Vu Kim Duoc v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 1516/2022 [2026] HKCFI 4787 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1516 of 2022 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Isaac Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.By a Form 86 filed on 16 December 2022 (“Form 86”), the applicant, a national of Vietnam, applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claim Appeal Board / the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 2 November 2022 (“Board’s Decision”)[1] confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 23 December 2021 and rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. 2.In the Form 86, the Board and the Director was both named as the putative respondents. No party was named as the putative interested party. Only the Board should be the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party instead. The Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on the court’s own motion. 3.I refer to the Board’s Decision for the background of the applicant, the basis of the claim, the evidence and the argument the applicant has relied upon, which will not be repeated herein. 4.The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Given the seriousness of the issue involved in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decisions of the Board. However, the Court will not intervene unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in those decisions: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at paragraph 14. 5.General assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review: see Re Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971, at paragraph 23. 6.The present application for leave is meant to be a filtering process, and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at paragraph 23. I will therefore provide brief reasons for my decision as follows. Discussion 7.The applicant has set out the following grounds for the intended application for judicial review:
8.At the hearing on 14 May 2026, the applicant confirmed that he did not have any submissions to supplement the documents filed in support of the application under the Form 86. 9.All intended grounds are general assertions without particulars. Those grounds also suffer more specific problems as follows. 10.Regarding the applicant’s intended challenge against the Director’s decision, such decision has been superseded by the Board’s Decision and therefore it is not susceptible to judicial review: re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549 at §45. The focus of the present application should be the Board’s Decision. 11.As to the intended challenge regarding the use of the COIs by the Board, the applicant has provided no particulars as to any specific problems of the COIs. The applicant also has not provided any particulars as to his alleged personal background and experience that were inconsistent with the COIs, and how they would have significantly impacted upon the Board’s Decision. Notably, the applicant had not reported the assaults by the loan shark to the police (see paragraph 17(h) and (k) of the Board’s Decision) and therefore had no specific evidence to demonstrate the lack of state protection for him. 12.The allegation that there was state acquiescence in his case was unsubstantiated by any particulars or evidence. 13.None of the grounds could demonstrate (i) any procedural unfairness in the appeal before the Board and (ii) how the Board’s Decision was irrational based on the principle set out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 14.I have also considered the Board’s Decision as a whole by applying the enhanced standard of scrutiny, I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. 15.The Board’s Decision has, with respect, correctly and comprehensively set out the applicable legal principles. I do not see any errors in either the summary or the application of those legal principles. 16.The Board’s Decision has also set out the procedural history of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim, including the details of the notifications to the applicant, the attempts to reach the applicant both before and at the scheduled hearing before the Board on 5 August 2022, and the applicant’s absence from the said hearing. Subsequently, the Board sent the applicant a letter putting him on notice of the Board’s intention to determine his appeal/petition pursuant to Schedule 1A of the Immigration Ordinance, to which no response was given by the applicant as of the date of the Board’s Decision (see paragraphs 9 to 15 of the Board’s Decision). I see no irregularities or unfairness in the entire process. 17.Upon the analysis of the applicant’s evidence given to Director and in the notice of appeal to the Board, the Board concluded that, due to his failure to provide any clarification, supplemental information or testimony, the applicant was unable to establish that he would suffer ill-treatment of any sort if refouled to Vietnam, or that there was any real risk of the creditors harming or even killing the applicant upon his return to Vietnam (see paragraphs 52 to 61 of the Board’s Decision). The Board further concluded that the applicant had failed to establish the proscribed risks. In any event, the Board took the view that state protection would be available, and internal relocation would be possible and not unduly harsh (see paragraph 67 and paragraphs 77 to 80 of the Board’s Decision). Based on the available materials, the conclusions of the Board were clearly justifiable. I do not see any basis to suggest that the Board was irrational or Wednesbury unreasonable. 18.I therefore dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Form 86. Dated the 24th day of August 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 |