Chau Sut Nga v. Hop Lee Construction Engineering and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCPI 300/2000 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 March 2001.
1. This is a claim for damages for loss suffered arising out of an industrial accident.
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 5 cases
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HCPI000300/2000 HCPI 300/2000 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES NO. 300 OF 2000 (Transferred from HCA 1955/1994) ____________
____________ Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Gill in Court Dates of Hearing: 12-16 & 23 February 2001 Date of Judgment: 9 March 2001 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1. This is a claim for damages for loss suffered arising out of an industrial accident. Background 2. The accident occurred in March 1991. Chau Sut Nga, the plaintiff, was then aged 47, married and with a grown up family. Then as now he lived in his home with one of his sons Chau Cheung Tung. A year later the son married Chan Lai Fan. She joined the household and has remained ever since. The plaintiff's wife at the time of the accident was living in her native village in China. Subsequently, in 1996, she was permitted to emigrate to Hong Kong and has since then come to live in the family home as well. 3. In 1991 the plaintiff was a casual construction site worker, generally employed for the purpose of laying concrete. Win House Industrial Limited, the second defendant, was the principal contractor engaged to build a multi-storey building on a construction site in Kowloon. The second defendant sub-contracted certain concreting works to Hop Lee Construction Engineering, the first defendant. The first defendant employed the plaintiff as one of a team of concreting workers to work on the site. 4. By 10 March 1991 the plaintiff had been so employed for about 3 months. On that date the team was occupied spreading and compacting liquid concrete as it was being poured, which when set was to become an integral part of the floor slab at first floor level. They were working on top of scaffolding erected for the purpose of supporting wooden form work into which the concrete was pouring, some 24 feet above ground floor level. It was the task of the plaintiff and his fellow workers to spread the concrete evenly and to compact it using portable vibrators. 5. Without warning, the scaffolding collapsed. It brought down with it the form work, the liquid concrete and the workmen, including the plaintiff, who suffered injury. 6. The cause of the collapse is a matter of conjecture. It seems likely that the scaffolding was built on uneven ground and was not sufficiently stabilized to cope with the altering weight distribution as the concrete was being laid, coupled with the activities of the workmen, spreading and compacting and moving about. At any event liability has been admitted by the defendants, so that how and why it happened is not an issue. What remains to be determined is the extent of the plaintiff's injuries arising from the accident and the amount of loss suffered by him. The Plaintiff's Injuries 7. There is no eye witness account of the accident and how the plaintiff fell and where and how he landed. In an unsworn statement of 9 February 1995 made for the purposes of an ECC claim the plaintiff said he had the impression of falling amongst the metal bars and wooden boards of the scaffolding and form work and the as yet uncured concrete, but otherwise had no recall. Medical notes reveal that he was admitted to United Christian Hospital, (UCH) complaining of having been knocked unconscious for half an hour, of a headache, nausea and blurred vision, tenderness in the chest and a sore right knee. Examinations including X-rays revealed no skull or other head injury and no internal injuries. His neurological status was checked and found to be unaffected. He recorded 15/15 on the Glasgow coma scale. He was kept in hospital for 7 days under observation before being cleared for discharge on 17 March, with a sick leave certificate to 30 March 1991. 8. In April 1991 he returned to work. During that month he suffered another injury which I do not need to expand on because it was minor and unrelated to that of 10 March and did not impact upon it. But he stopped working after April because pain and stiffness persisted in his right knee. Thereafter he was treated conservatively at UCH's Department of Orthopaedics until January 1993. His sick leave certificate was extended to 1 March 1993. 9. I pause here to mention that the nature and extent of the damage to the knee and how, in isolation, it would have affected the plaintiff's ability to work after it was suffered is not materially in dispute. Dr Tony Loy, the orthopaedic surgeon engaged by the plaintiff to examine and report on this injury in August 1993 said at page 2 of his report:-
10. The defence's appointed orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Danny Tsoi, who examined the plaintiff in July 1997, said at page 7 of his report:-
