吳超球及另一人 訴 陳秀蓮經營鵬利運輸公司

HCLA000012/2002

HCLA 12/2002

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

勞資審裁處上訴2002年第12號

（原本案件編號：勞資審裁處申索2001年第748號）

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主審法官： 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官張舉能

聆訊日期： 2002年9月20日

判案書日期： 2002年10月4日

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判案書

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1.這是第二申索人針對勞資審裁處暫委審裁官在2001年2月21日所作出之命令，提出上訴。

2.在勞資審裁處案件中，第二申索人聲稱是被告人之前僱員，由1988年8月15日至2000年12月12日，為被告人僱用為司機。

3.在案件中，第二申索人向被告人追討代通知金、欠薪、有薪假期、有薪年假及譴散費或長期服務金，合共港幣462,147.10元。當中欠薪部分佔港幣108,780.00元，而譴散費或長期服務金一項，佔港幣184,918.00元。

4.基於第二申索人聲稱，被告人拖欠其薪金達3個月之久，第二申索人遂於2000年12月12日，引用《僱傭條例》（香港法例第57章）第10A條離職。

5.有關欠薪方面，被告人的答辯理據為，發薪的方式及時間，並合作經營的模式，均為雙方協議的做法。第二申索人不能引用第10A條離職。另有關法定假期及有薪年假方面，被告人聲稱一直以來，工人於假日也沒有工資，因已經用分賬形式計算在內。此外，既然第二申索人不能引用第10A條離職，則他的代通知金、及譴散費或長期服務金的申索，均不能成立。

6.然而，被告人在其口供詞 [D1] 中第（C9）段聲稱："於報稅時，雙方協議在報稅時不報實數"。

7.當案件於2001年2月21日在審裁處作初步提訊時，暫委審裁官留意到上述被告人供詞內之說話，認為供詞倘若屬實，則雙方已觸犯了刑事罪行。有見及此，暫委審裁官在提醒了第二申索人，他保持緘默的權利後，向他詢問被告人的說法是否屬實，第二申索人未有回答。故此，暫委審裁官認為有理由相信，與訟雙方已犯上刑事罪行，而稅項之申報亦直接牽涉案件之申索項目，因若收入為虛報的收入，則所有申索的項目，也會被嚴重影響。

8.暫委審裁官鑒於事態嚴重，遂於審訊當天，命令將案件無限期押後，同時將個案轉交稅務局調查，待有結果後，雙方均可申請恢復聆訊。

9.2001年4月26日，第二申索人申請覆核暫委審裁官之命令，其申請被撤銷。

10.第二申索人遂針對暫委審裁官將案件無限期押後的命令，向本法庭提出上訴。

11.毫無疑問，勞資審裁處成立的目的，是為勞資雙方提供一快捷、簡單、便宜及不講究形式的方法去解決勞資紏紛。《勞資審裁處條例》（香港法例第25章）第20（3）條明文規定，審裁官如認為任何事宜與申索有關，則不論該事宜曾否由任何一方提出，亦須予以調查。這是法例賦予審裁官的權力及責任：參看Chan Suk Bing, Angie對Harbour Phoenix Limited [1992] 2 HKC 459一案例。

12.當然，這並不表示在合適的情況下，審裁處不能將案件之審理暫時擱置，或押後處理。然而基於一般之法律原則，亦有鑒於勞資審裁處之特別角色及責任，除非有非常特殊之情況，擱置或無限期押後審理案件之做法，未必恰當。

13.關於民事申索或答辯之案情，可能牽涉觸犯刑事法規方面，一般適用於民事法庭的有關法律原則，有不少案例清楚顯示。在Jefferson Limited 對 Bhetcha [1979] 1 WLR 898一案中，英國上訴法庭大法官Megaw有如下之分析（第904 頁H至 905頁F）：

" I should be prepared to accept that the court which is competent to control the proceedings in the civil action, whether it be a master, a judge, or this court, would have a discretion, under section 41 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, to stay the proceedings, if it appeared to the court that justice (the balancing of justice between the parties) so required, having regard to the concurrent criminal proceedings, and taking into account the principle, which applies in the criminal proceeding itself, of what is sometimes referred to as the 'right of silence' and the reason why that right, under the law as it stands, is a right of a defendant in criminal proceedings. But in the civil court it would be a matter of discretion, and not of right. There is, I say again, in my judgment, no principle of law that a plaintiff in a civil action is to be debarred from pursuing that action in accordance with the normal rules for the conduct of civil actions merely because so to do would, or might, result in the defendant, if he wished to defend the action, having to disclose, by an affidavit under Order 14, or in the pleading of his defence, or by way of discovery or otherwise, what his defence is or may be, in whole or in part, with the result that he might be giving an indication of what his defence was likely to be in the contemporaneous criminal proceedings. The protection which is at present given to one facing a criminal charge (the so-called "right of silence") does not extend to give the defendant as a matter of right the same protection in contemporaneous civil proceedings.

Counsel for the defendant, though he submitted that there was such a general principle, accepted that it was not a principle of absolute and invariable application, but that there was a measure of discretion in the court. He submitted, however, that in this case there ought here to be a stay of the proceedings in the civil action until such time as the criminal proceedings have come to a conclusion. In my judgment, while each case must be judged on its own facts, the burden is on the defendant in the civil action to show that it is just and convenient that the plaintiff's ordinary rights of having his claim processed and heard and decided should be interfered with.

Of course, one factor to be taken into account, and it may well be a very important factor, is whether there is a real danger of the causing of injustice in the criminal proceedings. There may be cases (no doubt there are) where that discretion should be exercised. In my view it would be wrong and undesirable to attempt to define in the abstract what are the relevant factors. By way of example, a relevant factor telling in favour of a defendant might well be the fact that the civil action, or some step in it, would be likely to obtain such publicity as might sensibly be expected to reach, and to influence, persons who would or might be jurors in criminal proceedings. It may be that, if the criminal proceedings were likely to be heard in a very short time (such as was the fact in the Wonder Heat case in the Victoria Supreme Court) it would be fair and sensible to postpone the hearing of the civil action. It might be that it could be shown, or inferred, that there was some real, not merely notional, danger that the disclosure of the defence in the civil action would, or might, lead to a potential miscarriage of justice in the criminal proceedings, by, for example, enabling prosecution witnesses to prepare a fabrication of evidence or by leading to interference with witnesses or in some other way."

14.在R 對British Broadcasting Corporation Ex parte Lavelle [1983] 1 WLR 23一案中，Woolf大法官（當時官階）援引及依循上述Jefferson 一案內之判詞，並作出如下之判斷（第39頁A至 C）：

"In the above passage from his judgment, Phillips J. was dealing with the matter in the context of whether or not dismissal was unfair. However, his approach strongly suggests that there should be no automatic intervention by the court. Bearing in mind that if the court does not intervene, the employee still has the choice whether to co-operate with the disciplinary proceedings or not, and the employee will still be entitled to contend that his dismissal was wrongful or unfair in the subsequent proceedings before the court or an Industrial Tribunal, it seems to me that while the court must have jurisdiction to intervene to prevent a serious injustice occurring, it will only do so in very clear cases in which the applicant can show that there is a real danger and not merely a notional danger that there would be a miscarriage of justice in the criminal proceedings if the court did not intervene."

