Re Hossen Riyaj

CACV 237/2025, [2026] HKCA 1336

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 1127

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 237 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3861 OF 2019)

_______________

_______________

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 16 January 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 19 December 2025 (“the Judgment”) ([2025] HKCA 1127).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Martin Wong (“the Judge”) dated 16 April 2025, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1549).

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“With due respect and humbly submission I beg to you that I do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance. I do not agree with the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board. The decision makers did not consider my claims properly. The decision makes me liable to go back to my home country where my life is not safe. I have severe problem in my home country. If I return there I will be killed by my enemies. The Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision was incorrect and unfair.” (sic)

5.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions on 28 January 2026.  In those submissions, he asserted that the Judge erred in law in failing to apply the principles of irrationality and procedural unfairness to the Director’s and the Board’s respective decisions.  He also asserted that the Board failed to give him sufficient chance to arrange for the relevant evidence to be provided in his non-refoulement claim and appeal, and that the Board failed to analyse whether state protection existed.  He further claimed that he would face hardship and be killed if refouled.

6.In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence. General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are also mere regurgitations of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [3] ‑ [11] of the Judgment.  He had not identified any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3].  His assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

7.Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

9.For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.

The applicant acting in person