Yoo Soon Nam v. Attorney General
Read the full judgment text of HCA 2190/1975 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. The plaintiff, a Korean lady who was aged 32 at the time of the events with which we are concerned, names the Attorney General as defendant in this action for damages for alleged false imprisonment by officials of the Immigration Department. That the imprisonment took place at Bayview Police Station and lasted from 3.41 p.m. on 12th July 1975 until approximately 12.30 a.m. on 15th July of the same year, is admitted the defence being that the detention was lawful under the provisions of s.26 o
Cited by 3 cases
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ACTION NO. 2190 OF 1975 -----------------
----------------- Coram: Pickering, Ag. C.J. Date of Judgment: 6th August 1976. ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1. The plaintiff, a Korean lady who was aged 32 at the time of the events with which we are concerned, names the Attorney General as defendant in this action for damages for alleged false imprisonment by officials of the Immigration Department. That the imprisonment took place at Bayview Police Station and lasted from 3.41 p.m. on 12th July 1975 until approximately 12.30 a.m. on 15th July of the same year, is admitted the defence being that the detention was lawful under the provisions of s.26 of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115). 2. The plaintiff lived in Hong Kong from 1963 until 1971 with her husband from whom she was divorced in that latter year. She has a sister in Hong Kong and a daughter who was born in 1968 and for some years prior to 1971 she carried on business in the Colony selling goods by retail to visiting Korean seamen and other Koreans. She left the Colony for Korea on 9th November 1971 but returned illegally by ship on 3rd December 1973, a fact which was unknown to the Immigration Department. In December 1974 information was received by that department from the Korean Consulate in Hong Kong by way of a written memorandum, to the effect that the plaintiff had been arrested and prosecuted in 1972 in Korea on a charge of smuggling and that in December of that year she had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a fine of 400,000 Won. The memorandum contained the further information that the plaintiff was in Hong Kong at that time and was believed to have entered the Colony by illegal means since the Korean Departure records showed no trace of her exit from Korea. 3. Enquiries were made by the Immigration Department at various addresses in the Colony where it was thought that information might be obtained as to the whereabouts of the plaintiff and eventually, on 12th July 1975, Mr. Wong Man Fai, an Immigration Officer, working with an assistant, observed a lady who answered to the plaintiff's description outside No. 760 Nathan Road, Kowloon. The two followed her and called her name in Cantonese whereupon the plaintiff turned round and denied that she was Yoo Soon Nam. After the officers had identified themselves she admitted that she was Yoo Soon Nam and that on 3rd December 1973 she had returned to Hong Kong by air illegally; on being asked about her passport she said that she had destroyed it but that she had a Hong Kong Identity Card at her home. It was Mr. Wong's evidence that during this conversation the plaintiff was trying to escape by moving around and asking to go to the toilet, a facility which Mr. Wong said would be given to her at the first available opportunity. It is fair to say that no importance can be placed upon this allegation of attempted escape since, when the plaintiff gave evidence de bene esse prior to her removal from the Colony under s.19 of the Immigration Ordinance, she was not asked about any such attempt and in any event the arrest which was complained of was not the arrest by Mr. Wong but the subsequent detention under s.26, to which I will come. 4. Mr. Wong informed the plaintiff that the he was arresting her and his recollection is that he told her that the arrest was under s.56(1)(d) of the Immigration Ordinance which provides that an Immigration Officer may arrest and detain any person if he has reason to suspect that such person has committed an offence under the Ordinance. The offence suspected was that of having landed in Hong Kong without the permission of an Immigration Officer contrary to s.38(1). The plaintiff was thereupon taken by taxi to the Harbour Control Office of the Immigration Department where she declined to tell Mr. Wong how she had returned to the Colony or to give any further information, claiming that she did not know either Chinese or English. 5. The day was Saturday and the time about 1.50 p.m. and Mr. Wong telephoned his superior Mr. K.K. Pui at his home reminding him of the facts of the case and telling him that he had arrested the plaintiff who had admitted returning to the Colony illegally but who declined further information. Mr. Pui thereupon informed Mr. Wong that he wished to make further enquiries and asked Mr. Wong to send him the necessary memorandum for signature in order that the plaintiff might be detained under s.26(a) of the Immigration Ordinance. Since that 48-hour detention period was subsequently ordered to be extended for a further five days under s.26(b), it will be useful here to set out s.26 which reads as follows:
