Cheng Ki Yin v. Director of Legal Aid Department

HCAL 1300/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4545

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1300 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.By Form 86 dated 17 July 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge a decision of the Director of Legal Aid (“DLA”), made on 20 February 2026, refusing to grant or continue legal aid.  The basis of the application is the Applicant’s assertion that she is entitled to legal benefits and rights.

2.The Form 86 seeks relief of: (1) an order of mandamus, because the Applicant has not committed any crime and has the right to apply for a lawyer to handle negligence compensation on her behalf; (2) prohibition order; (3) injunction; (4) damages; and (5) interim relief.  The Applicant names two companies, Global Event Management HK Ltd and Yee Tai Cleaning Company Ltd, and the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department as Putative Interested Parties.

3.Having considered the materials, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with this application on the papers.  This is my Decision.

B.  Background

4.From the papers, the following background matters are apparent.

5.On 18 June 2025, the DLA granted legal aid to the Applicant for the purpose of taking proceedings to claim damages for the personal injuries sustained by her in an accident on 27 June 2022.  The Legal Aid Certificate was limited to preparation for the issue of proceedings in accordance with the PI List Practice Direction 18.1, consideration of settlement and issue of a generally endorsed writ (not including service).  The assigned solicitor was Ms Lee Ka Yan, of Messrs Kwong & Lee.

6.The Applicant says that she requested a change of lawyer, as she was dissatisfied that Ms Lee wanted to close the case hastily, after handling it for just a month or so.  But the Legal Aid Department refused.

7.Though it is not clear what happened in the interim, it may be that legal aid was revoked.  The Applicant appears to have reapplied for legal aid.  That application was refused by the DLA on 20 February 2026, on the basis that (1) the Applicant had failed to show that she had reasonable grounds for continuing the proceedings to which the application related, (2) it would be unreasonable for legal aid to be granted in the particular circumstances of the case, and (3) the Applicant had failed to show negligence on the part of the defendants.

8.By Notice of Appeal dated 5 March 2026, the Applicant appealed against the DLA’s refusal to the Registrar of the High Court.  The legal aid appeal was numbered LAA 161/2026.  On 20 April 2026, Master R Lai, Deputy Registrar of the High Court dismissed the legal aid appeal, on the basis that the Deputy Registrar was in agreement with the decision of and the reasons given by the DLA.

9.In her affirmation, the Applicant states that “the only remaining option” for her is to apply for judicial review to seek justice.  The Applicant states that, according to Articles 35, 36 and 38 of the Basic Law, she has the right to apply for legal aid to engage a lawyer to represent her in claiming negligence compensation.

C.  Consideration of Merits

10.As I have indicated, the target of the Applicant’s intended judicial review is the decision of the DLA, but that decision was taken on appeal in LAA 161/2026, and the appeal was dismissed.

11.However, it is settled that where there has been a legal aid appeal, the underlying decision of the DLA refusing legal aid is not amenable to judicial review.  Indeed, there are different tests to be applied (1) when the DLA/Master is considering an application/appeal for legal aid and (2) when the Court is considering an application for judicial review of a decision refusing to grant legal aid.

12.The starting point is that, under section 10(3) of the Legal Aid Ordinance (“LAO”), a person shall not be granted legal aid certificate in connection with any proceedings unless he or she shows reasonable grounds for taking, defending, opposing or continuing such proceedings.  This is what the DLA decided in this case.

13.A legal aid appeal to the Registrar/Master is in the nature of a de novo hearing.  It does not take the form of a review of the decision of the DLA, and the question is not whether the DLA made a decision which was reasonably open to be made on the materials.  The Registrar/Master is deciding whether, in his view on the materials before him, legal aid should be granted.  Therefore, when hearing an appeal against the decision of the DLA refusing to grant legal aid, the Registrar/Master should adopt the same approach.

14.But the question to be answered by the Court when considering an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Registrar/Master’s decision dismissing a legal aid appeal is a different one.  The Court does not sit as a further tier of appeal, and does not re-examine the Registrar/Master’s decision afresh, or consider whether it would have granted legal aid to the applicant.  The Court’s function is confined to a review of the legality, rationality and fairness of the process, so as to determine whether the intended application for judicial review is reasonably arguable and has a realistic prospect of success.

15.Further, as the appeal to the Registrar/Master under section 26 of the LAO is a full appeal, where the applicant for legal aid has exercised the statutory right of appeal against the DLA’s decision, it follows that the underlying DLA’s decision is in principle not amenable to judicial review.

16.Therefore, with respect, the Applicant’s intended challenge to the DLA’s decision must fail.

17.In any event, the Applicant’s reference to Articles 35, 36 and 38 of the Basic Law do not change the analysis:

(1)  Article 35 provides that Hong Kong residents shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of the lawful rights and interests or for representation in the courts, and to judicial remedies.  However, that is not concerned with the provision of free legal aid by the Government.  Further, it does not enable a litigant to insist to have a particular lawyer.

(2)  Article 36 provides that Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare in accordance with law, and that the welfare benefits and retirement security of the labour force shall be protected by law.  However, the DLA’s refusal of legal aid in this case was in accordance with law, in particular the provisions of the LAO referenced above.

(3)  Article 38 simply provides that Hong Kong residents shall enjoy the other rights and freedoms safeguarded by the laws of the HKSAR.  This provision does not assist the Applicant in the present circumstances.

18.The Applicant has also not identified any suggested public law error on the part of the Deputy Registrar in dismissing LAA 161/2026.  That is unsurprising where that decision is not the intended target of review.  In any event, as identified above, the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction does not sit as another tier of appeal.  The Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction does not decide on the grant or refusal of legal aid.

D.  Result

19.The stated target of the intended judicial review is no longer amenable to review, in light of the fact that the Applicant had and exercised the statutory right of a legal aid appeal.

20.In any event, the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success.  That is so, whether the intended target of these proceedings is the decision of the DLA or the decision of the Deputy Registrar on the legal aid appeal.

21.Therefore, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.  I make no order as to costs.

The applicant, acting in person