15.在Securities and Futures Commission 對Nomura International (Hong Kong) Ltd [1998] 1 HKLRD 835一上訴法庭案例中（敗訴人其後針對上訴法庭之判決，向終審法院作出之上訴許可申請，為終審法院撤銷：見 [1999] 1 HKLRD 607），羅傑志上訴法庭法官（當時官階）對有關之適用法律原則，有如下之分析（第848頁J至849頁H） ：

"Questions have arisen in cases where there have been two or more separate proceedings arising out of the same facts or incidents and the court has been asked to exercise its power to intervene to prevent injustice because it was said that the continuation of one set of proceedings may prejudice the fairness of the trial of one or other of the proceedings. Frequently, although not exclusively, the question has arisen in cases where there are disciplinary proceedings at the same time as either criminal or civil proceedings. The scope for alleging prejudice is not confined to one set of proceedings or another and the prejudice complained of may occur in either of the proceedings. A number of cases have been cited to us, including R v Panel on Take-Overs & Mergers, ex p Fayed [1992] BCC 524; R v the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and Others, ex p Brindle [1994] BCC 297, and R v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, ex p Gallagher (30 September 1991); all are decisions of the Court of Appeal in England. What is clear from those cases and from the cases which are referred to in those authorities, including Jefferson Limited v Bhetcha [1979] 1 WLR 898 and R v British Broadcasting Corporation, ex p Lavelle [1983] 1 WLR 23, is that the courts will interfere to prevent a serious injustice occurring only in very clear cases in which the applicant shows that there is a real danger - and not merely a notional danger - that the continuation of the proceedings would cause a miscarriage of justice.

Whilst the judgment in the court below at p.17 reiterates a test in a form of words which is similar, but not the same as, those used in some of the cases, as Mr Thomas SC pointed out during the course of his address, the test propounded by the judge that there should be "a real risk of prejudice which may lead to injustice in one or both of those proceedings" might lead to the notion that the use of the word "risk" in relation to prejudice somehow implied some indefiniteness, as might the use of the word "may" in relation to "lead to injustice".

In my view, however, in propounding the test, it is not a mere matter of semantics that the use of the word "serious" which was used, for example, by Neill LJ in the R v Panel on Take-Overs & Mergers, ex p Fayed [1992] BCC 524 case in relation to the word "prejudice" or indeed by Woolf J in the R v British Broadcasting Corporation, ex p Lavelle [1983] 1 WLR 23 case in relation to the word "injustice" has been omitted. The fact is that in all the cases the courts have applied a very stringent test. The courts have not been satisfied with mere hypotheses. The courts have looked carefully at the relevant proceedings and examined whether there really has been prejudice in the sense of the complaining party being unable to put forward its case.

Just because criminal proceedings are on foot it does not mean that civil proceedings must come to a halt or that a defence may not be filed. If there is no real danger, for example, that a jury may be prejudiced by learning the facts or outcome of disciplinary proceedings, both proceedings have been allowed to proceed.

The courts have on more than one occasion noted the public importance of disciplinary proceedings. The public concern which such disciplinary proceedings as the SFC can bring is only addressed if those proceedings are dealt with promptly. It is for that reason that the courts have paid considerable attention to those charged with responsibility for the proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings will only be stayed in exceptional circumstances."

16.Jefferson一案例，牽涉在民事法律程序及刑事法律程序同時存在的情況底下，民事法庭是否應該暫時擱置民事法律程序，以待刑事法律程序完成，才審理民事訴訟。Ex Parte Lavelle一案例，牽涉在紀律處分程序及刑事法律程序同時存在的情況底下，紀律處分程序是否應該暫時擱置，以待刑事法律程序完成，才進行審理。在Nomura一案例中，上訴法庭要處理的是，在本地的紀律處分程序和外地之紀律處分程序同時進行時，法庭是否應該將本地之紀律處分程序暫停進行。在Ex Parte Lavelle和Nomura兩案例中，法庭所引用之適用法律原則，與刑事、民事法律程序並存情況底下之法律原則完全一樣。

17.在本勞資案件中，並無並存之民事法律程序及刑事法律程序。暫委審裁官所面對的情況，只是他認為有理由相信，雙方可能已觸犯刑事法律，須知會稅務局進行調查。這樣的情況與上述案例法庭所面對之情況，相去甚遠。況且在本案案情中，亦無任何或任何足夠之材料顯示，若不無限期將申索押後，會有實質（而非概念上）之危險，導致將來可能有之刑事起訴法律程序中會產生冤案（miscarriage of justice）；又或對與訟雙方在勞資審裁處之申索或答辯，有重大之不利影響。

