Poon Chi Kwong v. The Queen
Read the full judgment text of CACC 232/1968 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 26 July 1968.
1. This is an appeal against conviction for the murder of one Tam Sze, a lady aged sixty who lived in Flat E on the 9th floor of Kam Wai Building, Kam Wah Street, Shaukiwan.
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CACC000232/1968 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 232 OF 1968 -----------------
Coram: Scholes, P. , Mills-Owens, J. and Pickering, J. Date of Judgment: 26 July 1968 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1. This is an appeal against conviction for the murder of one Tam Sze, a lady aged sixty who lived in Flat E on the 9th floor of Kam Wai Building, Kam Wah Street, Shaukiwan. 2. In the court below there was evidence that, on the 14th of December, 1967, Shum Mui, the daughter of the deceased visited her mother at those premises, and that when Shum Mui left the flat shortly after 10.30 a.m. her mother was then the only person in the flat. There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the deceased was not then in a state of ordinary health. 3. At about 6 p.m. the same day the husband of the deceased, Shum Leung, returned home and found the door of his flat closed, but the grille on the outside of the door was half open. When he entered the flat he found his wife lying on the floor with a piece of string looped twice around her neck. Her gold necklace and two finger rings, one gold and one made of metal, were missing; in her clothing there was a sum of $3.55 in coins but there were no currency notes although the daughter, Shum Mui, gave evidence of having personally placed notes to the value of $15 in the pocket of her mother's inner clothing upon the occasion of her visit that morning. 4. The unfortunate victim was dead when she was found by her husband, but when the police arrived they found no indication that either the door or the windows of the flat had suffered any interference. The forensic pathologist placed the time of death as being most probably between 11.20 a.m. and 12.20 p.m. though he was prepared to concede the possibility of that estimate being imprecise within half an hour in either direction. The forensic pathologist did not include his estimate of the time of death in his written report and mentioned it only to Inspector Whitton who was in charge of the investigation. The pathologist's opinion was that death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation with the string. 5. On the 30th of December, 1967 the Shaukiwan police received a report of another crime, and Lam Kwai, the victim of the crime committed on that date, testified in the court below that her son was friendly with the appellant whom he frequently brought to their flat at Tai Shun House, Shaukiwan, and that she was very fond of the appellant treating him as her own son. This lady gave evidence of the accused calling upon her on the 30th of December when she was alone in her flat and of his declining, after a conversation lasting about 25 minutes, her invitation to stay for a meal. This witness said that she then went into the bathroom to wash some rice and that the appellant there upon came upon her from behind, hit her on the forehead with a hard object, put his arm around her neck and dragged her into the sitting room where, from a position behind her, he put a ligature of string or wire around her neck. After this she felt herself hit by some hard object on the back of the head and lost consciousness. When she came to it was to find her husband helping her. A gold ring, a gold necklace, one other ring, a lady's wrist watch, and a small silver chain were missing from the flat, as also was a sum of $500 in bank notes. 6. Because the victim of this robbery was able to tell the police just who had assaulted her, the appellant was arrested on the morning of the 2nd January, 1968 at about 10.30 a.m. when he was immediately cautioned. He made no verbal reply to the caution but nodded his head and took from his pocket the lady's wrist watch stolen from Lam Kwai on the 30th of December. The appellant then took the police to his home where he produced Lam Kwai's gold necklace and silver chain. Subsequently he took the police to a gold smith's shop where, he said, he had sold the gold ring: the ring, however, was not recovered having, according to the evidence of an employee of that shop, already been ...(illegible) down. 7. It need not be stressed that the similarity of method between the crime of the 14th of December and that of the 30th December was apparent to the police. 8. Following the visit to the goldsmith's shop the appellant was taken to Shaukiwan Police Station where, at 11.30 on the morning of the 2nd January 1968, under caution, he made a statement which amounted to a confession of the crime of the 30th of December. 9. From evidence, which is no longer in dispute before this court, it appears that, having obtained the appellant's admission to the offence of the 30th of December, Inspector Whitton instructed five detectives headed by a corporal to interrogate the appellant in regard to the murder on the 14th of December, and that such interrogation began at about noon or shortly after noon on the same day, the 2nd of January. By 1p.m. the interrogation had yielded nothing either to incriminate or exonerate the appellant in regard to the murder. At 1 o'clock the interrogation was adjourned, all concerned had lunch, and at about 1.30 pm. the appellant took the five detectives to Tai Shun House, the scene of the crime of the 30th of December, to recover a wooden stool with which, he said, he had attacked Lam Kwai. On the return of the party to the police station the interrogation was renewed at about 2 p.m., and continued until about 3 p.m. with the same inconclusive results as had characterised the pre-lunch interrogation. 