Li Tak Ming v. Secretary for Justice

Read the full judgment text of FAMV 18/1998 on BabelCite. This FAMV judgment was delivered on 23 November 1998 before Chief Justice Li, Mr Justice Litton PJ, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ.

Firearms licence renewal – statutory interpretation – prescribed form – public safety – leave to appeal – Court of Final Appeal – applicant sought renewal of arms licence – Commissioner required form with personal details – applicant objected – refused renewal – judicial review refused – leave to appeal refused – interpretation of s.32 Cap.238 – Commissioner entitled to prescribe form – no reasonable prospect of success – leave to appeal refused

Legal issues: Interpretation of statutory power to prescribe form for arms licence renewal

Outcome: Application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal refused.

Cited by 2 cases

Case No.FAMV 18/1998
Court
FAMV
Date23 Nov 1998
JudgeChief Justice Li, Mr Justice Litton PJ, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ
Case Document
100%Judiciary

FAMV000018/1998

FAMV No. 18 of 1998

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 18 OF 1998 (CIVIL)

(ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

FROM CACV No. 78 OF 1998)

_____________________

Between:
LI TAK MING Applicant
AND
SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE Respondent

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Appeal Committee: Chief Justice Li, Mr Justice Litton PJ and Mr Justice Bokhary PJ

Date of Hearing: 23 November 1998

Date of Determination: 23 November 1998

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D E T E R M I N A T I O N

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Mr Justice Bokhary PJ:

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal from a judgment given by the Court of Appeal on 10 June 1998. By that judgment the Court of Appeal affirmed a refusal by Sears J, on 19 March 1998, to grant the applicant leave to apply for judicial review of a number of decisions. Of these the ultimate one was a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Board on 13 November 1997. By that decision the Board affirmed the Commissioner of Police's refusal to renew the applicant's arms licence.

2. The applicant had sought the renewal of his arms licence, such licences requiring renewal annually. Whether to renew such a licence or to refuse to do so is the statutory duty of the Commissioner, placed upon him s. 32 of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, Cap.238. This section provides that:

"Upon application to him in the prescribed form, and payment of the prescribed fee, the Commissioner may renew [an arms] licence for such period as he thinks fit, or may refuse to renew the licence."

3. Reg. 9 of the Firearms and Ammunition Regulations provides that:

"An application for the renewal of [an arms] licence under section 32 of the Ordinance shall be made in such form and contain such particulars as the Commissioner may from time to time determine."

4. The applicant took exception to the form which the Commissioner required him to complete on this occasion. His contention came essentially to this. That form is not a prescribed form within the ambit of the relevant legislation. Put another way, it requires information which, upon the true construction of such legislation, the Commissioner is not entitled to seek by way of such form as he may lawfully prescribe.

5. All the judges who have considered this matter so far have taken the view that it is plain beyond reasonable argument to the contrary that the Commissioner was entitled to prescribe the form to which the applicant takes exception. What that form required the applicant to do was outlined thus by Sears J:

"He had to give his name and address, he had to say whether or not he had any illness in the previous year or so, whether he had been admitted to hospital, what shooting competitions he had been in, whether he had had any arrests, criminal convictions or bankruptcies or attempted to commit suicide."

6. The form is intrusive. But then measures taken for public safety generally are, for they have to be. Witness the fact that perfectly respectable people boarding an aircraft have to pass through a metal detector, and submit to a search if that device detects metal on them.

7. Is there any reasonable prospect that the Court of Final Appeal would differ from the judges who have considered this matter so far? In our view, there is none. Accordingly we refuse leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

(Andrew Li) (Henry Litton) (Kemal Bokhary)
Chief Justice Permanent Judge Permanent Judge

Representation:

Applicant in person

Miss Jenny Fung (of the Department of Justice) for the respondent