Roy Bhagya Shree v. Director of Immigration

Case No.HCAL 603/2026[2026] HKCFI 4926
Court
High Court CFI
Date02 Sep 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%

HCAL 603/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4926

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 603 of 2026

BETWEEN

  Roy Bhagya Shree Applicant
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Respondent

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

    consideration of documents only;          or
   consideration of documents and Applicant being absent in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 13 February 2026 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2912 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.The applicant was late for the hearing on 6 May 2026. The hearing was refixed to be heard on 1 June 2026. At the hearing on 1 June 2026, the applicant produced a card from the Director of Legal Aid, showing that she had applied for legal aid, and she asked for an adjournment of the hearing. The Court acceded to her request and adjourned the hearing to 19 August 2026. On 19 August 2026, the applicant was absent at the hearing. The Court ordered that her application would be dealt with on the papers.

4.The applicant came to the Court afterwards on the same day and asked for a hearing again. She did not give any reason for her delay. The Court refused to accede to her request.

5.The Court will deal with her application on the papers, assuming that she had abandoned her right to show cause why RPO should not be imposed on her.

The procedural history

6.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. She is an illegal immigrant. She has lodged a non-refoulement with the Director of Immigration (“the Director”).

7.Her claim was rejected by the Director because it was not substantiated.

8.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board found that the facts were fabricated and did not support any of the applicable risks[1]. The Board therefore dismissed her appeal.

9.The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 27 May 2025.

10.She appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed her appeal on 30 March 2026.

11.By letter dated 15 June 2025, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance.

12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

14.The applicant has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials, the immigration officer concluded that there was no significant change of circumstances referred to under section 37ZO. In her previous claim, the Board dismissed her appeal as her story was fabricated. In the additional material, she said that her situation had become more serious.

15.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those condition under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for subsequent claim.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

16.The applicant filed Form 86 on 20 March 2026 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

17.The applicant has raised the reason below to challenge the Director’s Decision.

a.  Her claim is a different claim.

b.  Procedural impropriety: failure to consider her right to life; failure to have sufficient inquiry into her situation as the situation in her country has become more serious; there was no screening interview;

c.  Error/ misdirection in law: Director did not consider her new fact that shows the risk of her life being endangered by her enemies is still in force; the Director failed to consider her supporting documents.

Discussion

18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.    

20.The reasons under paragraph 17 are general assertions without any evidence in support. In the subsequent proceeding, the law does not provide for a screening, which had been done in her previous claim. The reasons are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision.

21.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

22.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

23.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

24.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

25.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. Since the applicant was absent at the hearing, she is deemed to abandon her right to show cause why the RPO should not be imposed on her.

26.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

27.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 2nd day of September 2026

  (Allen LEE)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 2/9/2026

Roy Bhagya Shree

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 2/9/2026

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: L/M (34201) in
ImmD RA 7/37/C

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



Form CALL-1



[1]  The applicable risks are:

(1)  risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);

(2)  risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 2 risk”);

(3)  risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of Section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and

(4)  risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”).

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