10. Numerous suggestions of improprieties on the part of the detectives during these two periods of interrogation were rejected by the learned trial judge on the voire dire, but these allegations having been repeated before the jury the learned trial judge in his summing-up reminded the jury of each such allegation and its denial. 11. At approximately 3 p.m. Inspector Whitten asked Detective Sergeant Wong Man to take over the interrogation of the appellant, and the Sergeant proceeded to question the appellant in the office of Detective Inspector Cheung, who was present but engaged in other work and took no part in the interrogation. The five earlier interrogators were not present. It seems that in the early stages of the Sergeant's interrogation the appellant was prepared to talk about such matters as his general background and he let it emerge that amongst his friends was a man called Lau Kwong his reputed, though not actual, godfather. It so happened that the Sergeant knew Lau Kwong. After being questioned for about half an hour, the appellant announced that ...(illegible) refused to answer any further questions until he had seen Lau Kwong. Interrogation then ceased. Following two telephone calls from the Sergeant, Lau Kwong arrived at the police station at about 4.40p.pm. 4.50 p.m.. In the intervening period between the appellant saying that he would not answer further questions until he had seen Lau Kwong and Lau Kwong arriving at the police station, no further interrogation took place, and the appellant, at his own request, was given a cup of tea and cigarettes. 12. It is common ground that during the interrogation of the appellant by five police officers between approximately noon and 1 p.m., and approximately 2 p.m. and 3 p.m., as well as during Detective Sergeant Wong Man's interrogation, which lasted from about 3 to 3.30 p.m., no caution was administered to the appellant. 13. After Lau Kwong arrived at the police station he spoke to the appellant in Detective Inspector Cheung's office. Detective Sergeant Wong Man said in evidence that he himself was standing some distance away from Lau Kwong and the appellant, who were sitting at a table with their noses a short distance apart - a position which he described as "like chickens fighting". The Sergeant did not hear much of the conversation between the two men. That conversation was, however, described in its essentials by Lau Kwong, who said that the appellant told him that he had committed a robbery at Kam Wah Street and asked Lau Kwong what he should do whilst at the same time requesting Lau Kwong to take care of his, the appellant's, wife. It did not appear that either the date of the alleged offence or the word 'murder' was mentioned between the two, and according to the Sergeant, he had merely told Lau Kwong that the appellant had been arrested in connection with a robbery; no further details of the robbery were given to Lau Kwong, but the Sergeant said that he was referring to the robbery of the 30th of December and gave no information to Lau Kwong about the alleged robbery and murder at Kam Wah Street. 14. According to the Sergeant, the conversation between Lau Kwong and the appellant lasted about twenty-five minutes, and according to both Lau Kwong and the Sergeant the appellant wept towards the end of this period and was told by Lau Kwong "whatever you know tell the police" where upon the appellant turned to the Sergeant and said: "Sergeant, I wish to say something to you. I want to tell you about the death of the woman in Kam Wah Street." Upon this the Sergeant stopped the appellant, and having told him that he should tell anything he wanted to say to Detective Inspector Cheung, turned the appellant over to the Detective Inspector and left the room with Lau Kwong. 15. Detective Inspector Cheung gave evidence that he told the appellant, after revealing his identity to him, that he was making inquiries into the murder of Tam Sze at Kam Wah Street, Kam Wai House, 9th floor, Block E, on the 14th of December 1967, and that he cautioned the appellant in the standard form. Following this the appellant wrote a statement in his own handwriting. It reads :-
16. Upon the completion of this statement the Detective Inspector put a question to the appellant which was :-
to which the appellant answered :-
17. The admissibility of this statement and that of the question and answer which followed it constitute two of the four grounds of appeal. A further ground of appeal arising out of the statement is that the learned trial judge was wrong in excluding manslaughter as a result of provocation from the consideration of the jury in view of the allegation in this statement of the scolding of the appellant with abusive language by the deceased. We would mention at this stage that there was no other evidence supporting an allegation of provocation since the appellant himself elected not to give evidence before the jury in the lower court. There are thus three grounds of appeal arising from the statement and the question and answer which followed it:- the admissibility of the statement, the admissibility of the question and answer, and the exclusion of manslaughter from the consideration of the jury. 18. The events which lead to the fourth and final ground of appeal are to be found, not in anything that happened at the police station or at the scene of the crime but in the learned trial judge's reaction to a request by the Crown to be given leave to adduce evidence of similar facts. Counsel for the appellant does not now suggest that the trial judge's decision to permit evidence of similar facts (the evidence as to the robbery on the 30th of December) was wrong, but he contends that the learned trial judge was wrong in admitting such evidence having "already at the be ginning of the trial refused leave to the Crown to adduce evidence as to similar facts". 