Roy Bhagya Shree v. Director of Immigration
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HCAL 603/2026 [2026] HKCFI 4926 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 603 of 2026 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 13 February 2026 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2912 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant was late for the hearing on 6 May 2026. The hearing was refixed to be heard on 1 June 2026. At the hearing on 1 June 2026, the applicant produced a card from the Director of Legal Aid, showing that she had applied for legal aid, and she asked for an adjournment of the hearing. The Court acceded to her request and adjourned the hearing to 19 August 2026. On 19 August 2026, the applicant was absent at the hearing. The Court ordered that her application would be dealt with on the papers. 4.The applicant came to the Court afterwards on the same day and asked for a hearing again. She did not give any reason for her delay. The Court refused to accede to her request. 5.The Court will deal with her application on the papers, assuming that she had abandoned her right to show cause why RPO should not be imposed on her. The procedural history 6.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. She is an illegal immigrant. She has lodged a non-refoulement with the Director of Immigration (“the Director”). 7.Her claim was rejected by the Director because it was not substantiated. 8.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board found that the facts were fabricated and did not support any of the applicable risks[1]. The Board therefore dismissed her appeal. 9.The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 27 May 2025. 10.She appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed her appeal on 30 March 2026. 11.By letter dated 15 June 2025, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 14.The applicant has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials, the immigration officer concluded that there was no significant change of circumstances referred to under section 37ZO. In her previous claim, the Board dismissed her appeal as her story was fabricated. In the additional material, she said that her situation had become more serious. 15.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those condition under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicant filed Form 86 on 20 March 2026 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.The applicant has raised the reason below to challenge the Director’s Decision.
Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 20.The reasons under paragraph 17 are general assertions without any evidence in support. In the subsequent proceeding, the law does not provide for a screening, which had been done in her previous claim. The reasons are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision. 21.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 22.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 23.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 24.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 25.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. Since the applicant was absent at the hearing, she is deemed to abandon her right to show cause why the RPO should not be imposed on her. 26.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 27.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant. Dated the 2nd day of September 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable risks are:
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