Sri Lestari Bt Sutopo Suroso v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 391/2023 [2026] HKCFI 4748 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 391 of 2023 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Isaac Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.By a Form 86 filed on 15 March 2023 (“Form 86”), the applicant, a national of Indonesia, applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claim Appeal Board / the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 21 June 2022 (“Board’s Decision”)[1] confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 23 July 2021 and rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. 2.In the Form 86, the Board was named both as the putative respondent and the putative interested party. The Director should be the putative interested party instead. The Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on the court’s own motion. 3.I refer to the Board’s Decision for the background of the applicant, the basis of the claim, the evidence and the argument the applicant has relied upon, which will not be repeated herein. 4.The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Given the seriousness of the issue involved in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decisions of the Board. However, the Court will not intervene unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in those decisions: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at Dear Mavis, 5.General assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review: see Re Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971, at paragraph 23. 6.The present application for leave is meant to be a filtering process, and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at paragraph 23. I will therefore provide brief reasons for my decision as follows. Discussion 7.The Board’s Decision was issued on 21 June 2022. However, the Form 86 was only filed on 15 March 2023. The present application was accordingly made about 9 months after the Board’s Decision. Order 53, rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A, provides that an application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and, in any event, within 3 months from the date when the grounds for the application first arose, unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. 8.In considering whether to extend the time for applying for leave for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to, inter alia, the following:- (a) the length of the delay; (b) the explanation of the delay; (c) the merits of the substantive application; (d) the prejudice; and (e) the question of general public importance: Re Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1, at §§43-45; AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63/2015, 3 November 2015, at §27. 9.During the hearing, the applicant explained that she had changed her address in December 2022 and, as a result, had failed to receive any letters. However, she subsequently stated that she had received the Board’s Decision by post at her home address. The applicant has effectively no explanation as to the delay. 10.The merits of the intended judicial review is a significant factor to be considered in determining whether the Court should extend the time to apply for leave for judicial review. 11.The applicant has not provided any grounds for the intended application for judicial review. 12.At the hearing on 12 May 2026, the applicant confirmed that she did not have any submissions to supplement the documents filed in support of the application under the Form 86. 13.The Board’s Decision has, with respect, correctly and comprehensively set out the applicable legal principles. I do not see any errors in either the summary or the application of those legal principles. 14.The Board’s Decision has also set out the procedural history of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim, including the details of the hearing before the Board on 7 October 2021 (See paragraphs 2 to 8 of the Board’s Decision). The applicant has not made any complaints of irregularities or unfairness in the entire process. 15.After a detailed analysis of the applicant’s evidence given both before and at the hearing, the Board concluded that the threat of the applicant’s creditor to report the applicant’s uncle to the police for owing money if the applicant could not repay the loan was not sufficient for establishing the proscribed risks (see paragraphs 18 to 30 and 41 to 50 of the Board’s Decision). In any event, the Board took the view that state protection would be available (see paragraphs 31 to 40 of the Board’s Decision). Based on the available materials, the conclusions of the Board were clearly justifiable. I do not see any basis to suggest that the Board was irrational based on the principle set out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 16.Applying the enhanced standard of scrutiny, I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. 17.I therefore disallow any extension of time and dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Form 86. Dated the 20th day of August 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 |
Cases cited in this judgment