Ruga Supriya v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 275/2023 [2026] HKCFI 4482 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 275 of 2023 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Isaac Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.By a Form 86 filed on 22 February 2023 (“Form 86”), the applicant, a national of Bangaldesh, applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claim Appeal Board / the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 10 February 2023 (“Board’s Decision”)[1] confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 26 October 2021 and rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. 2.I refer to the Board’s Decision for the background of the applicant, the basis of the claim, the evidence and the argument the applicant has relied upon, which will not be repeated herein. 3.The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Given the seriousness of the issue involved in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decisions of the Board. However, the Court will not intervene unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in those decisions: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at paragraph 14. 4.General assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review: see Re Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971, at paragraph 23. 5.The present application for leave is meant to be a filtering process, and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at paragraph 23. I will therefore provide brief reasons for my decision as follows. Discussion 6.The applicant has made the following complaints in the affirmation in support:
7.At the hearing on 11 May 2026, the applicant was absent. 8.Applying the enhanced standard of scrutiny, I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. 9.The Board’s Decision contains a detailed analysis of the applicant’s claim. The applicant’s complaint that the Board did not take time to consider her claim or her life and simply dismissed the claim directly is baseless. 10.The Board’s Decision has, with respect, correctly and comprehensively set out the applicable legal principles. I do not see any errors in either the summary or the application of those legal principles. 11.Much of the applicant’s complaint was about procedural unfairness at the hearing before the Board and the interview with the immigration department. The Board’s Decision has set out the procedural history of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim, including the details of the hearing before the Board on 1 December 2022. It is noteworthy that the applicant was in fact legally represented at both the interview with the Immigration Department and at the appeal hearing before the Board (see paragraphs 2 and 21 of the Board’s Decision). Together with the notice of appeal, the applicant’s legal representative had submitted a piece of supplemental documentary evidence, which was a prescription document from a doctor at a hospital in the applicant’s home country, to support the applicant’s claim (see paragraph 20). At the appeal hearing, the applicant’s legal representative further produced a photograph to support her claim (see paragraph 30). The complaints that the applicant had not been properly assisted by the interpreter at the interview with the Immigration Depart, as well as the Board rejected her request to produce documents are contradictory to the actual happenings of those occasions as recorded in the Board’s Decision. Such complaints have no merits. 12.The Board has conducted a detailed analysis of the applicant’s evidence given both before and at the hearing, and concluded that the applicant was generally truthful and a credible witness as to the events that occurred prior to her departure from Bangladesh, although the Board considered that the applicant had exaggerated the seriousness of the threat posed to her by both her husband and AL members and what may happen to her upon her return to Bangladesh (see paragraph 72). The applicant stated clearly at the appeal hearing that she did not fear the AL members, and that her only fear was of harm by her husband (see paragraph 76). Whilst the husband had assaulted the applicant in the past, the injuries were minor and did not amount to serious harm, or torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”), or a threat to her right of life (see paragraphs 75 and 80). Whilst the Board accepted that that the ongoing pressure on the applicant to engage in sexual relations with local AL leaders could elevate the nature of harm feared by the applicant to the level of CIDTP or persecution, it could be negated by internal relocation to large cities such as Dhaka, which would not be unduly harsh for the applicant (see paragraph 81). Based on the available materials, the conclusions of the Board were clearly justifiable. I do not see any basis to suggest that the Board was irrational based on the principle set out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 13.I therefore dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Form 86. Dated the 12th day of August 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 |
Cases cited in this judgment