11. The plaintiff returned to work as a casual construction site worker in July 1993. However the persistent soreness in the knee meant he was no longer able to work as a concrete worker. He had to settle for less physically demanding light construction work, and then for only a few days per month. That intermittent activity was to last until December 1994. He tried to find work in January and February 1995, but none was available. 12. Thereafter he was not to work again. 13. It is the plaintiff's case, not accepted by the defence, that by 1995 another medical issue was emerging. 14. The plaintiff's live-in son and daughter-in-law came to realise that the plaintiff was becoming increasingly hard of hearing, forgetful, slow to respond to straight-forward requests and was spending much of his time apparently away in another world. He was to become less and less independent, capable of dressing and undertaking his personal hygiene, but needing to be reminded of what to do and when, and needing help with basic tasks. Gradually his condition deteriorated, so that by 1998 his daily routine had shrunk to eating and sleeping and pottering about the home or in the vicinity, taking no interest in newspapers, televisions or conversations carried on in his presence. 15. The extent to which this intellectual impairment is genuine and linked to the accident is the major area of dispute between the parties. During the time since the accident the plaintiff has been examined by a battery of doctors and specialists appointed to assist the court in establishing these issues. 16. Of less moment but contentious nonetheless is that as from 1994 the plaintiff began to complain of pain and weakness in his right elbow. Dr Tsoi examined it in July 1997 and said in his report at page 7:-
17. That is the position adopted by the defence. It is the plaintiff's case that the plaintiff was the victim of no other reported trauma that could have given rise to a fractured elbow except that of 10 March 1991; whilst undetected at the time the injury must have been caused by his fall. 18. I come now to deal with how the trial proceeded. Conduct of the Trial 19. Dr William Green, one of the examining psychiatrists appointed by the plaintiff, said in a report dated 20 April 1997 at page 3:-
20. This led to the son Mr Chau applying to represent the plaintiff, and an order was made to this effect in September 1997. 21. On issues of fact only Mr Chau the son and his wife Miss Chan have made statements. By their accounts when it came for the plaintiff to do so he was no longer intellectually capable. It was ordered that the son's and daughter-in-law's statements should be treated as evidence in chief. In the event that was what happened and they were called and cross-examined on that evidence. The defence did not oppose the production of the plaintiff's ECC statement (to which I have referred at p. 3) save as to weight. 22. I come now to the medical evidence. The plaintiff had engaged nine doctors and specialists to examine and report on the plaintiff; many did so more than once. The defence engaged another five. There were in all 35 reports. It was ordered that these reports alone should comprise the medical evidence with the exception that two psychiatrists, Dr K Singer for the plaintiff and Dr S Y Chung for the defence, should be called. This is because of the variety of opinions expressed by various doctors and specialists during the history of this case it is Dr Singer's conclusions upon which the plaintiff seeks to rely, whilst the defence depends primarily upon those expressed by Dr Chung. They appeared accordingly. 23. The plaintiff was the subject of an undercover video surveillance undertaken by the defence on various occasions from August 1994, the purpose of which was to invite the prospect that he might be a malingerer, or at least that the extent of his physical disabilities and mental impairment have been overstated. These tapes were played and produced. 24. I come now to the issues that had to be resolved. The Issues
25. For the purpose of finding out the answers, I come now to consider the evidence. The Evidence 26. Mr Chau the son was called first. He confirmed the contents of his witness statement. He said that prior to the accident his father worked as a construction site labourer generally as part of a team laying concrete. He rarely took days off, working on average 28 days per month. Following the accident he returned to work for a short time in April 1991, but then not until July 1993. Between then and December 1994 he worked between 5 and 7 days per month, undertaking light labouring duties. He has not worked since December 1994. 27. After the accident his father lacked energy; in particular he complained of pain in his right knee after standing or walking for a while. His right arm was weak and he was unable to extend it fully. He also complained of headaches and dizziness. 28. It was not until some time later that other symptoms emerged. First there was an apparent hearing loss. Then he became more and more forgetful, mentally slow and dull, slow to respond to questions, sometimes not able to understand what was asked or said. As time has passed he has had to be assisted more and more with basic functions or told when to perform one, such as taking a bath or coming to the table. Gradually his routine has shrunk to sleeping, eating and sitting around the house or lying on his bed. He does not, because he cannot, read the newspaper and has no interest in television. He does not engage in conversation. He will go out occasionally but not without someone to go with. He cannot perform simple chores like shop for an item or clean around the house or prepare food. He can attend to his personal hygiene but has to be told and needs assistance. He walks with a limp and usually needs support. 