The 48-hour period of detention commenced at 15:41 on that Saturday afternoon, 12th July, and when it expired it was replaced by detention under a s.26(b) Order issued by a Principal Immigration Officer, Mr. David Mills. That further period of detention came to an abrupt halt at 12:30 a.m. on the morning following its commencement as the result of an order by a judge in chambers who had been approached for a writ of habeas corpus and who had ordered that the application for the writ of habeas corpus and who had ordered that the application for the writ be made by an originating motion to a judge in court and that in the meantime bail be granted to the plaintiff. I would have interpose that after various other legal steps had intervened, the plaintiff was flown back to Korea by virtue of a Removal Order signed by the Governor under s.19 of the Immigration Ordinance. No complaint is made in these proceedings as to the Removal Order. 6. Having received back from Mr. Pui the form authorising the plaintiff's detention for a period not exceeding 48 hours under s.26(a), Mr. Wong accompanied the plaintiff to Bayview Police Station where she was detained over the weekend. Mr. Mills, a Principal Immigration Officer and head of the Investigation Division of the Immigration Department, who subsequently signed the order under s.26(b) for the plaintiff's further detention for a period not exceeding five days, was informed of these events of Saturday, 12th July, by Mr. Pui upon Monday morning the 14th at around 9 or 9:30 but nothing further happened in regard to the plaintiff herself until about 4 p.m. that afternoon when she was interrogated by Mr. Wong in his office at which time she answered questions put to her and recorded in statement form but refused to sign the statement. On this occasion the services of a Korean interpreter were utilised. In cross-examination Mr. Wong said that the reason that the plaintiff had been kept in custody over the weekend was because there was no Korean interpreter available but he went on to say that he would not deny that when telephoned by her solicitor on Sunday morning the 13th of July he had given two reasons as being the only reasons for her detention namely that the department wanted to know her exact identity and status and that it was suspected that she had entered Hong Kong illegally. 7. Mr. Pui, in evidence, confirmed what Mr. Wong had told him in a telephone call to his house at about 1.50 p.m. of the 12th and said that he had issued the order for the plaintiff's detention under s.26(a) because she would not give further information so that further enquiries were needed and that, since she had once absconded in Korea, it appeared likely that she might abscond again if not detained; whilst, had a Korean interpreter been available on the afternoon of the 12th the plaintiff would then have been interrogated further, the fact that no such interpreter was available was not the reason that she was detained, the main reason for not pursuing enquiries on the 12th being that she had refused to give any further information. In further cross-examination Mr. Pui agreed that the reason for the plaintiff's detention was to interrogate her to get her to admit that she had entered the Colony illegally, he having in mind that if she did admit, the Governor could be asked to exercise his powers under s.19 of the Immigration Ordinance by making a Removal Order against the plaintiff. 8. Mr. Mills, the Principal Immigration Officer in charge of the Investigation Division of the Immigration Department, agreed that in theory the plaintiff could have been charged under s.38 with entering the Colony without the permission of an Immigration Officer but said that when he made his order under s.26(b) he was not satisfied that the plaintiff had given them the full story and he had no wish to go before a magistrate without full facts; the plaintiff's assertion that she had entered the Colony illegally by air (which proved to be untrue) was, in the witness's experience, unlikely since it was very difficult for persons arriving by air to escape the immigration procedure and it was entirely possible that she had arrived with some document which entitled her to be in the Colony and was guilty of merely over-staying rather than of illegal entry. She had been detained purely for enquiries coupled with the belief that she might abscond if she were not so detained. 9. The plaintiff's solicitor, Mr. Cotterill, gave evidence to the effect that he was approached by the plaintiff's sister on Sunday morning, 12th July, upon which morning he made various telephone calls to officials of the Immigration Department. In the course of one of those conversations he was told by a Mr. Lee that the plaintiff had been detained because no Korean interpreter was available until Monday. Mr. Lee, it is to be noted, was not the arresting officer nor was he the officer who had signed the detention order under s.26(a) and his precise connection with, and knowledge of, the case never became apparent. In another conversation that morning with Mr. Wong, who had arrested the plaintiff, Mr. Wong said that the only reason for the plaintiff's detention was that the department wished to establish her identity and status and to make enquiries as to how she could enter illegally. Again, Mr. Wong was not the officer who had made the detention order. 10. I will deal first with the suggestion that the real reason for the plaintiff's detention over the weekend was merely that it was said that no Korean interpreter was available whereas there was no evidence whatever of any attempt to obtain the services of such interpreter. It is true that no such attempt was made but I have asked myself what it would have availed had a Korean interpreter been produced. As I see it the answer must be "nothing". It was Mr. Wong's evidence that at the time when he arrested the plaintiff in the street she had first denied and then admitted that she was Yoo Soon Nam; she had understood questions as to how long she had been in Hong Kong and had replied giving the date of her last departure for Korea and stating that on 3rd December 1973 she had returned to the Colony by air illegally; she had understood a question about her passport and replied to the effect that she had destroyed it; she had further understood a question regarding her possible possession of any travel document or identity card and had said that she could not produce any but that at her home she had a Hong Kong Identity Card; subsequently in the office she had repeated that she had re-entered Hong Kong illegally but had refused further details and had refused to sign a statement prepared by Mr. Wong as to what had passed between them in the street. 11. All this conversation took place in Cantonese and Mr. Wong described the plaintiff as speaking fluent Cantonese. At a later date when the plaintiff came to give evidence de bene esse before a registrar, the interpreter, who was admittedly interpreting in the Korean language, was asked by the registrar whether or not the plaintiff understood Cantonese and replied that she did and would be able to understand what the Immigration Officer had said to her. This assertion is perhaps of little value since the interpreter was interpreting between the English and Korean languages and I have no evidence as to his knowledge of Cantonese or his source of belief that the plaintiff spoke that language. Mr. Wong's evidence, however, is impressive as disclosing that the plaintiff participated in a quite lengthy conversation about her identity, movements with dates, passport and identity card. I find as a fact that the plaintiff understands Cantonese and speaks it with fluency. In the light of her refusal, in a language which she spoke fluently, to give any further information there would have been little point in obtaining there and then, or even on Sunday, the services of a Korean interpreter in order that she might repeat her refusal in her native tongue. In finding that the plaintiff understands Cantonese and speaks it with fluency I have not overlooked the fact that her conversations with her solicitor were conducted through the medium of a Korean interpreter. Mr. Cotterill said in evidence that he did not speak Cantonese and from the fact that an interpreter was used from English to Korean and vice versa it is apparent that he does not speak Korean. Some interpretation was therefore necessary and it seems to me quite natural that if an interpreter speaking the client's native tongue was available such an interpreter would be used despite the fact that interpretation from English to Cantonese and back might well have been adequate. Mr. Cotterill, of course, had the services of a Korean interpreter readily available since he had utilized such a person in taking instructions from the plaintiff's sister. 12. I have referred to Mr. Wong's evidence that the plaintiff admitted to him that she had re-entered Hong Kong illegally. In her evidence de bene esse the plaintiff denied having made any such admission. I did not take her evidence de bene esse with the result that whilst I saw and heard Mr. Wong in the witness-box I had no such advantage in respect of the plaintiff. Nevertheless upon this issue I accept the evidence of Mr. Wong and reject that of the plaintiff. 13. The fact of detention being undisputed the question is whether such detention was lawful within the meaning of s.26 of the Immigration Ordinance. That section requires an officer of the appropriate rank to be "satisfied" that enquiry for the purposes of the ordinance is necessary and that the person to be detained may abscond if not detained. Mr. Donnelly submits that in reaching the decision to detain no discretion was exercised or that, if it was, it was not exercised judicially. It is Mr. Donnelly's contention that there should have been an independent enquiry into the truth of the information received from the Korean Consulate to the effect that the plaintiff had been sentenced to imprisonment in Korea and had thereafter absconded from that country. In support of his argument Mr. Donnelly quoted the case of Labouchere v. The Earl of Wharncliffe(1) a case in which the plaintiff was restored to the use and benefit of his club upon a number of grounds one of which was that before expulsion from the club there should have been a fair enquiry into the truth of certain alleged facts concerning the plaintiff in that case. I do not think that the case assists the present plaintiff because there the club rule which gave rise to the court's assertion that there should be a fair enquiry into the truth of the alleged facts went as follows:-
