Nguyen Duy Dung v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 353/2023

[2026] HKCFI 4690

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 353 of 2023

BETWEEN

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following;

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submission by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Andrew Li:

1.  Extension of time to file the Form 86 be refused;

2.  The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name only the Torture Claims Appeal Board as the putative respondent and the Director of Immigration as the putative interested party; and

3.  Leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

INTRODUCTION

1.By a Form 86 filed on 8 March 2023 (“the Form 86”), the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision by the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 14 November 2022 (“the Board’s Decision”), which affirmed a decision by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 16 December 2021 in refusing the applicant’s non‑refoulement protection claim. He named the Board and the Director as the proposed respondents but neither of them was listed as interested parties.

2.I amended the Form 86 on my own motion to name only the Board as the putative respondent and the Director as the putative interested party.

3.I noted that the leave application was made out of time. Under Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A), an application for leave to apply for judicial review should be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose. There was no explanation for the delay and there was no application to apply for an extension of time to file the application. Given the lack of any explanation for the delay and application, I would reject any application for extension of time.

4.The applicant requested for a hearing and he attended the same.

BACKGROUND

5.The applicant is a national of Vietnam. He seeks non-refoulement protection on the basis that if he is refouled, he would be harmed by his creditor. His personal background, the relevant facts and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be accessed through a hyperlink[1]. I shall not repeat the same herein.

DISCUSSION

6.In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of appeal. Though in non-refoulement case an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board is required given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court should not usurp the role of the Board, which together with the Director are the primary decision-makers. This court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board (Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, [14(1)]). There must be a reasonably arguable claim with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted (Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).

7.In the Form 86 and his affirmation filed in support of the application, the applicant has specified the following grounds: -

(1)  The decisions of the Director and the Board were not reasonable or fair in the Wednesbury sense [3];

(2)  The Director has “failed to appreciate or give the proper importance or weightage to the presence of state Acquiescence” in his decision [4];

(3)  The Board acted “unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on the Country of Origin Information (“COI”)” but failed to take into account of the applicant’s personal background and experience. The Director “had listed relevant COIs which support the aversions that the police in [the applicant’s] country would not be able to protect. The Director failed to consider or give enough weightage to that evidence and ruled otherwise. [5];

(4)  The Board “was procedurally improper and/or unfair” when assessing whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by the applicant and unreasonably required the applicant to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response [6];

(5)  The Director has failed to take into account of the arguments raised by the applicant or has failed to give enough weight to such argument before reaching his decision [7]; and

(6)  The Board has made a ruling to dismiss the applicant’s appeal/petition based on findings which the adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition, “thus the Decisions (sic) was irrational” [8].

8.At the hearing, I asked the applicant if there is anything he wished to add to the grounds which have already been stated in the Form 86 and the affirmation, the applicant told the court that as he still has outstanding loans, he still cannot return to his country yet.

9.This obviously is not a good ground for granting leave for judicial review. Thus, there is no need for me to consider it further.

10.Insofar as the above purported grounds of review were made against the Director (including Ground [3], [4], [5] and [7] above), it has been held that the Director’s decision is not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the Board had been pursued: See Re Raschpal Singh [2020] HKCA 978, per Lam VP (as he then was) at §§40-41. Thus, there is no need for me to consider them. I only need to consider the Board’s Decision.

11.Looking at the Board’s Decision, the Board bore in mind the correct legal principles in respect of each of the four applicable grounds under the USM.

12.It took into consideration the applicant’s case and evidence, including the relevant COI. It also took into consideration of the possibility of internal relocation and concluded that it was a viable option in the case of the applicant.

13.After thoroughly analysing and assessing the above, the Board came to the findings and conclusions that none of the grounds was made out.

14.Having looked at the Board’s Decision carefully, I do not find there was anything unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

15.As the allegation of failing to appreciate or failed to give sufficient or proper weight to the presence of the state’s “acquiescence” was made against the Director only, it cannot be made a subject of judicial review as the Director’s Decision is not susceptible to judicial review as explained above.  

16.Further, I do not find the Board has placed too much reliance on the COI and failed to take into account of the applicant’s personal background and experience. To the contrary, I find the Board has taken into account fully of the applicant’s personal background and experience and has meticulously set out and analysed the evidence produced by the applicant, including the oral evidence he gave at the hearing.       

17.Lastly, I do not find the Board has adopted any improper or unfair procedures when assessing the explanations provided by the applicant. Nor did it in my view unreasonably requested the applicant to respond to any questions that he was not in a position to offer any response to.

18.Despite rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I could not find any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.

CONCLUSION

19.For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that this court should intervene by way of judicial review. I therefore dismiss the application.

Dated the 21^st day of August 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1