Chow Shuen Yu t/a Union Trading Co v. Ho Kam Cheung and Ho Kam Wing and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1118/1977 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. This is an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants and each of them from entering, remaining in possession or continuing in occupation or otherwise trespassing on or interfering with the plaintiff's enjoyment of "the land licensed to the plaintiff by the Crown under Crown Land Permit No. K2544 and the buildings erected thereon which had hitherto been occupied and used by the plaintiff as more particularly identified as House No. 11 and edged blue on the plan ann
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HCA001118/1977 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG HIGH COURT ACTION NO. 1118 OF 1977
----------------- Coram: Leonard, J. in Court. Date of Judgment: 25th July, 1977. ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1. This is an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants and each of them from entering, remaining in possession or continuing in occupation or otherwise trespassing on or interfering with the plaintiff's enjoyment of "the land licensed to the plaintiff by the Crown under Crown Land Permit No. K2544 and the buildings erected thereon which had hitherto been occupied and used by the plaintiff as more particularly identified as House No. 11 and edged blue on the plan annexed hereto, and an area of Crown Land to the eastern side thereof which the plaintiff has been occupying for many years. The approximate area of the whole of the land, the subject matter of this application is 1,300 sq. ft. and bounded by the initials EJGBDFKC on the plan annexed hereto". The area bounded by the initials EJGBDFKC on the plan is a rectangle. This rectangle is made up of three smaller rectangles one marked EJKC, one marked JGFK and one marked GBDF. Two of these rectangles i.e. the area within the initials EJGFKC consist of House No. 11 the entrance and a covered parking space. Rectangle GBDF identified in the plan as "AI" is in fact entirely occupied by a building which is a continuation of No. 11. It lies to the eastern side and is, the plaintiff claims, "land to the eastern side thereof which the plaintiff has been occupying for many years". It is impossible for me to estimate the area of the land bounded by the initials EJGBDFKC in the plan for the plan is not to scale and bears no measurements. The summons refers to it as being of about 1,300 sq. ft. The plan shows, to the south and south-west of the area bounded by the initials EJGBDFKC, two smaller areas : one, again marked "11", is a rectangle between the initials EHIJ (I will refer to it as "the granite house" since the house built on it is faced with granite) and an open area which is roughly rectangular but with the south-western side slightly curved. I will refer to this as "the open area". The southern boundary of the area within the initials EJGBDFKC consists of a straight line marked EJGB. This straight line is projected to the west to a point marked AX on the plan. Photographs exhibited and a view of the site show that this line AEJGB is a straight wall of inter alia house No. 11 unbroken save by the entrance. Very close to the wall to the south east of the entrance is a wooden building marked "huts" on the plan. I will continue so to refer to it. 2. The relationships between the plaintiff and the defendants go back for many years. The defendants to whom I will refer hereafter as the "Ho family" were the owners of a large parcel of land in Kowloon City consisting of Section C.R.P., Section D.R.P., Subsection 9 of Section E, Section F.R.P. and Section G.R.P. of Lot 577 in Survey District No. 1 known as HO Ka Yuen. I will refer this parcel of land as "Ho Ka Yuen". The Ho family granted a lease of Ho Ka Yuen on the 7th December 1946 to a limited company known as "Unilight Co. Ltd." to which I will refer as "Unilight". Unilight was clearly the creation of the plaintiff. He was its managing director and he and members of his family its shareholders. The lease was renewed on a number of occasions. Finally on the 22nd of December 1961 this land was let for a term of five years from the 7th December 1961 to the 6th December 1966, with an option to renew for a further term of five years. Unilight exercised the option and remained the tenant of the Ho Ka Yuen until the 31st December 1971. A six months notice to quit to expire on 31st December 1971 was properly served but possession of Ho Ka Yuen was not delivered up to the Ho family on the 31st December 1971. It was not until the 20th February 1974 that proceedings were instituted in the District Court by the Ho family for recovery of Ho Ka Yuen on the ground that Ho Ka Yuen was agricultural land and being let as such was excluded from Parts 1, 2 and 5 of the Landlord & Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance Cap. 7. Ho Ka Yuen was identified in the District Court proceedings by means of a plan. The plan bore an explanatory note indicating that it was copied from the original Survey District plan dated 1905, that there had been some subsequent revision of detail and that