Microsoft Corporation v. Lee Yuk Sang, Thomas and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 5257/2001 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 13 August 2002.
1. The plaintiff applied for summary judgment against the 2nd, 3rd and 12th defendants for all the claims in the Statement of Claim. At the hearing, I ordered unconditional leave to defend for the 2nd, 3rd and 12th defendants and I now give my reasons.
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HCA005257/2001 HCA5257/2001 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO.5257 OF 2001 -------------------------
------------------------- Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Fung in Chambers Dates of Hearing: 9 and 13 August 2002 Date of Judgment: 13 August 2002 Date of Handing Down Reasons for Judgment: 30 August 2002 ------------------------------------------------------ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ------------------------------------------------------ 1.The plaintiff applied for summary judgment against the 2nd, 3rd and 12th defendants for all the claims in the Statement of Claim. At the hearing, I ordered unconditional leave to defend for the 2nd, 3rd and 12th defendants and I now give my reasons. 2.The plaintiff is a well known computer software manufacturer under the trademark Microsoft ("MS"). In the Statement of Claim, it sued 14 defendants in respect of the MS products listed in the Schedule, and the following relief were claimed :
3.The 1st to 7th defendants are natural persons and the 8th to 14th defendants are corporations. The plaintiff alleged that all the acts complained of in the proceedings were committed pursuant to a common design between all the defendants to carry out such acts and each defendant is jointly and severally liable as a joint tortfeasor. The particulars of the joint tortfeasance was described as the conspiracy. 4.The conspiracy consisted of the following acts :
5.The claims for copyright and trade mark infringement relied on the same particulars as the conspiracy. 6.Default judgment has been obtained against the 14th defendant. 7.For the purpose of this summary judgment application, subsistence of copyright and registration of trademark are not disputed. The lack of authority or licence is also not disputed. 8.The following evidence are relied on by the plaintiff and are not in dispute :
9.The plaintiff relied on a statement dated 12 September 2001 given by Ms Elizabeth Heusner to the Belize police. Ms Heusner stated that she was a secretary of the 14th defendant from February 1999 to June 2000. The 14th defendant was owned by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants. At some stage the 3rd defendant sold his shares to the 1st defendant and was replaced by the 1st defendant. The 7th defendant was in charge of the 14th defendant. She saw Window 98-99 and 2000 software produced by the 14th defendant in large quantities for export. She asked the 6th defendant about it and was told not to bother. 10.In respect of the 2nd defendant, the plaintiff also relied on the following evidence :
11.As to the 3rd defendant, the plaintiff has produced documents of the 14th defendant and a copy of the Register of Directors and Managers under the Companies Act, Belize, showing the 3rd defendant has resigned on 24 August 1999. However, the plaintiff invited the court to ignore such documents and infer that the 3rd defendant was still a director of the 14th defendant after 24 August 1999 because :
12.The 2nd defendant's defence is that he was a mere investor in the 14th defendant and not involved in its daily operation which was in the hand of the 7th defendant, who was an employee of the 1st defendant and was stationed in Belize since the 14th defendant was set up. In mid-1999, the 1st defendant purchased the shares of the 3rd defendant and took over the management and control of the 14th defendant. 13.The 2nd defendant said the 1st defendant would produce the stampers for delivery to the 14th defendant. When the 1st defendant was in Hong Kong, the 1st defendant would do it himself. When the 1st defendant was not in Hong Kong, he would forward them to the 14th defendant and he countersigned on the invoices of the 9th defendant as told by the 1st defendant. 14.The 2nd defendant said he held on to the shares in the 14th defendant because he had lost over HK$5 million on it and the 1st defendant said he could make the 14th defendant profitable. 15.The 3rd defendant said he sold his shares to the 1st defendant at nominal value in mid-1999 and had resigned as director. The board meeting on 15 May 2000 was of no concern to him. 16.The legal test at this stage is not whether the defendants are to be believed, but whether they are so incredible as to be unbelievable. As a matter of principle, there is no objection that the plaintiff's case shall lie in a matter of inference. However, the inference must be so strong that there is no reasonable excuse against drawing it. The court will not conduct a mini-trial, weighing up the evidence on both sides in order to see whether the inference should or should not be drawn. 17.The case against the 3rd defendant can be dealt with shortly. Notwithstanding the admission of the board minutes of 15 May 2000 in his Defence, on the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff, there is a factual dispute as to whether the 3rd defendant has resigned on 24 August 1999. The plaintiff's pleaded case is that the counterfeit production by the 14th defendant started on a date unknown. There is no evidence that such operation has started before 24 August 1999. The statement of Ms Heusner is unclear as to whether the counterfeit production was before or after the 3rd defendant was replaced by the 1st defendant. It will be unfair to assume it in favour of the plaintiff without the opportunity of cross-examination by the 3rd defendant. Even so, a director is not per se liable for the acts of the company. There must be knowledge and adoption of the acts. Further, although it was pleaded that the 3rd defendant was also a member of the conspiracy involved with the stamper production facility in Hong Kong, the evidence at this stage failed to conclusively establish that. Hence, the 3rd defendant must be entitled to unconditional leave to defend. 18.The case against the 2nd defendant is much stronger, and prima facie, his countersignature on the three invoices containing reference to MS products directly links him up with the counterfeit production. However, there remains the following problems :
19.Mr Chain for the 2nd 3rd and 12th defendants submitted that there are also problems with the seizure of the two discs from Helbern :
20.As an ancillary point, Mr Chain submitted that the evidence linking the seizure at the stamper production facility and in Belize came from Mr Donal Keating, an employee of the plaintiff. It is not known whether by "forensic examination" he meant scientifically aided examination or whether it was also based on his opinion. If the latter were also included, his evidence may be objectionable by reason of him being the employee of the plaintiff (see Liverpool Archdiocesan Trust v. Goldberg [2001] LLR(PN) 823). 21.Mr Chain also submitted that the 2nd defendant's countersignature on the three invoices does not, without more, link him to the stamper production facility as part of the conspiracy. No summary judgment application has been taken out against the 1st defendant. If there is to be a trial involving the other defendants, or against the 2nd defendant on the wider conspiracy, the attraction and justification of attempting to dispose of the claim against the 2nd defendant are greatly reduced (see Green v. Hancocks [2001] LLR (PN) 212, per Chadwick at p.219). Further, based on the pleadings in the Statement of Claim, it is difficult to extrapolate part of the claim to enter partial judgment against the 2nd defendant. It is submitted that there is some other reason to be a trial under the second limb of Order 14, rule 3(1). 22.The 2nd defendant's explanation was that he did not know that the three invoices were for counterfeit MS stampers when he signed them. After considering all the evidence, I cannot say that he is unbelievable. 23.In the premises, I granted unconditional leave to defend for the 2nd, 3rd and 12th defendants. 24.I have ordered the costs of this application to be costs in the cause. The reason is that the Defence filed amounted to no more that bare denial, and the defence was disclosed by affidavits. Further, the 3rd defendant has admitted in his Defence the board minutes of 15 May 2000 which he now seeks to deny in affidavit. For the same reason, leave to appeal on costs was refused.
Representation: Mr Nigel Francis of Messrs Herbert Smith, for the Plaintiff Mr Benjamin Chain, instructed by Messrs Y.S. Lau & Partners, for the 2nd, 3rd and 12th Defendants |