Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Mr Loganathan, Suresh Babu
Read the full judgment text of HCIA 3/1999 on BabelCite. This HCIA judgment was delivered on 20 March 2000.
1. This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue ("the Commissioner"), by way of case stated, against the decision of the Board of Review ("the Board").
Cites 1 case
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HCIA000003/1999 HCIA3/1999 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE INLAND REVENUE APPEAL NO.3 OF 1999 (ON APPEAL FROM BOARD OF REVIEW NO.B/R 214/1998) ---------------
-------------- Coram: Hon Cheung J in Court Date of Hearing: 15 March 2000 Date of Judgment: 20 March 2000 ----------------------- J U D G M E N T ----------------------- The appeal 1. This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue ("the Commissioner"), by way of case stated, against the decision of the Board of Review ("the Board"). The facts 2. The facts of this case are as follows. The Respondent ("the Taxpayer") submitted an incorrect return for the year of assessment 1996/97. Income was understated by 67%. Mr LEE Kwok-leung ("Mr Lee"), then acting as a Deputy Commissioner in the Inland Revenue Department ("the Department"), intended to impose additional tax under section 82A of Inland Revenue Ordinance, Cap.112 ("the Ordinance") on the Taxpayer. Mr Lee caused a notice ("the 1st Notice") to be issued to the Taxpayer under section 82A(4) of the Ordinance notifying the Taxpayer of his intention and inviting him to make written representations. The Taxpayer submitted written representations. The case then came into the hands of another officer of the Department, Mrs SIN LAW Yuk-lin ("Mrs Sin"), who was also a Deputy Commissioner. She, having considered and taken into account the written representations, issued a notice ("the 2nd Notice") assessing the Taxpayer to additional tax under section 82A in the sum of $5,000. 3. The Board held that the 1st Notice was valid but the 2nd Notice was invalid because it was not issued by the same person who issued the 1st Notice. As a result, the 2nd Notice was null and void. The consequence is that the Taxpayer was not required to pay the additional tax. Additional tax 4. If a taxpayer submits incorrect tax returns, two consequences may occur. First, prosecution under sections 80 and 82 of the Ordinance. Alternatively, he may be liable for additional tax under section 82A. Under section 82A an assessment of additional tax may be made only by the Commissioner personally or by a Deputy Commissioner personally (section 82A(3)). The procedure involved is set out in section 82A(4) :
The issue 5. The issue in this appeal is whether a single person is required to perform all the steps set out in section 82A(4) in order to levy an additional tax on a taxpayer. Construction of tax statute 6. In construing a tax statute, the purposive construction approach is not excluded. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Ed. p.748 stated that :
7. In W T Ramsay Ltd v. IRC [1982] AC 300 at 323, Lord Wilberforce said in relation to the taxing Acts that :
In Case No. D15/98, the Board in construing section 82A referred to paragraph 912 of Halsbury's Laws of England Vol.44 which stated that :
Mr Li, who appeared for the Commissioner, stated that this passage which was found in the 1983 edition of Halsbury's no longer appears in the 1995 edition. The proper approach 8. Whatever may be the reason for the absence of a similar passage in the current edition of Halsbury's, I accept the approach set out in Bennion and the decision of Lord Wilberforce in Ramsay as the approach one should adopt in construing a tax statute. In my view, notwithstanding the use of the word "personally" in section 82A(3), the assessment of additional tax does not need to be made by a single person only, so long as the officers involved in the additional tax assessment hold the rank of either a Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner. Administrative and not judicial functions 9. One begins the task by asking what is the role of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner in assessing additional tax. Although a comparison had been made to judicial proceedings in which the judge who hears the evidence will also give the verdict, in my view, it is inappropriate to compare the role of the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner to that of a judge. The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner's role is an administrative one, namely, to assess the additional tax. There is no difference in principle between the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner in assessing additional tax and that of the Commissioner in dealing with objections raised by a taxpayer against the assessment of tax by an assessor. The role is still an administrative one. This was the position in Mok Tsze Fung v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1962] 1 HKTC 166 which was concerned with section 64 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance of 1950 which provided for an appeal to the Commissioner against the assessment by an assessor. Section 64 had since been replaced by provisions for making objections to the Commissioner. It was held by Mills-Owens J that during the hearing before the Commissioner under section 64, his role was an administrative one and not a judicial one, see also CIR v. The Board of Review, Ex-parte Herald International Ltd [1964] HKLR 224 and Encyclopaedia of Hong Kong Taxation, Vol.4, para.20299. 10. The power to assess additional tax by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner does not make their function a judicial one. The Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner in assessing additional tax does not hold a hearing. They are not required to hear evidence or observe the demeanour of witnesses. There is no opposing parties. In considering whether additional tax should be levied, they consider whether there was any incorrect return and the written representation made by the taxpayer. The task can be performed by more than one person so long as they are holders of the same rank. If a taxpayer is dissatisfied with the assessment of additional tax, he may appeal to the Board under section 82B of the Ordinance. The Board holds hearings to determine the appeal. Intent of legislature 11. It cannot be the intent of the legislature that in the operation of the Ordinance, a single person should be responsible for assessing the additional tax. The top hierarchy of the Department consists of the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioners and the Assistant Commissioners. The task of assessing additional tax is given to the two most senior officers of the Department instead of the assessors. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner are civil servants. Civil servants come and go by appointment, promotion, retirement or transfer. Civil servants also go on leave. It would disrupt the smooth operation of the tax system if the interpretation by the Board is adopted. Take this example : if the Commissioner, shortly before his retirement, had issued section 82A notices requiring the taxpayers to make representations, these notices would be useless upon his retirement because the new Commissioner who assumes the office is not the very same person who issued the notices in the first place. This cannot be right. To carry the matter further, if the new Commissioner is required to issue the notices afresh, he would receive the same representations that the former Commissioner had already received. His task is not made any different by the new representations. A further illustration is this. Under section 82A(6) an assessment can be raised on the executors of a taxpayer who had since died. If a taxpayer had died after making representations which were within his personal knowledge, it would be unfair to the executors who would be liable to the additional tax, if the written representations submitted by the deceased taxpayer cannot be acted upon by the new Commissioner. Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance 12. The approach I have adopted is supported by provisions of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance ("IGC Ordinance"). There is no contrary intention in either the Ordinance or the IGC Ordinance which displaces the operation of the IGC Ordinance. Section 19 of the IGC Ordinance requires a fair, large and liberal construction of an Ordinance as will best ensure the attainment of its object according to its true intent, meaning and spirit. Section 39(2) provides that :
Section 54 further provides that :
Section 39(2) and section 54 clearly indicate that the condition in section 82A is satisfied so long as the duties are discharged by the holder for the time being of that particular public office. This is how one expects a public duty is to be performed. Meaning of the word "personally" 13. Section 3A of the Ordinance provides that :
By reason of section 3A, in discharging his functions under section 82A, the Commissioner clearly cannot delegate the task to a Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner or any public officer. In my view, when the Ordinance requires that the assessment of additional tax is to be made by the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner personally, all that it means is that the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner cannot delegate his task to someone else and the task have to be performed by a public officer holding the rank of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner for the time being. "As the case may be" 14. Reference is made to the words "as the case may be" in section 82A(4). This may well indicate that both the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner cannot be involved in one particular case. However, this is not the situation in the present appeal where the assessment for additional tax was made by two public officers, both holding the same rank of a Deputy Commissioner. I do not see how a legitimate expectation can be relied upon by the Taxpayer that the additional tax assessment would only be made by one single officer. Effect of irregularity 15. Mr Li also submitted that even if section 82A is to be construed as requiring the assessment to be made by the same officer, the irregularity in the present case could not be so fundamental as to nullify the 2nd Notice. Substantial compliance and consequence 16. It is only necessary for me to deal very briefly with this issue. In Nina T. H. Wang v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1994] 4 HKTC 15, the Privy Council reviewed the authorities and stated that :
17. In R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex-parte Jeyeanthan [1999] 3 All ER 231 Lord Woolf suggested the matter can be dealt by asking three questions :
18. In the present case, there was obviously a substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirement under section 82A(4). The notice had been issued to the Taxpayer who responded by his written representations. If Mrs Sin was to issue a fresh 1st Notice, it would have been identical in content with the 1st Notice issued by Mr Lee and would have served no useful purpose at all. Discretion is not an issue in the present case. To the third question, the Taxpayer would have suffered no adverse consequences. He was not deprived of the chance to make written representations before the additional tax was imposed. His written representations were considered by a revenue officer in the rank of a Deputy Commissioner. If the Taxpayer was aggrieved by the decision, a right of appeal to the Board was available to him under the statute. In my view, any irregularity would not have the effect of nullifying the 2nd Notice. Section 63 19. Section 63 of the Ordinance provides that :
This makes it clear beyond doubt that in construing section 82A, one is concerned with the substantial compliance of the statutory provisions. Quantum 20. There is no dispute that the amount of additional tax is properly assessed. The answer to the questions 21. The two questions raised in the case stated are as follows :
The answer to these two questions is both "no". Costs 22. The Taxpayer did not appear on the hearing of the appeal. He informed the Court in writing that he would not be making representations and would abide by the result of the decision. This is a test case for the Commissioner because there are other similar pending cases. The appropriate order is that there shall be no order as to costs of the appeal.
Representation: Mr Herbert Li, SGC of Department of Justice, for the Appellant Respondent in person, absent |
Cases cited in this judgment