Case Document

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HCAL 2591/2025

[2026] HKCFI 4553

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2591 OF 2025

BETWEEN

	Jitthisong Rattana	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative
		Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or

consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.

2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 November 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 29 August 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL002591_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.The Board found that the applicant’s application for non-refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 June 2025 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Amendments

3.The applicant named “torture claims Appea Board non refoulemen clams Petition office” as the 1^st putative respondent and “Direter of immigration” as the 2^nd putative respondent, and merely put an address as the putative interested party.

4.As the Leave Application only concerns the Board’s Decision, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent, and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.

5.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office which provides administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.

6.Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of Immigration” is added as the putative interested party.

The applicant’s case

7.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.

8.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Thailand, she feared being harmed or killed by a loan shark named NOI as she could not repay the loans she obtained from NOI.

Oral hearing

9.The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application and her case was heard on 6 August 2026.

10.When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of her intended judicial review, the applicant merely said that she could not go back to Thailand because someone would kill her. When this court asked her what was wrong with the Board’s Decision, the applicant only said that she wanted to stay in Hong Kong further.

Grounds for judicial review

11.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

12.However, the applicant did not advance any ground for her intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affirmation dated 24 November 2025. She only mentioned in the said affirmation that she would like to request for a hearing of the Leave Application with the assistance of legal representative and a Thai interpreter.

13.What the applicant said at the oral hearing before this court were not valid grounds for the intended judicial review at all.

Discussion

14.First of all, the applicant could not request this court to give her legal assistance. If she required the assistance of a legal representative for the Leave Application, it is her own right and duty to seek legal assistance.

15.This court notes that the applicant was actually provided with legal assistance during the first-tier screening of her non-refoulement claim. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly emphasized that, as a matter of law, a non-refoulement claimant is not entitled to free legal representation at all stages of the process (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15; Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17; and Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37).

16.Thus, the applicant cannot expect free legal assistance to be provided to her at all stages of her non-refoulement claim process, including the Leave Application.

17.A Thai interpreter was present at the oral hearing on 6 August 2026 to assist the applicant.

18.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

19.The applicant’s alleged loan problem had already been considered by the Board. If the applicant intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in a judicial review.

20.However, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the intended judicial review, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality.

21.In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board arranged an oral hearing on 12 August 2025 and the applicant was present. Thus, the applicant did have the opportunity to present her case to the Board in person.

22.As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a detailed analysis of the applicant’s claims and its reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection.

23.The Board considered that the applicant’s problem was a purely private matter relating to the dispute with her creditor on outstanding loan repayment. The avoidance of loan repayment was clearly not one of the RC[1] reasons. The applicant had never suffered from any form of physical or mental injury from NOI and/or his followers. The Board did not accept that the ill-treatment suffered by the applicant attained a minimum level of severity. The applicant’s case did not involve state acquiescence.

24.Moreover, the Board did not accept that the Thai police and/or the higher authorities in Thailand would not take action to assist the applicant if she reported the case to them. The applicant had no previous personal experience in dealing with the Thai police and the higher authorities in Thailand. Her assertion in relation to the lax attitude and inaction of the police and the higher authorities was bare allegation without concrete evidence.

25.As stated in paragraphs 70 to 109 of the Board’s Decision, the Board had gone through very extensive country of origin information (“COI”) and found that the Thai government had already tried their best to combat corruption, arrest loan sharks and improve police professionalism. Thus, the Board found that reasonable state protection was available to the applicant, and there was no ground based on well-founded fear for refusing it.

26.Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant was not at a real risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm under the USM.

27.The Board did not consider the viability of internal relocation for the applicant. However, it is a well-recognised principle that the decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the applicant has established that she qualifies as a refugee pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor [1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of persecution in her home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).

28.As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm, it is not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation.

29.The finding of facts was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with her appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.

30.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.

31.As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Conclusion

32.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.

Dated the 12^th day of August 2026

( Gladys LEE )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Notes for the applicant: If leave has been granted, the applicant or the applicant’s solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on: 12/08/2026 Applicant’s ref. no: Nil		Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 12/08/2026 Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative respondent’s ref. no.: USM 26561 Director of Immigration Putative interested party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 562/25 (Formerly RBCZ 5000480/25) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)