the District Office was not responsible for the accuracy of any "division of the original lot". The pleadings in District Court Action No. 1072 of 1974 make it is clear that the premises of which the Ho family sought recovery were Ho Ka Yuen. Unilight in its amended defence and counterclaim in the action admitted that the Ho family were the owners of Ho Ka Yuen and that the premises were first demised to Unilight as agricultural land on which Unilight had erected structures and buildings, in consideration of which (claimed Unilight) the Ho family had granted to Unilight an option perpetually to renew the demise of Ho Ka Yuen at the expiry of each term of 5 years at a reasonable rent. Unilight counterclaimed for a further lease for a further term of five years at the rental of $375 per month or at such rental as the court might deem reasonable. 3. On the 3rd October 1974 a settlement of the action between the Ho family and Unilight was reached and by consent the Ho family got judgment for possession "of the suit land" with a stay of execution for 18 months until the 30th of April 1976. The terms of settlement included an undertaking by Unilight "neither by its agents, servants or otherwise to assign or create any sub-tenancy of the whole or any part of the suit land "and a further undertaking to provide the Ho family with a list of its existing sub-tenants and the amounts of rent received therefrom within 14 days". To settle on these terms and so get a stay of 18 months was perhaps sharp practice on the part of Unilight and therefore on the part of the present plaintiff. For Ho Ka Yuen was occupied by a number of commercial undertakings. Obviously it would be of importance to the Ho family to know their identities. What was not revealed to the Ho family was that there were not a number of sub-tenants but one! For Unilight, the creation of the plaintiff, had sublet to "Union Trading Co.". Union Trading Co. although calling itself a firm had in fact as its sole proprietor the plaintiff. Union Trading Company occupied parts of the Ho Ka Yuen and had sublet other parts to several other commercial undertakings. In June 1976 i.e. after the lapse of the 18 months stay Union Trading Co. (a firm) applied successfully to be joined as a party and to have leave to defend the action in which the Ho family had secured judgment against Unilight by consent on a claim that the premises were protected under Part I of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (this notwithstanding the fact that Unilight admitted in its pleadings that they were agricultural land!) that therefore the consent judgment should not bind Union Trading Company (a firm). Mr. Chow the present plaintiff was at this time holder by himself or by members of his family of all the shares in Unilight and sole proprietor of Union Trading Co. On the 8th June 1976 an order was made that he be allowed in to defend and that there be a stay of execution "as regards premises occupied by Union Trading Co." In making this order the court can scarcely have adverted to the fact that Mr. Chow was the sole proprietor of the Union Trading Co. and the majority shareholder in Unilight. The hearing of the action with Mr. Chow as the second defendant commenced on the 10th of November 1976. Mr. Choi appeared for Mr. Chow and Mr. Cheung for the Ho family. The District Judge was informed that they had agreed on the issues to be fought. The issues agreed were:
The District Judge found that "the suit land is not subject to Part I of the Landlord & Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance" and also that the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of section 3(1)(b) of that Ordinance. He gave an order for possession on the basis that the property was agricultural land and that any building thereon had not been erected before the 17th of August 1945. So far as I can determine from the papers before me "the suit land" was never precisely defined as to its boundaries. It was undoubtedly the Ho Ka Yuen and the precise boundaries of the Ho Ka Yuen are in dispute before me. They were not in dispute before the learned District Judge. He was concerned with the entity Ho Ka Yuen. Indeed the first sentence of his judgment reads :
In arriving at his conclusion that the Ho Ka Yuen was agricultural land and that no building had been erected on it before the relevant date 17th August 1945 the District Judge based himself upon the evidence of three members of the Ho family whose evidence was to the effect that until the land was leased to Unilight after the Japanese occupation it was vacant being used for the cultivation of sweet potatoes and peanuts. He appears to have based himself also, in part, on evidence as to the age of the buildings on the land given inter alia by a Mr. HO Ping-kuen a draftsman and assistant surveyor called by the Ho family who estimated the age "of the oldest buildings to be 30-40 years or over 40 years". The learned District Judge clearly did not accept the evidence of Mr. HO Ping-kuen in its entirety for he regarded his evidence and that of another surveyor as indicating that the oldest buildings are about 30 years old. This is of some importance because of Mr. HO Ping-kuen's evidence as to the boundaries of the HO Ka Yuen. His evidence suggested that the land within the initials EJGBDFKC or some of it was not part of Ho Ka Yuen. Clearly the District Judge did not decide whether or not it was or not that was not in issue before him. He gave possession or various lot numbers mentioned and of nothing else. He did not expressly except from his judgment the land included by the initials EJGBDFKC. Mr. Chow now maintains that this land does not belong to the Ho family and that he has a Crown land permit No. K2544 which entitles him to occupy part of it and that he occupies the other part of it as a trespasser - a trespasser against the Crown not as against the Ho family. 