Inherent in that rule lay the necessity for enquiry before a member could be called upon to resign. In s.26 of the Immigration Ordinance there is no such condition precedent and indeed one of the very purposes of detention is for subsequent enquiry. 14. Irrespective of the Labouchere case(1) however, it was Mr. Donnelly's contention that it was incumbent upon the immigration officials to make their own enquiries as to the truth or otherwise of the information contained in the memorandum from the Korean Consulate concerning the plaintiff. It is well-known that certain countries are not above requesting the extradition of their subjects from foreign countries upon the ground of alleged criminal offences whereas in fact the true reason for requiring the return of the individual concerned is political and that is the reason that in some jurisdictions it has been considered desirable to set up specialist extradition tribunals. I am not suggesting that the true reasons for requiring the return of the plaintiff to Korea were political or that it is the habit of the South Korean authorities to disguise their motives in any such manner. But the decision as to whether to accept at its face value information received from a foreign consulate in Hong Kong or whether to make an independent check of the accuracy of that information is a political and not a judicial decision and there is nothing in the Ordinance imposing any duty to make such an independent check and nothing to stultify the acceptance at its face value of information so received. I am of the view that there was nothing improper in the Department's acting upon the information received from the Korean Consulate without independent enquiry as to its veracity. 15. Turning to the degree to which the Immigration Officials concerned must be "satisfied" of the matters referred to in s.26 Mr. Donnelly cited certain cases from the matrimonial jurisdiction of the English courts including Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones(2), Blyth v. Blyth(3) and Bastable v. Bastable(4) in the last mentioned of which the directions contained in various statements made by members of the House of Lords in the first two cases were described as not altogether easy to follow. In those earlier two cases the suggestion that the standard of proof required in regard to adultery and to condonation is that beyond reasonable doubt, was probably obiter but what can be discerned from the third case is that in regard to adultery a high standard of proof, though not amounting to proof beyond reasonable doubt, is required. 16. I do not consider that for our present purpose any assistance is to be derived from a consideration of the standards applicable to the field of matrimonial law. 17. Mr. Somerville, for the Crown, approached the matter somewhat differently. He did not seek to shelter behind the subjective test adopted by four of their Lordships in the House of Lords in the case of Liversidge v. Anderson(1). In this he was clearly right for until that case such expressions as "reasonable cause to believe" the phrase there under consideration - had involved an objective test, by an independent tribunal, of the reasonableness claimed for the conduct which was impugned. I know of no exception to that until the case of Liversidge v. Anderson created a wrinkle in the fabric of English law upon the subject. Until then the objective test had always been available against any person, rich or poor, powerful or weak; but in that case such test was abandoned by the majority of the House largely upon the ground that the person in whom the power was vested was a Secretary of State whose conduct was apparently to be judged upon a different basis from that of, for example, a police constable. The decision may be said to have put back the clock, under the exigency of national emergency, in declaring executive action of the type with which we are here concerned as not being subject to judicial review. In truth our law would be largely paralysed if it did not constantly appraise, by objective tests, the reasonableness and unreasonableness of conduct. That has been recognized in that there has been some retraction from the anomalous position adopted by the majority in Liversidge v. Anderson(5), something of a return to the objective standard and an appreciation of the force underlying Lord Atkin's dissenting speech in that case. 18. Recognizing this, Mr. Somerville suggests that the test which should be adopted by this court is to be drawn from Lord Atkin's dissenting speech in Liversidge v. Anderson(5) and from the principle adopted in Ross Clunis v. Papadopoullos(6) I have not derived direct assistance from the dissenting speech of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson. Certainly in that case the learned Law Lord clung tenaciously, and in my respectful view rightly, to the historical objective test in regard to the phrase "reasonable cause to believe". But the state of mind with which we are here concerned is "satisfied" and in regard to that, Lord Atkin appeared to concede without giving any authority for the concession, that where that word was employed in the Defence Regulations it gave unlimited discretion to the Secretary of State assuming only that he acted in good faith. More pertinent to the present discussion is the case of Ross Clunis v. Papadopoullos. In that case a Commissioner in Cyprus had power to impose collective fines on the assessable inhabitants of an area by reason of the commission of a series of offences in that area for which the Commissioner had reason to believe that the inhabitants had been generally responsible. No order for a collective fine could be made however unless an enquiry had been held by the Commissioner and, in holding such an enquiry the Commissioner was required to "satisfy himself" that the inhabitants of the area were given adequate opportunity of understanding the subject matter of the enquiry and making representations thereon. The Privy Council rejected the submission that the test as to whether the Commissioner had discharged the duty to "satisfy himself", was a wholly subjective test and said that if it could be shown that there were no grounds on which he could be so satisfied, the Court might infer either that he did not honestly form that view or that, in forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts. This, as it seems to me, is the test which should be applied in the present case. The question is whether or not the appropriate official had grounds for being satisfied that enquiry for the purposes of the Ordinance was necessary and that the plaintiff might abscond if she was not detained - and that is the sole test. It may be that his satisfaction is misplaced but that matters not if it be genuine and if there exist grounds upon which the satisfaction could be based. In the case of Liversidge v. Anderson(5) Lord Atkin said:
19. It seems to me that similar considerations must apply to an immigration officer's state of satisfaction and that if there were grounds which could lead to that state, and if the state of mind was genuine, then any detention resulting therefrom was lawful. 20. Mr. Donnelly has put forward the case of Nakkuda Ali v. M.F. De S. Jayaratne(7) as reinforcing his contention that the test is objective. But it is to be observed that in that case the phrase under discussion was "reasonable grounds to believe" whereas here we are dealing with the term "satisfied" unqualified by any such words as "upon reasonable grounds". In Harwood v. Frost(8), also a case of alleged false imprisonment, it was held by the Court of Appeal that to be "satisfied" with a state of things, means to be honestly satisfied in your own mind but does not, by itself, mean that reasonable care is to be taken to make enquiries before being satisfied. Similarly the effect of the Court of Appeal's decision in Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning(9) was that the courts could not examine the Minister's decision that he was "satisfied" that an order was requisite for dealing satisfactorily with extensive war damage, from the angle that the phrase meant satisfied on reasonable grounds. Thus it appears to me that the extent of the qualification which it is open to the court to apply to the term "satisfied" in s.26 of the Immigration Ordinance is limited to that described in Ross Clunis v. Papadopoullos(6) that is to say that if it could be shown that there were no grounds upon which the officer could be so satisfied it would be open to the court to infer either that he did not honestly form that view - and bad faith is not alleged - or that, in forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts. Applying that test to the facts of the present case, the Immigration Department officials had information from a source likely to be credible that the plaintiff had absconded from Korea after being there sentenced to a term of imprisonment; they had her own admission that she had entered Hong Kong illegally but that admission was complicated by the fact that the method by which she asserted she had so returned to Hong Kong was one to which it was difficult to assign any credibility. In those circumstances the officers of the department had a considerable interest and indeed a duty to make enquiries as to how in fact the plaintiff had returned to the Colony for it is their responsibility upon becoming aware of a leak in the immigration procedures to trace the source thereof and thereafter to plug the leak. As to being satisfied that the plaintiff may abscond if she were not detained, she was a woman who, upon credible information, had left Korea by secret means in order to avoid a term of imprisonment in that country; who had compelling reasons for not wishing to return to that country; who had returned to Hong Kong illegally and knew that this fact was now known to the Immigration authorities; who must also have known that, as a result, her expulsion from the Colony by one method or another was a distinct possibility and who must have appreciated that in the event of expulsion the most likely destination would be her own country where she would probably be imprisoned. There thus existed the strongest temptation to avoid further attentions of any sort from the Immigration Department and the practical method of effecting this result would have been to go to ground. It was Mr. Donnelly's contention that Mr. Mills' evidence to the effect that he feared that this was exactly what would happen, went further than anything pleaded in the Defence. With this I am unable to agree for the Defence pleaded that the detention was lawful by virtue of the provisions of s.26 of the Immigration Ordinance thereby, by inference, asserting that the detention had been made on the ground (inter alia) that the plaintiff may abscond if not detained. Against that background of events I am quite unable to say that there were no grounds upon which the officials responsible for the plaintiff's initial detention and for its extension could have been satisfied of the matters as to which they were required so to be satisfied before detaining the plaintiff. 21. It was nonetheless Mr. Donnelly's contention that Mr. Pui had admitted that the real purpose of the plaintiff's detention was to get her to admit illegal entry in order that the Governor could be asked to exercise his power of removal under s.19 of the Immigration Ordinance. What in fact Mr. Pui said was that he "had in mind" that if she admitted illegal entry the Governor could be asked so to exorcise his powers. In fact the plaintiff had already admitted illegal entry and it is apparent that the purpose of further enquiry was not to elicit a duplicate admission but to find out how she had re-entered the Colony. In any event the intention of ultimately applying to the Governor for a Removal Order was not said by Mr. Pui to be the only reason for her detention and it could perfectly well co-exist with the fact that of there being legitimate matter for enquiry coupled with a belief that the plaintiff may well abscond if not detained. 22. Finally it was contended that the plaintiff ought to have been told the reason for her detention, as to this it was said by Viscount Simon in Christie v. Leachinsky(10) that the requirement that a person arrested should be informed of the reason why he had been seized naturally does not exist if the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained. It seems to me that must apply here. The plaintiff knew that she was dealing with immigration officials; she had admitted to them her illegal re-entry; she had declined to give details and it must have been apparent to her that the purpose of her detention was to endeavour to elicit further information from her and that the fact of physical confinement was a reflection of the belief that she might otherwise abscond. At the same time it would put the matter beyond doubt if the procedure was tightened up so that in these cases the detainee is served with a document having specific reference to the matters contained in s.26 of the Ordinance. In the present case the only person served appears to have been the Station Sergeant at Bayview Police Station who received Mr. Pui's memorandum which was headed "Request for detention under s.26(a) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115)" and which requested the detention of the plaintiff on grounds which, apart from the reference to s.26(a), were not further detailed. 23. For these reasons the plaintiff's action is dismissed with costs. 24. Lest however, another court should take a different view as to the defendant's liability, it is incumbent upon me to state what damages I would have awarded had I myself reached a different conclusion upon that issue. No special damages are claimed though one might have expected the plaintiff to have claimed the cost to her of the legal process which had to be employed to secure her liberty. The primary question is whether or not exemplary damages would be called for. It seems to me that they would. In Rookes v. Barnard(11) Lord Devlin analysed the categories of cases "in which an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength of the law and thus affording a practical justification for admitting into the civil law a principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal". His Lordship went on:-
25. That principle has never been disapproved. Mr. Somerville submits that there was nothing "oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional" in the behaviour of the Immigration Officers. Should another court come to a conclusion that the detention did amount to false imprisonment, I do not think it could be said that the behaviour was arbitrary for even the plaintiff's counsel does not allege bad faith. The false imprisonment, if such it ever be held to be, was however unconstitutional and, in its effect, oppressive; and unconstitutional and oppressive acts by servants of the government attract exemplary damages. 26. In assessing such damages I would be influenced by two facts. First it would have been open to the Immigration authorities to have charged the plaintiff on Saturday, 12th July with illegal entry and to have placed her in police custody until Monday morning to appear before a magistrate when she might or might not have obtained bail. In this sense it could be said that the Immigration Officers had merely gone the wrong way about securing the right result. In qualification of that it must be appreciated that had the successful application for habeas corpus not intervened, the plaintiff would have been detained for up to seven days and not merely until the Monday morning. The second fact which would influence my assessment is that I do not think that it can be doubted that the government servants responsible for the plaintiff's detention believed that they were acting lawfully. In Wilkes v. Wood(12) it was said that a belief that the act impugned was lawful could be pleaded in mitigation of damages. Such a belief was here pleaded. 27. Making due allowance for these factors, if the detention should be held to constitute unlawful imprisonment, it would be both unconstitutional and oppressive and I would assess the damages at $40,000. Representation: J.D. Donnelly (Hampton, Winter & Glynn) for Plaintiff Somerville for Crown/Defendant. (1) 13 Ch. D. 346 (2) 1951 A.C. 391 (3) 1966 2 W.L.R. 634 (4) 1968 1 W.L.R. 1684 (5) 1942 A.C. 286. (6) 1958 2 A.E.R. 23. (7) 1951 A.C. 66 (8) 14 T.L.R. 306. (9) 1947 K.B. 702. (10) 1947 A.C. 573. (11) 1964 A.C. 1129, 1226. (12) (1763) Lofft. 1. |