29. Next came Miss Chan, the plaintiff's daughter-in-law. She, too, adopted and confirmed her witness statement. Having arrived at the Chau family home in 1992 she has since then been a full-time housewife and in charge of the household. 30. She said that as from 1993 the plaintiff began to feel faint periodically, and suffered dizziness regularly; sometimes this was followed by nausea and vomiting. From the same time he was complaining of headaches, which occurred at first once per month and then increased gradually to almost daily. Then he started becoming less and less responsive to what was said to him. To her mind he was always slow to reply. But by 1995 he seemed no longer to understand even simple matters. He was withdrawing more and more into a world of his own. 31. By 1998 his condition was such that it was difficult to have any conversation with him. Now he sits around, not watching television or doing anything meaningful. His physical movements are slow. He can wash himself and so on but has to be told what to do and when to do it. 32. I come now to the plaintiff's own statement made in February 1995 for the purposes of the ECC proceedings. In it he recorded that for ten years prior to March 1991 he had been a concrete worker employed on a casual basis. Prior to the accident he had been working for the first defendant on site for 2 to 3 months. On the day of the accident he was on the scaffold 20 to 30 feet above the ground when he felt it start to slip to one side and he fell as it collapsed amongst the debris. But apart from that he had no recollection until hospital. 33. After the accident he resumed work but that did not last because of continuing pain and discomfort. Having resumed work in July 1993 he could not work more than a few days in a month, particularly because pain in his right knee prevented his walking or standing for any length of time. He also complained of headaches and dizziness. (He made no reference to pain or discomfort in his right elbow or arm). 34. He spelt out the days and months when he did work between July 1993 and December 1994, and concluded by recording that he had tried to find work in January and February 1995 but none was available. 35. I come now to the surveillance tapes. These were four video recordings taken of the plaintiff but without his knowledge between August 1994 and October 2000. 36. The first, taken in August 1994, depicts the plaintiff leaving premises in Central following a medical appointment relating to this litigation and returning to his home in Fanling by public transport and on foot. Then 6 days later it shows him leaving home, taking breakfast nearby and then, by public transport and on foot, making his way to a large construction site in Shatin. There he is seen working in a team removing and scraping wooden moulds and stacking debris. The plaintiff when walking did not seem to limp although I believe I saw a slight stiffness in his gait, as if favouring a limb or joint. The work he was seen on tape to be doing was by no means strenuous. 37. The second tape was a short one taken in March 1997 outside in the vicinity of the plaintiff's home. It showed him coming out of the building where he lives, strolling around, slowly, with a noticeable limp, sitting for a while before rising and returning to his home about an hour later. He was by himself, did not perform any duty nor engage in any conversation. 38. The third tape was filmed in June 1998. The plaintiff and his son were viewed coming out of a building in Nathan Road following another medical examination and taking a bus home. 39. The fourth and final tape was taken on the 21 and 25 September 2000. On the 21 the film depicted the plaintiff and his son travelling by public transport and on foot from Pokfulam to Fanling, pause at the local Jockey Club betting shop, buy fruit and return home. (In evidence Mr Chau the son said that at the Jockey Club he had given his father $20 and told him to queue to buy a random selection mark 6 ticket. At the fruit shop it was he who was buying the fruit, including a bunch of grapes his father picked out). On 25 September they were both filmed in and round Central where the plaintiff was again being medically examined before returning home by public transport and on foot. My impression was that the plaintiff seemed to be supported by his son most of the time, assisted where necessary up or down flights of steps, walking slowly and with a limp. 40. The tapes were accompanied by reports. These revealed that there were many more attempts to capture the plaintiff on film as the operatives waited outside the building where he lives for him to emerge when he did not. The significance of these unproductive engagements is that they support the family's account that he seldom leaves home. 41. I come now to the medical evidence. 42. The apparent onset of the plaintiff's mental impairment as reported by the family from 1995 began a series of examinations by specialists in neurology and psychiatry appointed by both sides. Dr Fali Shroff, neurologist, saw him in July 1995. He reported that "he manifested slow mental processes" and "appeared visibly mildly depressed." He carried out tests including taking head X-rays and conducting EEG and MRI scans. All readings were normal. But he recommended a psychiatric examination and Dr Green was appointed for the task. He did so and reported. But his findings and opinion have not been accepted by either side as I shall come to. 43. All those who examined and reported on the plaintiff after 1995 made reference to his displaying a flat or dull demeanour, to his being slow to respond to straightforward questions and to not being able to recall some obvious personal details. He also answered incorrectly elementary problems. 44. It was not until December 1997 that the plaintiff was first examined by Dr Chung, the psychiatrist appointed by the defence, and November 1998 that he was seen by Dr Singer upon whose opinions the plaintiff now relies. He was seen for a second time by Dr Chung in September 2000 and by Dr Singer in January 2001. 45. Both psychiatrists interviewed the plaintiff and family members and received copies of the UCH medical notes and the numerous reports which by then had been prepared by the various doctors and specialists who had already examined the plaintiff. They also had a copy of the first of the surveillance tapes. 46. Dr Singer began his report by repeating what he had been told happened to the plaintiff on the day of the accident; namely, that "a torrent of concrete mixture poured on him carried him down from a height of three stories and buried him." Pausing here, it is obvious that he was given an exaggerated and thus inaccurate account of what happened. But when subsequently asked if that coloured his findings and diagnoses he said it did not; that he relied on the clinical evidence to establish the extent to which the plaintiff was hurt. He noted that on the plaintiff's and son's own accounts and according to the records and reports the headaches and dizzy spells he experienced from the date of the accident had persisted to the time of the examination. On the son's account he noted that there was no apparent impairment of intellect or memory for the first two years, but that there was a decline thereafter, and soon the impairment was obvious. Deterioration continued until 1997; his condition was constant after that. He was told and noted the following psychiatric complaints:-
47. Following the examination he reported:-
Asked how many days in a month he said "I don't know".
48. Dr Singer's opinion was detailed, as follows:-
49. He went on to report that he was alive to the prospect that the patient and his family might have been feigning his condition. He dealt with this in the following way:-
50. I come now to Dr Chung's report. He recorded what Mr Chau the son said as follows:-
51. He examined the plaintiff and reported as follows:-
52. He gave his opinion after that. He said the plaintiff displayed marked intellectual and memory impairment compatible with an advanced stage of dementia. This is a syndrome resulting from severe brain damage. But the UCH medical records made following the plaintiff's admission gave no indication of a serious head injury. He referred to the tests undertaken by neurologist Dr Shroff that is the X-ray and EEG and MRI scans producing normal results. And he said further:-
53. Dr Green in his report had found that the plaintiff had suffered "a severe and permanent intellectual loss due entirely to the accident". Dr Chung for the reasons given disagreed with this opinion. (I should mention here that Dr Green's report was produced for completeness. But the plaintiff does not seek to rely on his conclusions; those advising him accept there is not and never has been dementia). 54. Dr Chung went on to report:-
55. He concluded:-
56. It is to be noted that Dr Chung did not consider or otherwise seek to report on the syndromes of post-concussional syndrome and depressive disorder. 57. Following the examination that he conducted in September 2000 he concluded:-
58. By this time he had read Dr Singer's report and diagnosis. Of the post-concussion syndrome he said:-
59. Of the depressive disorder he said:-
60. Dr Singer in the meantime had considered and formed his own views on Dr Chung's findings and opinions. Having stated that he agreed the plaintiff was not suffering from dementia, and that in his view Dr Green had erred in his diagnosis, he went on to say:-
61. In a later report of August 2000 he responded to a request to rationalize why the plaintiff's health did not deteriorate until some years after the accident. He said:-
62. Following the examination carried out in January of this year Dr Singer gave the following up-dated opinion:-
63. It closely matched his original diagnosis. But, if anything, he found the plaintiff's condition slightly worse. He said:-
64. He also responded to Dr Chung's criticisms of his diagnoses of post concussion syndrome leading to a depressive disorder. He noted Dr Chung had said:-
and commented:-
65. Dr Chung had said further:-
66. Dr Singer commented:-
67. In the witness box both maintained the belief that their respective diagnoses and prognoses were correct and to be relied on whilst the other's were not. However Dr Chung whilst making no concessions as to the accuracy of his opinions did, in cross examination, come to accept that the symptoms displayed were consistent with Dr Singer's findings of post-concussional syndrome (PCS) coupled with depressive disorder (DD) albeit in a non-typical way. Findings of Fact 68. First and foremost, I deal with the plaintiff's psychiatric condition. Clearly what is crucial to my findings is how I deal with the conflicting viewpoints and conclusions of two eminent psychiatrists. 69. Dr Singer having been engaged late in the post-accident history had the advantage of having before him not only the patient for examination but also all the reports from a parade of doctors and specialists who had over the years examined him. He considered and rejected dementia, finding Dr Green had led himself and others up a wrong path, before considering PCS and DD, and finding that it was a combination of these syndromes from which the plaintiff was suffering, caused by the accident though not manifesting itself for three years. Having arrived at that conclusion he tested it by looking at other possible alternatives including malingering. He gave carefully considered reasons why he found there was no malingering or other cause. 70. Dr Chung, on the other hand, in his first report focused on the earlier held opinions of dementia before rejecting that as the complaint. Although from the witness box he said he considered other types of psychiatric disorder he did not refer to them in his report, which rather suggests he did not. It was not until Dr Singer raised PCS that he conceded that the symptoms indicated that the plaintiff is and has been suffering from that. 71. Dr Chung found the plaintiff has all along been feigning his problems and in particular mental impairment. His conclusions rely on that premise and, presumably, the collusion of his family over the years. On this crucial issue I observe:-
72. Both psychiatrists have agreed that there are unusual features of this case. Dr Chung says these weigh against Dr Singer's findings. But it seems to me that the correct approach is that they merit a cautious, analytical examination of the symptoms and all other clues before an opinion is arrived at. 73. And this, as I find, is precisely how Dr Singer dealt with the plaintiff's condition. He approached his task with care, weighing and considering all possible conclusions, not disregarding those symptoms which might break a pattern, testing his own preliminary observations and giving painstaking consideration to the contrary viewpoint of his counterpart. I have come to the conclusion that his diagnoses and prognoses are correct; where they differ I find that Dr Chung's are not. 74. It has been proved, on balance, that the plaintiff suffers from PCS and DD as a direct consequence of the accident. 75. I come now to the right elbow complaint. The plaintiff's case that the apparent trauma suffered some indefinite time prior to Dr Tsoi's examination was caused by the accident because there was no other reported incident does not sit happily alongside the absence of any complaint or record of such injury when the plaintiff was in UCH. The burden being on the plaintiff to prove causation he falls far short of achieving that. The existing injury to the right elbow was not caused by the accident. 76. These findings of fact answer the first three questions I have posed at page 9; there remains to be dealt with the fourth, which I come to next. Quantum of Damages PSLA 77. The plaintiff suffered a lasting injury to his right knee which accelerated the degenerative processes that were already underway at the time of his accident and which, in the natural order of things, would have required him to give up work of a heavy duty type about now. Much more serious is that he came to acquire mental disabilities from which he is unlikely to get well, although, with treatment, there may be a partial recovery. 78. Dr Singer said in his first report:-
79. In the meantime his world has shrunk to eating and sleeping, mooching round the home, seldom going out and then only when accompanied. He needs some assistance although by no means full time. Mr Sakhrani, his counsel, referred me to cases of head injuries resulting in psychiatric disorders, some of them devastating. He submits, by comparison, that a proper award under this head would be $700,000.00. I think this is too high. Given the plaintiff's age, the extent of his disabilities and the need for some but not continuous care, the prognosis that after treatment he may be a candidate for further employment, albeit of a menial and sporadic nature, I believe his injuries fit mid range in the category of a serious injury, as laid down by the Court of Appeal in Lee Ting Lam v. Leung Kam Ming [1980] HKLR 657 and referred to in Chan Pui-ki v. Leung On [1996] 2 HKLR 401. Having then made comparisons with the awards in a number of cases cited to me by both counsel, and in particular:- Joan Carol Bouvin v. Wong Ying Yau unreported HCPI 195/2000, (a 35 year old, whiplash injury, PCS & DD - $475,000.00); Lai Tim Fai v. Lee Yuk Ping unreported HCPI 762/1996, (age not given, serious head injury, skull fracture, brain damage, neurological defects, risk of epileptic seizures - $700,000.00); Chung Man Yau v. Si Hon, unreported HCPI 117/1995, (age not given, skull fracture, PCS & DD - $470,000.00). 80. I conclude a proper award, under this head, is $500,000.00. Loss of Earnings Pretrial earnings 81. It is agreed that the plaintiff was earning $13,000.00 per month at the time of the accident and by now, in the same occupation 10 years later, he would have been on $26,438.40 per month. I accept the plaintiff's own account that during the period to December 1994 he earned $25,000.00. 82. So, his loss of earnings to the date of trial can be calculated as follows:-
Post-trial earnings 83. I pay heed to Dr Tsoi's comments in a report he presented dated 7 December 1998:-
84. There is also the right elbow injury to take into account, not caused by the accident as I have found, but which would have accelerated the natural degenerative process and speeded the day of retirement. Taking a realistic position I believe the plaintiff would have had to give up by about now, at least on a regular and full-time basis, and thereafter be reduced to working intermittently for a limited period. I propose to deal with this by adopting a multiplier of 2 to the income he would have been earning at today's rates. 85. I calculate his future loss of earnings as follow:-
Special Damages 86. Hospital fees of $600.00, doctor's fees of $400.00, travelling expenses of $500.00, a damaged watched $2,500.00, in all $4,000.00, are agreed. 87. What are not are claims the plaintiff has pleaded and now asks for being the cost of tonic food and trips to China for medical treatment there. For tonic food he pleaded an average of $3,250.00 per month making a total of $370,500.00. Now he is prepared to settle for $35,000. He claims to have made 20 trips to China for medical treatment, at a total costs of $12,000.00. 88. The defence disputes the validity of both these claims. Few receipts have been produced, and no evidence to establish that treatment out of Hong Kong and tonic food were necessary or were beneficial. I accept these arguments. The defence has offered $5,000.00 under each head; I believe this to be reasonable and will award accordingly. Future Medical Care 89. As I have recorded, Dr Singer is of the view that three years worth of psychiatric care may benefit the plaintiff to the extent that, sporadically, he might be able to return to the job market. I think realistically, he is unlikely to be offered a job ahead of those mentally fully alert. But the prognosis is sufficiently encouraging to indicate a better quality of life and reduced dependency on others. I believe the figure of $195,000 is a worthy price to pay for this expectancy, and allow it accordingly. Home Care 90. The plaintiff claims under this head $4,000.00 per month for life; a total of $480,000.00. I find this would be an acceptable sum to expend were the plaintiff to be so invalided as to need constant attention with no hope for improvement. The plaintiff is not, happily, helpless. Far from it. Most functions he can perform unaided, once reminded. And even if, after three years, he is not after all fit for the job market, it seems likely that he will have regained his independence. 91. I propose to award a notional $1,200.00 per month to run for three years. This comes to $43,200.00. Interest 92. The traditional awards under this head are 2% p.a. on the PSLA from the date of writ to judgment, and half the judgment rate (say 6.25%) on pre-trial loss of wages, less any ECC award, plus special damages, from the date of the accident to judgment. 93. Mr Cheung argued for the defence that the proceedings had taken an inordinately long time to come to trial, close to ten years. This was the fault of the plaintiff, or at least was not the fault of the defence. He said that interest should not run from a date two years after the defence conceded liability, which it did in June 1996. Mr Sakhrani countered that if the defence wanted the period of accrued interest to be reduced in this way it was bound to plead that; see the White Book 1999 edition at page 321. 94. Mr Cheung was able to turn that argument on its head, for the plaintiff in his pleadings had claimed interest on the PSLA for only 4 years and on the special damages for 6 years. He says, adopting the same point, that he can now claim no more. I believe he is right. I calculate the interest as follows:-
Conclusion 95. This all adds up as follows:-
96. There will be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $4,064,180.00 together with costs taxed if not agreed, with his own costs taxed under Legal Aid Regulations. 97. The orders for costs are nisi at first instance.
Representation: Mr A Sakhrani, instructed by Messrs Jewkes Chan & Partners, for the Plaintiff Mr A Cheung, instructed by Messrs Cheng, Yeung & Co, for the Defendants |
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