4. As a result of this contention I have had to consider various plans which were not authenticated as to boundary by any authority which were not to scale and on none of which were adjoining properties clearly delineated. From these, from Crown land permit No. K2544 and from various photographs produced to me I have had to decide whether or not Mr. Chow has established a triable issue that the Ho family have trespassed on or interfered with his enjoyment of land licensed to him, or land occupied by him not forming part of the Ho Ka Yuen. 5. The act of trespass of which Mr. Chow complains is the act of the Ho family in instructing the court bailiff to execute a writ of possession against, inter alia, the land within the initials EJGBDFKC which was occupied by Mr. Chow. The writ of possession in question was that issued as a result of the judgment obtained by the Ho family in District Court Action No. 1072 of 1974. Mr. Rodway for the Ho family has argued that I must keep the following facts firmly in mind. Firstly the original defendant to that action was a Unilight in which Mr. Chow or his nominees held the majority of the shares. Mr. Chow was managing director. Judgment against Unilight was by consent. One of the terms of the consent order made on the 3rd of October 1974 was that there should be a stay of execution until the 30th of April 1976. Another of the terms was that Unilight undertook to provide to the plaintiffs a list of its existing sub-tenants. In fact there was only one sub-tenant - "Union Trading Co." Union Trading Co. was not a firm. It was in the sole proprietorship of Mr. Chow. One would expect Mr. Chow as managing director of Unilight to know all about the pleadings in the action and the consent judgment against Unilight. It was not until the 8th June 1976 i.e. 20 months after the consent judgment had been obtained that "Union Trading Co. (a firm)" was added as a party. Judgment was given against Union Trading Co. on the 25th November 1976 (almost 25 months after the consent judgment) and even then Mr. Choi as solicitor for Mr. Chow applied for a stay of execution for six months and got a stay for three months. On the 2nd April 1977 for the first time Mr. Chow's solicitors wrote to the Ho family's solicitors raising a query as to the boundaries of the suit land. It is, Mr. Rodway argued, with this background in mind that one must approach the question as to whether by his affidavits Mr. Chow has established the existence of a triable issue which should form the basis on which I would grant an interlocutory injunction. 6. Before embarking on a detailed examination of Mr. Chow's affidavit I should like to review the position between the 2nd April 1977 and 13th May 1977 the return date of this summons. On the 2nd April 1977 Mr. Chow's solicitors wrote to the solicitors for the Ho family. In the course of this letter they drew attention to the fact that at the District Court trial a plan drawn by Mr. HO Ping-kuen was produced, on which Mr. Ho had marked the boundary of the suit land and the demarcation of the buildings on and adjoining the suit land. It read :
[I pause to remark that at the hearing I was supplied with a copy of the notes of the proceedings in Action No. 1072 of 1974 and it is clear from them that "the people of Unilight Film Studio drafted the agreement". Unilight Film Studio was run by Unilight, the company of which Mr. Chow was managing director.] The letter of the 2nd April 1977 continues:
The claims put forward in this letter appear to be three-fold. Firstly that a plan tendered at the trial in the District Court by Mr. Ho the surveyor was incorrect. This is not a claim that the plan was accurate or that the evidence of Mr. Ho was accurate or that Mr. Chow was deceived by it. What is being urged here is that there was an error of 6,000 sq. ft. in that plan. Secondly there is the claim that "the 2nd defendants are the Crown Permittee" [The grammatical looseness as to number here may not amount to a Freudian slip but it suggests that Mr. Chow had even his own solicitors confused.] The second defendant "were" Mr. Chow. Mr. Chow was the Crown Permittee. It is implicit that Mr. Chow was claiming that house No. 11 north of the line AEJGB was on the land over which he had a Crown Permit. Thirdly is the claim that other houses with which we are not concerned were outside the suit premises. Naturally these claims came as a surprise to the solicitors for the Ho family. I doubt if they fully understood