18.至於任何人的「保持緘默」權利方面，首先，如案例顯示，這不是擱置民事案件的絕對理由。再者，被告人是自願披露瞞稅，放棄緘默權。最後，第二申索人作為申索人，有舉證責任，若他堅持緘默權，則只會影響本人的申索；而他反對審裁官命令，提出覆核及上訴，亦證明他希望申索進行審理，無論他在審訊中行使緘默權與否。在這等情況下，無限期押後審理案件，並不恰當。

19.暫委審裁官認為稅項之申報，直接牽涉本案之申索銀碼，因若收入為虛報的收入，則所有申索項目，也會被嚴重影響。本席認為這或許是事實，而稅務局亦有權力及責任去調查有關稅項之申報，是否有虛報之情況。故將案件之內容通知稅務局之做法，無可厚非。然而這並不表示審裁處不需或不應就本案之申索項目及銀碼數目，進行調查，作出正確之裁斷；亦不表示審裁處可將調查及裁決之責任，交給稅務局代為處理。況且，稅務局之調查結果，對審裁處毫無約束性，雙方之爭訟，最終必須以審裁處之裁斷作準。將涉案案情通知稅務局，並不構成無限期押後審訊申索之理由，亦有違勞資審裁處設立之宗旨及目的，及《勞資審裁處條例》第20（3）條所賦予審裁官的權力及責任。

20.基於上述原因，本席頒令上訴得直，撤銷暫委審裁官2001年2月21日所作之命令；並作出指示，審裁處須盡快排期審訊第二申索人之申索，以祈盡量彌補案件從2001年2月押後至如今，對雙方所造成之拖延、不公及損失。（關於這方面，本席順帶一提：稅務局到如今都未就雙方之報稅問題，作出任何具體之決定；而報稅問題，迄今亦未引起任何刑事之檢控。）

21.至於訟費方面，本席理解被告人之陳詞，即暫委審裁官之命令，乃審裁官之個人決定，並非由於她任何之申請或陳詞所造成。被告人只是依循審裁官之命令行事。至於本上訴方面，被告人亦無主動抗辯，只是在接到上訴通知後，依期出席，等待法庭之判決。在上訴聆訊中，亦未有作出任何答辯陳詞。

22.代表第二申索人的吳大律師陳詞時指出，被告人在獲悉法庭給予第二申索人提出上訴之許可命令後，可以主動認輸，放棄就上訴之抗辯，同意上訴得直，則可免却上訴聆訊。本席同意，理論上來講，這是正確的說法。然而，被告人無律師代表，而本上訴亦起源於一勞資審裁處之申索糾紛，雙方均無律師代表。被告人因不諳法律，並未在第二申索人獲得法庭上訴許可後，主動提出同意上訴得直，可以理解。本上訴可以說是勞資審裁處法律程序之延續，用以糾正一項與被告人無尤的程序錯誤。上訴訟費可視為解決雙方糾紛所需之訟費的一部份。

23.故訟費方面，在行使酌情權底下，本席命令如下：上訴之訟費歸於勞資審裁處之案件中；除非雙方能就訟費達成協議，否則交由本法院聆案官評定。第二申索人本身之訟費，按《法律援助規例》（香港法例第91章）規定，進行評定。

24.本判案書援引及節錄若干段以英文書寫之判詞。本席特此指令，在本判案書宣布的同時，由法庭之傳譯官將本判案書內所節錄之英文判詞，給予被告人口頭中文翻譯。若時間不方便，被告人可與法庭登記處聯絡，以便作出安排，另訂日期、時間，為被告人提供口頭翻譯之服務。

第二申索人，由葉、謝、鄧律師行轉聘吳港發大律師代表

被告人，無律師代表，親自出庭