Case Document

100%

HCAL 503/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4753

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 503 OF 2026

BETWEEN

	Ngo Thi Hai Yen	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative
		Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or

consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.

2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated 26 January 2026 and filed on 2 March 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 31 December 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL000503_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 12 November 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) was not substantiated on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition and confirmed the Director’s Decision, which rejected the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection.

Amendment

3.In Form 86, the applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the putative respondent, when only the Board should be so named.

4.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.

5.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.

The applicant’s case

6.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.

7.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because she feared that if refouled to Vietnam, she would be harmed or killed by her creditor Hoang Ngoc due to her inability to repay a loan obtained from the creditor.

Oral hearing

8.The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application and her case was heard on 13 August 2026.

9.The applicant attached a document to her Form 86 with the title “Grounds on which Relief is Sought”. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds stated therein, she merely said that she could not go back to Vietnam.

Grounds for judicial review

10.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

11.The contents of the said document with the title “Grounds on which Relief is Sought” were in fact a combination of the grounds commonly used by many other applicants in similar applications as their grounds for applying leave to judicially review the Board’s decisions without any regard to their own situations.

12.The grounds contained in the said document were listed under 5 headings as follows:-

(1)  Error of Law - State Protection;

(2)  Error in Risk Assessment;

(3)  Failure to Take Relevant Considerations into Account;

(4)  Irrational Finding on Internal Relocation; and

(5)  Inadequate Reasons

13.As aforesaid, the applicant did not elaborate on any of the grounds stated in the said document at the oral hearing. She only said that she could not go back to Vietnam. However, as the applicant was relying on the grounds stated in the attachment to her Form 86, this court will still deal with them as discussed below.

Discussion

14.Ground (1) as stated in the attachment to the applicant’s Form 86 concerns her challenge on the Board’s finding on the availability of state protection to her, and she accused the Board for failing to consider her specific circumstances.

15.This courts notes that the Board essentially refused the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement as the applicant’s case did not qualify her for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the USM.

16.In fact, the Board accepted the factual basis of the applicant’s claims, but found that the applicant’s problems with her creditor was only a personal and private matter. The creditor was not a state actor and there was no evidence of state acquiescence. The police did not refuse the applicant’s report to them. The fact that the police had not taken any further action did not mean that the applicant was denied protection. The applicant was unharmed in the two incidents of threats. The ill-treatment and injuries the applicant sustained in the two attack incidents were not serious and did not attain a minimum level of severity required for international protection. Moreover, the applicant’s fear of the creditor was not for a Convention reason.

17.The Board had gone through extensive country of origin information (“COI”) and found that state protection would be available to the applicant. The Board found that the applicant could not establish that she faced a real and substantial risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm upon return to Vietnam. The Board’s conclusion on the availability of state protection was made in the context that even if the risk did exist, state protection was still available.

18.Thus, the Board did properly assess state protection for the applicant.

19.In fact, the applicant did not specify what specific circumstances of hers were required to be considered but the Board failed to do so. Such a general allegation cannot help the applicant at all. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244, “general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to the facts of his case”.

20.There is therefore no merit in the applicant’s Ground (1).

21.In Ground (2), the applicant asserted that the Board erred in the risk assessment of the applicant’s case in that it required an unduly high degree of certainty of future harm and failed to conduct a proper forward-looking assessment of risk upon return.

22.Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, this court is of the view that the Board had indeed duly assessed the applicant’s risk based solely on her own account. As can be seen from paragraphs 32 to 38 of the Board’s Decision, the Board had specifically confirmed with the applicant what she actually faced and the level of injuries she sustained in the two incidents of threats and the two attack incidents. The applicant agreed that the injuries she sustained were not serious and that the intention of the creditor was to pressurize her to make repayment only. More importantly, the applicant agreed that the creditor had no real intention to kill her.

23.Thus, the Board’s conclusion on the applicant’s future risk cannot be flawed.

24.In Ground (3), the applicant challenged the Board for failing to take relevant considerations into account, including (a) the repeated assaults against the applicant; (b) the escalation of threats; (c) the fact that the alleged persecutor was able to trace the applicant after relocation; and (d) the cumulative effect of violence and intimidation.

25.As discussed in paragraph 22 above, the Board had duly considered the applicant’s account of the alleged events, and even confirmed with the applicant the level of injuries she sustained in all the claimed incidents. More importantly, it was the applicant’s own evidence that she had relocated to Hanoi for more than 3 months, during which she did not meet and was not located by the creditor and/or his men (see paragraph 35 of the Board’s Decision).

26.Hence, the applicant’s assertion that the Board did not take into consideration the fact that the alleged persecutor was able to trace her after relocation was simply untrue, and Ground (3) is baseless.

27.In Ground (4), the applicant complained that the Board had made irrational finding on internal relocation, as the applicant had previously relocated but was located again.

28.As aforesaid, it is untrue that the applicant had been located by the creditor after relocation.

29.Moreover, the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection was refused for reasons that her case did not satisfy the requirements on any applicable grounds under the USM. As can be seen from paragraphs 101 to 104 of the Board’s Decision, the Board explicitly stated that it was not necessary for the Board to consider the issue of internal relocation for the applicant. The Board only mentioned that it had discussed this issue with the applicant at the Board’s hearing, and it was of the view that since there was no reliable evidence to show that the creditor had huge network to relocate the applicant, internal relocation could be a viable option to her.

30.Thus, Ground (4) is simply misconceived.

31.Finally, the applicant advanced in Ground (5) that the Board had given inadequate reasons for rejecting her claim, including its conclusions on risk of serious harm, availability of state protection and internal relocation.

32.However, this court finds that the Board had given a detailed analysis of the applicant’s claim, assessed her claims based on her account, and had given full reasons why it concluded that the applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the USM.

33.In any event, the applicant only made a general accusation that the Board did not give adequate reasons for rejecting her claims without any specificity. As mentioned in paragraph 19 above, general assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review. Thus, Ground (5) is totally unfounded.

34.It is therefore this court’s finding that the applicant has failed to establish any valid ground for challenging the Board’s Decision.

35.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

36.Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the intended judicial review.

37.In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 19 December 2025 and the applicant was present (through video link). Thus, the applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the Board.

38.As can be seen from paragraphs 23 to 100 of the Board’s Decision, the Board had duly considered all aspects of the applicant’s claims against each of the applicable grounds under the USM.

39.The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.

40.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.

41.As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Conclusion

42.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.

Dated the 19^th day of August 2026

( Gladys LEE )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Notes for the applicant: If leave has been granted, the applicant or the applicant’s solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on: 19/08/2026 Applicant’s ref. no: Nil		Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 19/08/2026 Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative respondent’s ref. no.: USM 27618 Director of Immigration Putative interested party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 2010/25 (Formerly RBCZ/5001887/25) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)