19. What happened at the trial was that immediately after the jury had been sworn, and in its absence, counsel for the appellant addressed the court on the admissibility of this similar fact evidence which the Crown proposed to introduce. The learned trial judge having observed that the admissibility of evidence was normally decided at the time when it was tendered, a discussion ensued between the judge and counsel on both sides. At the conclusion of that discussion the learned trial judge said: "Well, we will listen to counsel opening on the basis that similar fact evidence will not be tendered and see how the thing goes", and subsequently he said: "The question is whether this evidence is of a kind - of a sort, in view of the similar facts - the fact he is associated with the son of the family - going to her house when the husband is away - just a woman there, ties a string around her neck - robbery being the primary motive - the only motive - we will see how things go". 20. That was how matters were left before the jury returned. 21. At a subsequent stage of the proceedings the admissibility of the similar fact evidence was again argued, and the learned judge observed "at the beginning of this case we did not really have a very full argument". There upon, following a lengthier argument than that which had taken place at the beginning of the trial, the learned judge ruled in favour of admitting the similar fact evidence. 22. The first ground of appeal is as follows :-
23. In regard to this ground, Mr. Lee, who appeared for the appellant, referred to the fact that it was common ground that the appellant had not been cautioned in respect of the murder either before or during his interrogation and that he was in custody during the interrogation, although there was a question as to whether he was in custody for the robbery on the 30th December only or for both the robbery and the murder. The only evidence against the appellant at the time of the interrogation being that of similar facts, counsel contended that the appellant was in fact in custody for both offences, because although there was no direct evidence of the appellant being under arrest for the murder the question of custody depended on freedom, and the police inspector in charge of the investigation had said that even if there had been no robbery on the 30th December, he would not have let the appellant go. 24. Mr. Lee submitted that the questioning of the appellant whilst in custody without caution was clearly a breach of rule 3 of the Judges' Rules (the old Rules, which remain in force in Hong Kong), and that the learned trial judge had failed to consider whether or not he should exercise his discretion to refuse to admit the statement, Exhibit P.6, on account of the breach of rule 3. 25. In support of his contention that there had been a breach of rule 3 of the Judges' Rules Mr. Lee cited the cases of Lee Wai & Others v. The Queen(1) and Regina v. Buchan(2) and he submitted that these cases showed that an accused should be cautioned before being questioned even if he is in custody for another offence, but he distinguished Lee Wai's case from the present case because, where as in Lee Wai's case only one question had been asked, in the present case the appellant had been questioned for two and a half hours, and also because, where as in Lee Wai's case the accused had been reminded of his former caution, in the present case that had not occurred and the appellant had not been cautioned. In regard to the case of Cheung Kun Sun and Others v. The Queen(3) counsel for the appellant conceded that there were distinguishing features between that case and the present case, namely that in that case confessions were made during interrogation, which was not so in the present case, and in Cheung's case the accused were in custody for the offence about which they were being interrogated and with which they were later charged, which was at least in doubt in the present case; further in Cheung's case the statements made and put in evidence were basically the same as statements made under interrogation which was not so in the present case, and it appeared from Cheung's case that the statements themselves gave the impression that they were not voluntarily made (see page 21 of the report) which did not arise in the present case. Nevertheless, he relied on that case as deciding that an accused person should not be cross-examined, whilst in custody, about the offence for which he is in custody. 26. Mr. Corrigan, who appeared for the Crown, referred to the fact that the statement, Exhibit P.6, had been ruled by the trial judge to be a voluntary and admissible statement after a voire dire lasting six days and that the judge had found as a fact that the statement had not been obtained by any verbal inducement or other pressure; further, that all that had occurred from 11.30 a.m. to about 5.30 p.m., when the appellant wrote the statement, had been duly canvassed before the trial judge, who had also heard the arguments of counsel thereon. 27. In regard to the cases of Lee Wai & Others v. The Queen(1) and Regina v. Buchan(2), Mr. Corrigan contended that both those cases concerned their own facts; however in both of them it was held that under rule 3 of the Judges' Rules it was permissible to question an accused for an offence other than that charged when such a person had been first cautioned. Counsel submitted, further, that in the present case the police had been entitled to question the appellant in the same way as they could have done at his home or in the street, that the appellant had not incriminated himself either in the course of or as a result of the questioning, nor was there, at the time, sufficient evidence where on to charge him the appellant was no more than a suspect and the police were investigating the case. Crown counsel contended that so long as the police did not seek to use in evidence the answers given under interrogation there was no reason why they should not interrogate. In the present case, he submitted, there had been no breach of rule 3, because the appellant was not in custody for the offence in respect of which he was being interrogated; in respect of that offence he was in the same position as a person asked to go to the police station to make a statement. He cited paragraph 804 of 10th edition of Phipson on Evidence, and the cases of R. v. Wattam(4) and R. v. Joyce(5) as authorities for the admission of answers given during interrogation without caution, even when an accused was interrogated at a police station, but he conceded that a different view was taken in the case of R. v. Bass(6), and he agreed that it was a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case as to whether or not a person was in custody at the time of the making of a statement. 28. Mr. Corrigan conceded that the object of rule 3 of the Judges' Rules was to prevent the danger of an accused person being forced or induced to incriminate himself. The rule, he argued, applied to the case of a person under arrest because, presumably, there was already evidence against him, but did not apply to an interrogation conducted in the course of an investigation. He submitted that, in the circumstances of the present case, the absence of a caution before the interrogation was immaterial because no statement had resulted. The learned trial judge had rightly said that the only question he had to decide, after hearing all the evidence, was whether or not the statement was voluntarily made. Crown counsel maintained that the questioning had made no difference in respect of the position of the appellant. If the Crown had sought to put in evidence any answers arising out of the questioning, circumstances, it did not arise. 29. Mr. Corrigan went on to submit that the only substantial question raised was whether or not the fact of interrogation could be said to be an inducement; whether or not all that had occurred before the cautioned statement amounted to an inducement. It was in fact the case that the appellant had made no incriminating statement during or on the conclusion of the questioning. 30. In his reply Mr. Lee relied upon the overall principle that no suspect is obliged to incriminate himself, and he contended that the provisions of rule 3 plainly provided that persons in custody should not be questioned without caution. Mr. Lee submitted that if the appellant had been cautioned before the interrogation in respect of the murder it might well have made a difference because the appellant had twice been cautioned previously in connection with the robbery of the 30th December, and not having been cautioned before the interrogation in question he might well have thought that he could not refuse to say anything. Mr. Lee also argued that the trial judge had not ruled on the question whether the interrogation amounted to an inducement; and it did not appear from the record that the judge had directed his mind to that. He submitted that the interrogation had been an ordeal and that the appellant would not have known for how long it would go on, and might well have thought that it would continue until the police had been told what they wanted to know or until he confessed. Mr. Lee said that there was no allegation against the sergeant who had questioned the appellant, and he would agree that there had been no inducement during the two hours immediately before the statement, Exhibit P.6, was made, but he submitted that the effect of the interrogation would not have dissipated by the time the statement was made. 31. Although in Lee Wai's case(1) the accused had in fact been cautioned, and the question before the court was whether or not an accused could be questioned on one offence when in custody for another offence, it is of interest to note that the Full Court in that case said, when referring to rules 1 and 3 of the Judges' Rules :-
A similar question arose in Buchan's case(2) in the Court of Criminal Appeal in England, a case in which the accused had also been cautioned before being questioned, and in that case the relevant part of the headnote reads :-
32. We think that it is clear from rule 3 of the Judges' Rules, 1930, that a person in custody should not be questioned without prior caution whether in respect of the offence for which he is in custody or in respect of any other offence. 33. Cheung Kun Sun's(3) case is distinguishable from the present case in that in that case the accused had already incriminated themselves during their interrogation, and therefore, no doubt, in their own minds thought that they had nothing to lose in repeating their confessions after they had been formally cautioned, and the statements made after caution were basically the same as those made during questioning, whereas in the present case the appellant did not incriminate himself during the interrogation; and further in Cheung Kun Sun's case(3) the statements made after caution, themselves gave rise to the impression that they were not voluntarily made. 34. In our view, the question whether or not there was a breach of rule 3 does not directly arise, as it was not sought to adduce in evidence any statement made by way of answer in the course of the interrogation. If it had been sought to adduce any such statement then, clearly, the trial judge would have been bound to take the view that it had been obtained in breach of the rule, for the reason that, although the rule permits questioning of a person in custody in respect of another offence (see R. v. Buchan(2)), it plainly requires the prior administration of a caution. The real question in our view is whether the interrogation is to be said to have operated as an inducing or compelling factor in relation to the statement Ex.P.6, when it ultimately came to be made, that is to say whether there is reason to conclude that, not with standing the caution administered to the appellant following his conversation with his reputed godfather, when he stated that he wished to say something, he may have remained under some impression, as a result of the prior persistent interrogation without caution, that he was bound to make a statement. 35. The appellant did not incriminate himself during, or at the end of, the interrogation; indeed the police made no headway in their interrogation of the appellant. Following the conclusion of the interrogation a period of about two hours elapsed before the appellant wrote out the statement, Exhibit P.6, and during that period he was, at his own request, given tea to drink and cigarettes to smoke. Before writing out the statement, he was duly cautioned. Apart from this, as has already been stated, during that interval the appellant sent for a friend, Lau Kwong, whom he termed his godfather, and he and Lau Kwong conversed together for about half an hour. During that time Lau Kwong told the appellant: "whatever ...(illegible) tell the police" and it was directly after this conversation that the appellant told the police that he wanted to make a statement, and he was then cautioned and wrote out the statement on Ex.P.6; it would thus seem that it was on account of this conversation that the appellant decided to make the statement which he wrote on Ex.P.6. We think that, in these circumstances, it is clear that the interrogation did not operate as an inducing or compelling factor, and that even if it did its effect was dissipated before the making of the statement, Exhibit P.6. We therefore see no reason to interfere with the finding of the learned trial judge, who both saw and heard the witnesses, that the statement, Exhibit P.6, was voluntarily made. 36. For these reasons the first ground of appeal fails. 37. The second ground of appeal is :-
38. In regard to this ground, Mr. Lee for the appellant said that Inspector Cheung had admitted in evidence that he had not asked the question appearing at the end of the statement, Exhibit P.6, for the purpose of clearing up any ambiguity, and there had thus been a blatant violation of rule 7 of the Judges' Rules; nor had any further caution been given before asking the question; the trial judge had found that there had been a violation of rule 7 but he had ruled that the answer to the question had been given voluntarily, and he had not exercised his discretion to refuse to admit the question and answer in evidence. Counsel submitted that the question and answer were an important piece of evidence on account of the time element since by his answer the appellant placed himself at the scene of the murder at what the forensic pathologist had said was the probable time of the victim's death. 39. In regard to this ground of appeal, Mr. Corrigan for the Crown contended that there was no question of there being any trap or improper inducement in the asking of that simple question and that that had not been suggested, and that there was no reason why that evidence should not have been received. He conceded that there had been a breach of rule 7 of the Judges' Rules, but contended that it was clear from the record that the trial judge had in fact decided not to exercise his discretion and exclude the evidence and that he had done so rightly. Although the answer to the question had in fact been incriminating, in the sense of adding the appearance of veracity to the appellant's statement, the appellant might in fact have given any answer. 40. It is clear, in our view, that the learned trial judge in his ruling expressly recognized that there had been a breach of rule 7, and that he then went on to consider whether or not the question was answered voluntarily, and that he came to the conclusion that it was answered voluntarily. It is apparent that, recognizing that there was a breach of rule 7, he nevertheless decided not to exercise his discretion to reject the evidence, but to admit the question and answer in evidence. We see no reason to differ from his decision. The question and answer added comparatively little to the statement, and we agree that the question might well have brought about an answer detrimental to the prosecution's case. 41. Ground two of the grounds of appeal therefore also fails. 42. The third ground of appeal is :-
43. In regard to this ground of appeal, Mr. Lee for the appellant stated that he had no quarrel with the trial judge's decision to admit in evidence the evidence of similar facts; the authorities were clear that he could do so; but, counsel said, the point he took was that the trial judge, having once refused to admit similar fact in evidence, could not later change his mind. He conceded that the general tenor of the judge's first statement on the matter was to wait and see what happened before making a final decision, but he submitted that the general impression given by what the judge had said was that if the defence was not changed his ruling would stand. 44. We think that it is clear from the record that the trial judge did not, at any stage, refuse leave to the Crown to adduce evidence as to similar facts, but, when the matter was first raised, reserved his decision and left the matter open. He made no final ruling on the matter at the beginning of the trial, and of course a judge is under no obligation to make a decision on whether or not to admit evidence until such time as it may be formally tendered. We therefore consider that there is no merit in the third ground of appeal. 45. The fourth and final ground of appeal is:-
46. Mr. Lee, in support of this ground, submitted that there was evidence of provocation on which manslaughter should have been left to the jury. He conceded that a mere provocative act was insufficient, but contended that the evidence went beyond that in the present case. The evidence of provocation on which he relied were those sentences in the statement, Exhibit P.6, which said:- "As soon as I arrived at the above address, she at once scolded me and also used abusive language to scold me. In a moment of anger I grasped (her) neck until (she) fainted. I also feared she might shout aloud so I tied her up with a string." He also relied on the evidence of Inspector Whitton and Mr. Chan Wai Kan, the interpreter, who had said that on the 5th January the appellant had said to the Inspector "I did not mean to kill her", when the appellant, at his own request, had been brought before the Inspector. Mr. Lee also drew attention to section 4 of the Homicide Ordinance, (Cap.339), which provides that provocation in law may rest upon things said alone, and he said that the question was whether the sentences he relied on, given the most favourable interpretation, could amount to provocation. He conceded that the medical evidence showed that the death was not due to manual strangulation but to strangulation by the string tied around the deceased's neck. Counsel suggested that the sentences which he relied on gave rise to the implication that the anger aroused in the appellant equally applied to the tying with the string. 47. In regard to this ground of appeal it may firstly be noted what Parke J. said in the case of R. v. Higgins(7), namely:-
48. For the principles applicable to the substance of this ground of appeal, we were referred to the case of Lee Chun-chuen v. Reginam(8) in which Lord Devlin, delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, said :-
49. Applying these principles to the present case, we do not think that the evidence relied upon was such that a reasonable jury might have formed the view that a reasonable person so provoked would be driven, through transport of passion and loss of self-control, to the degree and method and continuance of violence which produced the death in this case. Nothing was made known of the nature of the alleged scolding and abusive language, and the jury could not have been invited to speculate thereon. Putting it at the highest there was evidence of a provocative incident and no more. Further, it is evident from the terms of the appellant's statement that the act which, according to the medical evidence, caused the death, namely the tying of the string around the deceased's neck, was not related to the alleged provocation; having recounted in the statement that he was scolded and abused, and that in a moment of anger he grasped the deceased's neck until she fainted, the appellant then went on in the statement to state what happened about the tying of the string, saying:-
50. Thus it is clear from the appellant's own statement that the reason why he tied the string around the deceased's neck was not on account of the scolding and abusive language, but because he feared that she might well call for help. In our view the evidence of the statement could afford no basis for leaving to the jury the question of a verdict of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation. 51. For these reasons, we consider that the learned trial judge was right in excluding manslaughter from the consideration of the jury, and it follows that ground 4 of the grounds of appeal fails also. 52. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
26th July, 1968. Representation: M. Lee (L.S. Shum & Co.) assigned for Appellant. A.J. Corrigan, C.C. for Respondent. (1) 1962 H.K.L.R. 351; (2) 1964 1 W.L.R. 365; (3) 1962 H.K.L.R. 13 (4) 36 C.A.R. 72; (5) 42 C.A.R. 19. (6) 37 C.A.R. 51 (1) (1962) H.K.L.R. 351 at 371 (7) 1829 3 C. & P. 603 at 604 (8) 1963 1 A.E.R. 73 at 77, 77-8, 79-80. |