Sarah Maglalang Yanga v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 747/2026 [2026] HKCFI 4310 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 747 of 2026
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 15 April 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 30 October 2024 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 14 August 2024 rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: - 2.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Philippines, she would be harmed or killed by her ex-boyfriend when the latter found out that the applicant dated another man in Hong Kong. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 3.At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 21 July 2026. The applicant was in detention at Nei Kwu Correction Institution. She had expressed her wish to attend the hearing. Hence, a body order was issued to bring the applicant to court for the hearing. Discussion 4.A leave application operates as a “filtering” process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 5.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. Apart from repeating her claimed fear of harm from her ex-boyfriend in a hand-written letter attached to the supporting affirmation, the Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds. 6.At the hearing, the applicant only stated that she did not wish to go back home. 7.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence was generally consistent. However, the Board found that she would not face any risk of harm if refouled as it found that the past ill-treatment did not meet the requisite level of severity and further that the risk was purely a private matter. The Board further found that state protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors. 8.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The contents provided in the applicant’s letter were only a repeat of her case and did not advance the intended challenge any further. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. I find that the applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5]. Whether to extend time for the late application 9.Another matter I need to consider is the delay. Pursuant to O 53 r 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, an application to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within 3 months from the date of the Board’s Decision. The Leave Application was late for 1 year and 3 months, which is lengthy. 10.When the court asked the applicant to give an explanation for the delay, the applicant stated that the reason for the delay was due to her detention. She said that she only received the Board’s Decision when she was in detention. The court therefore asked her to clarify as to when she was first detained. She told the court then she was detained at the Castle Peak Immigration Center since December 2025. In January 2026, she was then transferred to the present Nei Kwu Correction Institution. She could not immediately file the present application because she did not have money. It was only after she managed to borrow sufficient money from her friend could she be able to file the Leave Application. 11.I do not accept the applicant’s reason for the delay. According to the applicant, she was not in detention when the Board’s Decision was delivered. In fact, she was only detained 14 months after the delivery of the Board’s Decision. When the court told her that her given reason for detention did not seem to be reasonable, the applicant then said that she had changed her residential address. However, the applicant was very unclear as when she changed her address and whether she had informed the Board of the change of address at any state. Given the entirely incoherent explanation for the delay, I am not satisfied that the applicant had provided good reason. This, coupled with the significant period of delay and the lack of good prospects of success of the intended challenge, I refuse to exercise my discretion to grant the applicant an extension of time to file the Leave Application out of time. Orders 12.There shall be no extension of time for the applicant to file the application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time. 13.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 7th day of August 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. [2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142]. [4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment