSHK, to be summarily assessed. The LSHK shall provide its Statement of Costs for Summary Assessment by 14 August 2026, and the Applicant may file a List of Objections, if any, by 28 August 2026. Thereafter, the summary assessment will be made by me on paper.
The applicant, acting in person Clyde & Co, solicitors for the putative respondent | ||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment