Aqua-leisure Industries Inc. and Another v. Aqua Splash Ltd.
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HCA018928A/1998 1998 HCA No. 18928 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ____________
____________ Coram: The Hon. Mr. Justice Keith in Chambers Date of Hearing: 14 May 1999 Date of Delivery of Judgment: 14 May 1999 ______________ J U D G M E N T ______________ The request for information 1. On 12th February, it was ordered that there be a speedy trial of this action. The trial was subsequently fixed to begin on 24th May. That is now only 10 days away. The estimate of the length of the trial was 5 days. However, on 29th April an order was made declaring that the Defendant's solicitors had ceased to be the solicitors acting for the Defendant in the action. That gave rise to some concern. The order for a speedy trial had meant that the work to be done to get the action ready for trial had had to be completed within a shorter timescale than usual. By 29th April, there was still much work to be done. 2. In addition, the Plaintiffs' solicitors were anxious to know how they should prepare for trial. A number of the Plaintiffs' witnesses live overseas, and if the trial proceeds, they will have to come to Hong Kong. And if the Defendant decides not to be legally represented, it may well be that the Plaintiffs' solicitors will not instruct leading counsel for the trial. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' solicitors asked me to exercise the powers conferred on the court by Ord. 25 r. 6(1), which provides, so far as is material:
The information which the Plaintiffs' solicitors suggested I sought related to whether the Defendant was still proposing to defend the action. If so, did it propose to be represented? If so, by whom? And if by solicitors, when did the Defendant propose to engage them? The hearing on 29th April and its aftermath 3. It was on 29th April that the Plaintiffs' solicitors asked me to require the Defendant to give the court that information, which was when various summonses relating to amendments to the Statement of Claim, specific discovery and the exchange of witness statements were before the court. I was not prepared to consider whether the Defendant should be required to give that information other than at a hearing which had been convened for that purpose. Accordingly, I directed that a date be fixed for determining whether any further directions should be given in the action. In the meantime, the Plaintiffs' solicitors wrote to the Defendant on 4th May in the following terms:
The questions set out in the attached sheet were as follows
4. The sanctions for not complying with a requirement under Ord. 25 r. 6(1) are set out in Ord. 25 r. 6(3), which provides:
The Plaintiffs' solicitor's letter to the Defendant referred to the latter of those sanctions. The letter included the following statement:
The hearing yesterday 5. The restored summons for directions came before me yesterday. No-one from the Defendant appeared, nor had anyone communicated with the Plaintiffs' solicitors since its own solicitors' instructions had been withdrawn. Nor had anyone replied to the Plaintiffs' solicitors' letter of 4th May. At this hearing, I considered whether the Defendant should be required to give the information sought. I decided that it should be. Effective case management required nothing less. With the trial of the action so imminent, the Plaintiffs' solicitors had to know the answers to their questions to enable effective preparation of the case for trial to be completed. Apart from the judgment of Jerome Chan J. in Luigi Benetton S.r.1. v. Face Time International Ltd. (HCA 4135/93), in which the Defendant was ordered to state whether it proposed to call witnesses at trial, I knew of no case, reported or otherwise, in which Ord. 25 r. 6(1) had been used for this purpose. However, the fact that the application was a novel one did not mean that the order ought not to be made. 6. The difficulty was that no-one from the Defendant was present in court to answer the questions, and I did not think it right to proceed further until the Defendant had been notified (a) that I had required it to give the information sought, and (b) that in the event of such information not being given, I would have to consider whether to strike out the Defendant's Defence. I therefore adjourned the summons until today. My order adjourning the summons stated that it was being adjourned
In addition, the Plaintiffs' solicitors wrote to the Defendant yesterday. Having referred to yesterday's hearing, the letter continued:
The hearing today 7. No-one from the Defendant has appeared today. The information which I required should be given has therefore not been given. Mr. Douglas Clark for the Plaintiffs now asks me to strike out the Defendant's Defence. Apart from the Defendant's recent conduct of the litigation, Mr. Clark relied upon the following three matters. First, the evidence filed by the Plaintiffs in support of the application for a speedy trial of the action demonstrates that the Plaintiffs have a "very strong case". Secondly, although the Defendant is the Hong Kong subsidiary of a "financially strong" Dutch company, it may well have been incorporated as a "special purpose" vehicle with few assets. It may therefore not be good for damages and costs. Thirdly, the Plaintiffs would be put to unnecessary expense if they have to bring witnesses from overseas for what might be a trial in which the Plaintiffs may have to do little more than prove their case. 8. I am very reluctant to make an order which has the effect of debarring the Defendant from defending the action for non-compliance with a requirement to provide information when the Defendant has been given comparatively little time to consider its position, though I recognise that the shortness of time has been the result of the Defendant's solicitors' instructions being withdrawn so soon before the trial of the action. As it is, I have decided that I must take a robust view of the case. Since the Defendant is not even prepared to tell me that it proposes to defend the case, I can only assume that it is proposing not to do so. In those circumstances, I see no reason why the Plaintiffs should be required to go to the trouble and expense of proving a case which is not to be defended. In the exercise of my discretion under Ord. 25 r. 6(3), therefore, I order that the Defendant's Defence be struck out. The effect of that is that the Plaintiffs will be entitled to such relief as they are entitled to on the facts pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim, and I shall hear from Mr. Clark as to the terms of the judgment which I should enter.
Representation: Mr. Douglas Clark, of Messrs. Lovell White Durrant, for the Plaintiffs Defendant absent |