the letter and for this they perhaps cannot be blamed. Their reply suggested that the allegation was tantamount to saying that if a tenant is to erect an illegal structure he may be ordered to surrender the premises to the landlord but not the illegal structure: that they have applied to the court for execution to be levied on the whole of the premises "including houses Nos.4, 10, 8 and 6". No.11 is oddly omitted. In a letter of the 12th of April 1977 Mr. Chow's solicitors say that their client's case is that while the terms of the consent judgment provided that all superstructures on the Crown land become the plaintiff's property it doesn't follow that superstructures erected on the adjoining land "and not within the boundary of the suit land would also go to the landlord". Certain sentences in this letter of 12th April 1977 may be of importance in any other possible proceedings which may arise out of two contradictory affidavits filed by the respective solicitors. They read:
[In their letter of the 6th April 1977 the Ho family solicitors had in turn included an odd sentence. It reads :
The letter of the 12th April 1977 continues :
On the 6th of May 1977 Mr. Chow's solicitors reiterated :
7. I pass then to a consideration of Mr. Chow's affidavit. It commences with an averment that he is the sole proprietor of Union Trading Co. and he produces a copy of the business registration in respect of that business. This shows that Mr. Chow is and always was the sole proprietor of Union Trading Co. He goes on cautiously to say :
He then admits that the Ho family are the owners of the Ho Ka Yuen which he identifies by lot numbers and reference to plan which is the same as the plan which was attached to the writ in the District Court, but he does not produce any evidence here or indeed anywhere to show the boundaries of the Ho Ka Yuen and particularly their boundaries on the southern side. He cites the various tenancy agreements the issue of the writ of summons in the District Court and goes on to say :
This appears to me to be a suggestio falsi although Mr. Chow has already pointed out that he and Union Trading Co. are one and the same person. At best it is confusing. He goes on to say that the action between Unilight and the defendants was settled but that the action between "my company" and the defendants was tried and at the end of the day judgment was given in favour of the defendants. This is accurate - but it was a very long day. He goes on to refer to the judgment in the District Court and to a copy of the plan produced in the District Court by Mr. Ho the surveyor and suggests that :
I can find nothing to show that this is accurate despite a careful examination of the District Court record. Admittedly the evidence of Mr. Ho the surveyor (not a member of the Ho family) was that he did not think that the shaded portion to the south of the plan was part of the land owned by the Ho family. Mr. Chow continues to state that he believes that the real boundary of the land of the defendants extended only to the uncoloured part within the red frame and that House No. 11 on the plan (i.e. House No. 11 north of the line AEJGB) was outside the boundary of the land owned by the defendants. He then states :
He produced receipts for the fees and says that he has been paying "rates in respect of the land licensed to me by the Crown since 1962." He produces a receipt for the last payment of rates. I will consider the effect of Crown Land Permit No. K2544 and of the rates receipts later. He goes on :
The statements in this paragraph are utterly essential to his case. He produces no evidence to demonstrate their truth. He goes on in his affidavit to deal with the correspondence which I have already outlined and states that on the morning of the 7th May the bailiff and his men came together with Mr. Ho the surveyor and a representative of the defendants. Argument ensured. The Ho family claimed to be entitled to the "whole of house No. 11 on the ground that they had discovered a demarcation stone near their land". He states :
This last sentence is, I feel not candid as it was admitted to me at the site that Mr. Chow occupied the granite house. The granite house is clearly "near Ho Ka Yuen". Even now Mr. Chow would not contend that he does not occupy it. The granite house is clearly outside Ho Ka Yuen. It is also clearly south of the line AEJGB. Again the granite house is shown on a plan submitted to me by Mr. Bernacchi as part of the land included, according to Mr. Chow's own case, in the permit land. Clearly when the bailiff entered he did not enter on the granite house but only on that house No. 11 which lies north of the line AEJGB. The granite house is a single storey building. The "House No. 11" north of the line AEJGB is two storeyed so that it is to it that Mr. Chow refers when he talks of House No. 11. The rest of the paragraph is little more than argumentative. There are four plans attached to Mr. Chow's affidavits. The first CSY-2. bears the numeral "11" six times. Three portions bearing the numeral No.11 are clearly within Ho Ka Yuen and we need not concern ourselves with them. Two are on the southern side within in the initials CEJGFK. The sixth is clearly outside the Ho Ka Yuen and bounded by the initials EHIJ. Mr. Chow when he refers to House No. 11 refers to the area bounded CEJGFK not to the area bounded EHIJ. The area bounded EHIJ is the granite house. It is the area CEJGFK which is in dispute and Mr. Chow is suggesting that it is part of the land comprised in the Crown Land Permit. The second plan exhibited to Mr. Chow's affidavit is a plan issued by the District Office, Sai Kung (that used in the District Court proceedings and annexed to the District Court writ.) It is of no help to me. The plan CSY-6 is a copy of the plan exhibited by Mr. Ho the surveyor in the District Court proceedings. It shows part of house No. 6 and the two areas marked No. 11 together with an area marked entrance the area between the initials CEJGFK shaded. Fourthly, there is the plan annexed to the Crown Land Permit. This shows an irregularly shaped piece of land. Its shape is approximately the same shape as the area the initials EHIJ (the granite house) coupled with on area also undoubtedly outside the Ho Ka Yuen marked "open area" on CSY-2. Indeed I am quite satisfied that the area EHIJ coupled with the open area is in fact the permit area. I will give my reasons for this conclusion later. What has led to confusion is that the granite house is also marked No. 11. 8. What confounds Mr. Chow and makes it likely that he has attempted deliberately to confuse me is that it is single storeyed. What ruins his case here is that it is granite and House No. 11 north of the line AEJGB is concrete with no granite. That is very important when one considers the terms of the Crown Land Permit to which I now turn. 9. Crown Land Permit No. 2544 describes the land which Mr. Chow is permitted to occupy as "located at Hau Wong Temple". Its area is given as 1,248 sq. ft. The purpose for which the land may be used is given as "open storage, transformer house, workshop and D.G. storage". The structures permitted on the permit area are to be :
The transformer house and workshop then is the granite house. Again it is noteworthy that the demand for rates on which the rates receipt is printed is a demand for rates in respect of "C.L.P. K2544 Hau Wong Temple, New Village, Storage". (my emphasis). 10. Mr. Bernacchi has laid great stress on the principles enunciated in the much quoted case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.(1) as applied in Fellows & Son v. Fisher(2) and Penney Inc. v. Penneys Ltd.(3) but it is not conceded here that there is a serious question to be decided. It is not conceded that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious and before I even begin to consider such questions as the balance of convenience Mr. Bernacchi must satisfy me of this. In this as in any interlocutory proceedings I must bear it in mind that it is no part of my function to try the case on affidavits I cannot however shut my eyes to the history of the case in the District Court. This has been brought before me by the plaintiff and it reveals a sorry state of affairs as far as he is concerned. But it is the evidence put forward by Mr. Chow that must and has engaged me primarily. 11. At an early stage in his argument Mr. Bernacchi conceded that it was for Mr. Chow if he would succeed to satisfy me that there was a triable issue that the action of the bailiff under the writ of possession involved some Crown land. The plaintiff brought before me a confusing number of plans and the defendant to rebut his statement of facts produced many photographs of the site. Both plans and photographs I found confusing so I took a course which must be most unusual in interlocutory proceedings to clear my mind : I visited the site. I am quite satisfied from this visit without taking the affidavits of the defendant into account that the land comprised in Land Permit No. K2544 all lies south of the line AXEJGB and consists of the land marked "open area" coupled with the granite house i.e. the land marked No. 11 within the initials EHIJ. The granite house has a flat concrete roof : it is about 13' x 23' x 10'. It is common case that the granite house is on the permit land. I as a result of my visit was left in no doubt whatever that the space marked "open area" adjacent to it is the remainder of the land the subject of the Crown Permit. Mr. Bernacchi in the course of argument on a copy of plan CSY-6 outlined in red the area which his client contended was the permit area. I have made this plan a part of the record and initialled it. According to it Mr. Chow would include in the permit area the granite house, a piece of vacant land outside the entrance to the main House No. 11 and the main house No. 11 (EJGFKC) itself. The rest of the house "AI" or FGBD he would have it was Crown land on which he trespassed. The first thing to notice about Mr. Bernacchi's plan is that the vacant land included within the red boundary is at present entirely unused except for the purpose of approaching the entrance. It does not include a dangerous goods store and is not suitable for open storage and repair. Secondly as drawn the red line cuts through a very small Part of the huts I have mentioned which are not occupied by Mr. Chow. Thirdly it