Re Pante Luisa Tuppil

CACV 193/2025, [2026] HKCA 1338

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 1123

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 193 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2532 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 20 January 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal out of time to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 19 December 2025 (“the Judgment”) ([2025] HKCA 1123).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Reuden Lai (“the Judge”) dated 2 April 2025, by which the Judge refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1342).

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.Pursuant to section 24(2) of the HKCFAO, an appellant has 28 days from the date of the Judgment to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the present case, the deadline for the applicant to seek leave to appeal against the Judgment fell on 16 January 2026.  Accordingly, the applicant was four days late in taking out her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

5.As the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal within time, the Court has a discretion to extend time under section 24(5) of the HKCFAO only if good and sufficient grounds are shown by the applicant: see Re Imran Muhammad [2021] HKCA 482 at [9] and the authorities cited therein.  In deciding whether there are such good grounds, the Court is entitled to take into account (a) the length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the chances of the appeal succeeding if an extension of time is granted; and (d) the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted: Begum Jahanara v Ian Candy, Esq & Another [2021] HKCA 83 at [4] and the authorities cited therein.

6.In her Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“I would like to inform to Court of Final Appeal. I am disagree with the decision maker authorities. There are not proper investigation in my case. They were rejected all my evidence I have one daughter who is study in Hong Kong school. My life is still danger in my home country.” (sic)

7.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions on 3 February 2026.  In those submissions, she complained that her case was not determined fairly and that she was deprived of the right to make full ground of appeal.  She further asserted that the lack of language and legal assistance constituted an error of law or procedural unfairness, and that the authorities had been discriminatory towards non-refoulement claimants.  She also complained that the Board’s Decision was unfair and unreasonable.

8.As the applicant’s delay is not inordinate, for present purpose, we will focus on the merits of her application.

9.In our view, her application is plainly devoid of merit. Her assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Her allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions she had previously made before this court in her appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [3] ‑ [12] of the Judgment.  She has not identified any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3].  The applicant also fails to condescend upon particulars how her daughter’s education has any bearing on her present application.  Plainly, her assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal. 

10.Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, her allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

11.Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

12.For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.

The applicant acting in person