cuts through a continuous southern wall between the initials AX and B on CSY-6. Fourthly it omits the open area to the south of the southern wall. Finally to fit in with it the stone house would have to be five-sided. It is in fact four-sided. The "open area" does contain a dangerous goods store (concrete) for oxygen/ acetylene 6 ft. by 3 ft. by 7 ft. I cannot of course vouch for these figures but from my inspection of the site they appear to me to be reasonably accurate although I should say at a rough guess that the height may be more than 7 feet. The "open area" is apparently otherwise largely unused although it is suitable for open storage and as a repair yard whereas the area outside the entrance to House No. 11 would not so be suitable. My inspection of the premises showed that on a number of places in the "open area" on the granite house and the House No. 11 (EJGFKC) there are stencils with Mr. Chow's name on them and indications that the "open area", the granite house and House No. 11 (EJGFKC) are all occupied by Mr. Chow under C.L. Permit K2544. This just could not be. The three areas combined (even without the area outside the entrance) greatly exceed 1,248 square feet. They cannot all 3 be within the permit area. The granite house is. Therefore if the "open area" is House No. 11 (EJGFKC) cannot be. A stenciled sign on a wall of the open area says it is. Stenciled signs on the wall of House 11 (EJGFKC) say it is. But both cannot be. The stencils are identical all fairly recent and all bear the name of Mr. Chow as permittee. Who applied them - Mr. Chow does not tell us. At the site I asked for the keys of the gate to the "open area". Mr. Chow indicated that he did not have them and that he did not have access to the "open area". Why then should any one apply such a stencil to the wall of premises to which Mr. Chow did not have access and who applied, several times, an identical stencil to the walls of the premises over which he still has complete control? I have had no answer to this conundrum. My view of the site revealed another strange and unexplained matter. Above the main entrance to House No. 11 (EJGFKC) high on the southern wall through which the entrance runs were indications that signs and numbers had recently been obliterated. One was clearly an image of the sun with rays streaming from it (presumably a reference to Unilight). Nearby this I could just decipher some figures the last of which was a "7" the last number of Lot 577. Why were these signs obliterated? It is pointless to speculate. What is of importance is the conclusion to which I have come as a result of a careful consideration of Mr. Chow's affidavit the terms of the Crown Land Permit and my visit to the site. My conclusion of fact (which I consider established not on the balance of probabilities but beyond reasonable doubt) that the open area and the granite house are the premises the subject matter of the Crown Land Permit and that no part of the premises north of the line AX to B is. The only fact which could suggest outherwise is that the fence to the south-west side of the open area is curved rather than angular. 12. This is attributable to the fence a somewhat ramshackle affair having been pushed out of shape by the squatter huts adjacent to it over the years or to an error in the sketch attached to the Crown Land Permit. It is not of importance when set against all the other facts, the continuous nature of the old wall between AX to B, the siting of the dangerous goods store, the fact that its doors are marked oxygen/acetylene, its area, the fact that the granite house is the only granite house there and therefore that Mr. Chow must be in error when he says that a two storeyed house was the transformer house when the permit says that the granite house is the transformer house; all of these facts and the whole general appearance of the area make me certain that the permit area is the "open area" and the granite house. I have reached this conclusion without reference to the affidavits filed on behalf of the Ho family and in particular without reference to the lamentable disagreement on oath of the respective solicitors for the parties. I obviously cannot resolve that difference and I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by my sending the papers to the Attorney General with a view to investigation. If I thought there was any reasonable hope of proving which one of these officers of the court was guilty of perjury I would order an investigation at once but I can see no such hope. 13. It is as I have sought to make clear no part of my function here to decide any matter on which there is conflict on the affidavits and it is for that reason that I have confined my attention to Mr. Chow's affidavit, his exhibits and my own view of the site. As he has failed to persuade me that there is a triable issue that the bailiff entered on any Crown land I must dismiss this application with costs with a certificate for counsel.
Representation: Bernacchi, Q.C. and Edward Chan (R.W. Young & Co.) for plaintiff/applicant. Rodway (Philip K.H. Wong & Co.) for defendants/respondent. (1) (1975) 2 W.L.R. 316. (2) (1975) 3 W.L.R. 184. (3) (1975) H.K.L.R. 598. |